Sentencing policy and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 by Shiels, Robert Sinclair
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Shiels, Robert Sinclair (1987) Sentencing policy and the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971. PhD thesis 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6951/   
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
SENTENCING POLICY AND THE MISUSE OF DRUGS ACT 1971 
ROBERT SINCLAIR SHIELS 
DEGREE OF PH.D. 
DEPARTMENT OF PRIVATE LAW 
FACULTY OF LAW AND FINANCIAL STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
MARCH 1987 
ROBERT SINCLAIR SHIELS 
1987 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk 
BEST COpy AVAILABLE. 
TEXT IN ORIGINAL IS 
CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF 
THE PAGE 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk 
TEXT CUT OFF IN THE 
ORIGINAL 
Sentencing Policy and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 
PART ONE: TABLES 
a. Declaration 
b. Summary 
c. Acknowledgement 
d. Tables of Reference 
PART TWO: BACKGROUND 
Chapter 1 History and Literature Paragraph 
1 Introduction 1.1 
2 Sentencing Literature 1.10 
3 Methodology 1.26 
-
4 Controlled Drug Literature 1.32 
PART THREE: OFFENCES 
Chapter 2 Offences and Sentences Paragraph 
1 Introduction 2.1 
2 Section 3 2.16 
3 Section 4 2.49 
4 Section 5 2.71 
5 Section 6 2.104 
6 Section 8 2.11 
7 Section 9 2.116 
8 Section 9A 2.117 
9 Section 11 2.118 
10 Section 12 2.119 
11 Section 13 2.120 
12 Section 17 2.121 
13 Section 18 2.122 
14 Section 19 2.123 
15 Section 20 2.125 
16 Section 23 2.128 
17 Section 27 2.129 
Chapter 3 Speciali ties Paragraph 
1 Conspiracy 3.1 
2 Couriers 3.16 
3 Addicts 3.27 
4 Deportation 3.43 
-i-
Chapter 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions 
Sentencing Powers 
Prior Writings 
Conclusions 
Tables 
PART ONE: TABLES 
Declaration 
Paragraph 
4.1 
4.6 
4.18 
Appendix 
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academic writings. 
Summary 
Until recently sentencing was not considered to be a separate subject 
within the discipline of law. It was thought to be a matter 
essentially for judges. Sentencing was not taught as such. Rather, 
on ascending to the bench lawyers took with them their experience of 
the law in practice and their knowledge of their powers as limited 
by statute. Thereafter there was little in the way of guidance. In 
the last quarter century sentencing has developed in a number of ways. 
Parliament has passed an increasing number of laws creating and 
limiting new powers. Academic commentators have analysed judgements 
and they have sought to establish a scheme of things to do with 
sentencing. Judges themselves have tended increasingly to explain 
their decisions and to develop an order of priorities. This work 
is a study of the sentencing policy laid down in judicial decisions 
in cases of contraventions of The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. By 
studying the sentencing decisions in reported cases of drugs offences, 
a legal model of the drugs trade is established. Such a model in 
broad terms follows the nature and terms of the offences contained in 
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. But it is clear that there are certain 
aspects that cut across the conventional order of offences. In 
particular, the sentencing of drug addicts has posed difficult 
questions for the courts to consider. It is uncertain as to whether 
lawyers have grasped fully the implications of drug abuse on the 
scale practiced by most addicts. This particular study has been 
completed in the context of the present literature relating to 
sentencing offenders. The law is predominantly that of England and 
Wales because that is the jurisdiction with the greatest number of 
reported cases. Consideration is given to both Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. The Law is stated as at 31st December 1986. 
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PART TWO: BACKGROUND 
Chapter 1 HISTORY AND LITERATURE 
1.1 This work purports to be a study of judicial attitudes and 
decisions on sentencing drug offenders with a view to 
determining judicial policy. Judges do not live or work in an 
intellectual or social vacuum. Their thoughts on drug offenders 
are frequently reflected with the legal principles discussed in 
their jUdgements. The growth of a sentencing policy for drug 
offenders is paralleled by the development of the subject of 
sentencing, the literature of the latter having grown 
considerably in recent years. 
1.2 But what is meant exactly by "decisions on sentencing"? There 
are in Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland few reported 
decisions at the first level or the trial stage. The vast 
majority of reported cases studied here are appeals against 
sentence. This is not a study of appeals involving a question of 
law or a question of fact or on any other ground which may appear 
to be a sufficient ground of appeal. 
1.3 Many, but not all, of the considerations relevant to the types of 
appeal specified above apply equally to appeal against sentence. 
It has been observed (1) that two significant exceptions arise 
from the nature of the appeals against sentence. In such an 
appeal: 
"a. the High Court do not need a transcription of 
the trial judge's charge (if any); 
b. there are only two possible issues, competency 
and severity." 
At its simplist the reported cases considered in this work are 
all appeals against sentences imposed by trial judges and which 
are thought to be too severe. 
~ ~ 
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1.4 Matters are more complex than might be assumed from the simple 
assertion above. In the first place sentencing policy, in 
England and Wales especially, is very much a question of 
relativities with each case being considered in relation to what 
is or might be the worst case of the same criminality. Secondly, 
the most recent developments from how the executive's expressed 
intention of "doing something" about the profit made from selling 
controlled drugs. The law in this regard, although being 
concerned with sentencing, will almost certainly involve appeals 
unrelated to severity but possibly related to competency. 
Thirdly, relativity exists within the range of offences of 
controlled drugs but also in relation to other crimes but in 
R v Hunt(2) a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in the House of Lords 
observed that offences involving controlled drugs are "amongst 
the most serious in the criminal calendar." 
1.5 Perhaps 'it is best now to declare an interest. The justification 
for this is found in an observation of Professor Hall Williams 
that: 
"The study of crime is carried out by many scholars 
from the point of view of their different disciplines 
and sometimes (though rarely and with difficulty) through 
interdisciplinary studies. The most common approach to 
the study of crime is to start from the point of view and 
follow the interests and emphasis of one's own particular 
discipline. Indeed any other approach is fraught with 
danger." (3) 
In short, the discipline sets the approach and the approach the 
result. The interest declared then is that this work has been 
written by a Solicitor in Scotland who either prosecutes in the 
courts in Glasgow regularly or is involved in the preparation of 
cases for prosecution. (4) 
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1.6 Within the Procurator Fiscal Service The Book of Regulations 
provides the general rules governing the policy and practice of 
prosecuting crime in Scotland. In relation to sentencing it is 
said that: 
"Sentence is a matter for the court. The Procurator 
Fiscal must not suggest a sentence but he should 
draw the court's attention to any mandatory sentence. 
The Procurator Fiscal must be aware of the court's 
power of sentence both in general and in ~elation to 
particular offences. This is especially important in 
Indictment cases where there is no notice of pently." (5) 
But it must be emphasised that this work is not restricted to 
Scotland and that the bulk of the convictions occur in England 
and Wales. There have been a few reported decisions in Northern 
Ireland. 
1.7 The aims of this work are as follows:-
(1) To consider the framework of the legislation and common law 
for the disposal of any drug-related case before the courts; 
(2) To analyse subsiduary or supporting legislation which appears 
in drug-related cases to be of considerable importance; 
(3) To consider the development of the legislation and also 
judicial attitudes as a means of assessing drug-related 
activities; 
(4) To decide whether existing legislation can be shown to be 
ineffective to meet drug-related criminal activities. 
It may assist to have these aims explained to some extent. The 
framework of the law of controlled drugs represents 'Parliament's 
view of the problem. The case law shows how that law is 
developed. It has been suggested above that different 
disciplines may have varying views of the same problem. However, 
in defence of lawyers, the words of Professor Blondel may be 
cited for he said, admittedly in a different context, that; 
A.· 
• 
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"Lawyers are unquestionably over concerned with 
formal institutions; the criticisms levelled 
against them have much justification. But it is 
important to see why legal studies have played a 
large part in political analys~ reality, though 
not wholly governed by formal rules, is moulded by 
them to a large extent. Formal rules often contain 
and therefore influence behaviour." (emphasis added).(6) 
1.8 In explaining the aims stated it may assist to consider a 
theoretical tool which has for some time been used to advantage 
by sociologist and criminologists. That tool is the "model" and 
it has been described as 
" an artificial accentration of reality to elucidate 
the conflict and tension which exists in any particular 
legal system between essentially opposing values."(7) 
Models have been used widely for various studies and that 
includes sentencing. Professor Nigel Walker's influential book 
Sentencing in a Rational Society contains an important sentencing 
model (8) and this approach has been adopted by others (9). One 
of the most recent examples of models is contained in James 
Bakalar and Lester Gunspoons' Drug Control in a Free Society. 
The authors' aim is to review the peculiar medical, legal and 
social status of drugs by examining the formal and informal 
controls used in modern industrial societies and comparing them 
with other methods that have been or might have been used. In 
pursing their aim the authors postriate a number of "models" of 
drug control. The essence of these models:-
(1) the "vice" model of drug control which consists of putting 
the burden of criminal sanctions entirely on the grower, 
manufacturer and distributor rather than the user. This model 
seeks to cut off the drug supply where it is concentrated in the 
fewest hands. (10). 
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(2) the "consumer or medical" model of drug control also dictates 
that users are left alone since they are "at most the 
victims." (11) 
(3)the "disease-crime" model seeks to arrest drug-users as 
criminals and then impose on them §s sick people. This raises 
various philosophical questions (12). 
An earlier use of the model in the drugs context was that of 
Dr Martin Plant in his important book Drug Takers in an English 
Town: 
"The 'medical model' of drug taking as intrinsically 
and invariably harmful has been generally accepted. 
This model is consistent with the legal proscription 
of certain types of drugs." (13). 
The author criticises the model as ignoring the possibility that 
drug-takers may regard their behaviour differently, and that they 
might view drug-taking as valuable within their own terms of 
reference. Dr Plant's study then is of the subjective attitudes 
of the users to the durgs, to each other and to the law. This 
sustained sociological analysis draws heavily on the concept of 
anomie to produce in essence "a users model". (14). 
1.9 The aggregate of the aims of this work is to produce a legal 
model of drug control - based firmly on the 1971 Act - by means 
• of "standardised, systematic procedures" (15). The hypothesis is 
that there is a strategy behind the sentencing policy, that 
strategy being rooted in the 1971 Act but going beyond it. If 
this matter is tackled with a little less than full confidence or 
if there are any other uncertainties then it is encouraging to be 
reminded by Dr Keith Bottomley that: 
"Neither the study of crime rates nor the analysis 
of individual criminal behaviour need necessarily be 
aimed at the discovery of casual relationships of any 
king. Provided that the precise nature and objects of 
the exercise are made clear, useful purposes may be 
1.10 
served by research which is aimed at the discovery of 
facts and associations which improve the identification, 
prediction or other manipulation of crime at the societal 
or individual level." (16). 
It is hoped that the research in this study amounts to "useful 
purposes" but now a review of the relevant literature must be 
attempted. 
Sentencing Literature 
Dr Andrew Ashworth has said that: 
"The principal sources of English sentencing law 
are two fold: Legislation and judicial decisions. 
Academic writings might also be said to be a source, 
in a broad sence." (17). 
Much the same - but not exactly the same - can be said about 
Scotland. (18). Regretably, in practice many legal text books 
dealing with English law of sentencing either make no reference 
to Scotland or Northern Ireland or only make passing mention. 
Scotland 
Any intellectual approach to Scots criminal law must be with a 
heavy heart for, as Sheriff Gordon says, echoing Hume: 
"The dearth of literature and authority in Scotland 
is not due only to the fact that a small country offers 
fewer examples of criminal activity than does a large 
one. Criminal law has long been neglected by Scots 
lawyers." (19) 
But for sentencing the general approach of Parliament has been 
similar in the three home countries: Statutes passed establish 
the legal framework of the sentencing powers of the courts and 
supplement existing common law powers. These statutes establish 
the upper level for the exercise of the powers of the Court but 
within that restriction judges have a very broad discretion. The 
result of the exercise of judicial discretion is judicial 
decisions. 
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But, again, as Sheriff Gordon tells us: 
"The position is not very much better with regard to 
case law. Since 1913 there has been very few reports 
of criminal trials, so that it is difficult to know 
what actually goes on in the criminal courts, 
especially the summary ones." 
And later: 
"There has also been a tendency for judges to 
deliver very short opinions in criminal appeals 
and to avoid detailed discussion of principle or 
authority." (20) 
It is clear that this judicial reluctance to opine at any length 
applies equally to appeals on matters of law and of sentnece. 
Futher, in Scotland the central role of the Crown Office is such 
that while the task of that establishment is directed at 
obtaining balance and consistency in the prosecution of crime, 
the decisions there are essentially administrative and therefore 
are not subject to judicial review. (21) 
1.11 Thus, in Scotland the modern statutes affecting sentencing have 
not been illuminated by judicial decisions or other legal 
commentary to any great extent. Indeed, it would be an incorrect 
proposition to state that legislation is the only source of 
~ sentencing policy in Scotland but it might reasonably be argued 
that of the two sources referred to by Dr Ashworth, judicial 
decisions are the far weaker source. There remains, of course, 
academic writings: in an earlier age Hume in his Commentaries on 
the Law of Scotland Respecting Crime analysed the then criminal 
law. The learned author considered, generally speaking, the 
common law and the statutory provisions of criminal law and 
procedure but many of the cases cited include the sentence 
simply as a means of indicating for the sake of completeness 
how the trial ended. Still, Hume does define a sentence as: 
1.12 
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"the act of the Court pronounced in pursuance 
of the verdict, and applying the law to the 
fact, as found by the assize." (22) 
The analysis continues to divide sentences into either of the 
categories of a sentence absolvitor or sentence condemnator (23). 
The latter is "such as passes on a verdict which affixes some 
strain of guilt to the pannel." (24). These matters are to be 
found in Chapter XVII of Commentaries and the great work 
concludes (25) with brief notes of the "several sorts of 
punishment" being a general description of the powers then 
available to the Court. 
Later works on Scots criminal law tend not to be as analytical 
as Hume but more descriptive so that Alison's Principles and 
Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland, Anderson's The Criminal 
Law of Scotland and Macdonald's A Practical Treatise on the 
Criminal Law of Scotland contribute little to sentencing. The 
modern exposition of the criminal law by Sheriff Gordon is 
substantial but neither of the two editions considers sentencing 
except to state statutory maxima. Renton and Brown on Scots 
criminal procedure does consider sentencing but in terms of what 
Scots j~dges and justices may do. There is no explanation of 
what the bench ought to consider doing or why they have done 
whatever it is that they have done. It contains some reference 
to what few authorities there are (26) but Renton and Brown 
itself does not consider the principles. 
Perhaps now is the correct point at which to indicate the 
distinction that exists between the law of sentencing and the 
principles of sentencing. The former is concerned with what 
powers a bench has and what the authority is for that power and 
the extent of it. The latter is concerned with the rules that 
are applied or ought generally to be applied when deciding what 
power is to be used and the extent to which that power is 
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applied: or so it is submitted. In summary, the Scots texts 
seem to have dealt adequately with the former through various 
editions but with a virtually complete neglect of the latter. 
Sheriff Nicholson's The Law and Practice of Sentencing in 
Scotland is the first of our texts to deal with both aspects of 
the distinction, as the title would suggest. The aim of the book 
is put in context: 
"From the earliest days the sentencing of convicted 
offenders has played a major part in our criminal 
justice system, but despite the increasing complexity 
of the law and procedural rules relating to it, 
despite its growing social and economic consequences, 
and despite the enhanced public interest that now 
surrounds it, there has been no textbook in Scotland 
which has treated sentencing as a subject in itself, 
separate from other aspects of general criminal law 
and procedure. This book is an attempt to repair that 
ommission." (27) 
It was only four years after that statement that a supplement was 
published indicating the speed of change. In a review of that 
supplement Lord Hunter, then a Senator of the College of Justice, 
opined that: 
"It is thought that the time is approaching when 
a much more comprehensive and detailed treatment 
of the sentencing process in relation to particular 
crimes and offences should find its way into a Scottish 
textbook. Such treatment by an author, who has himself 
had practical experience, would be of much greater 
value to both the judiciary and practitioners than any 
number of disconnected articles and programmes by 
academic researchers, who sometimes lack the objectivity 
which such a study requires." (28) 
These observations raise a number of difficult questions: not all 
judges in England have been happy with the academic analysis of 
their jUdgements. But who else is to do such a job as is 
suggested? The entire subject is such now that few practitioners 
can master the topic and write about it. And when in Scotland 
did academic researchers ever lack "objectivity" or, to put the 
1.14 
1.15 
-10-
matter another way, what is the "objectivity" that is required? 
England and Wales 
Parliament has been especially active for England and Wales in 
the field of criminal justice with a complete restructuring of 
sentencing options to include new and wider powers, for example 
youth custody and detention centre training and also part-
suspended imprisonment. Academic writings and commentaries have 
spread accordingly. It is interesting to note that for Engligh 
law there seems to be no established meaning of the term 
'sentence'. The nearest that there is to a definition is that 
included in Section 50 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 which 
provides for the purposes of that Act, that: 
"Sentence ... '. includes any order made by a 
court when dealing with an offender including 
a hospital order .... and a recommendation for 
deportation .... " 
Futher, while Scots law is sometimes said to be a system based 
on principle, rather than precedent (29), English law proceeds 
on precedent. There is in England and Wales a far greater 
tendency for judicial comment, analysis and explanation and this 
is apparent especially in durgs cases. Accordingly, there is an 
extensive literature on all aspects of the sentences of the 
English courts and the enormous business has a tendency to 
generate its own momentum. 
One of the most recent of English writers on sentencing has said 
that: 
"The sentencing of offenders is a subject which maybe 
considered from many different points of view. There 
is the high philosophical approach, which seeks to 
explain and provide a moral justification for the 
infliction of punishment by society upon offenders. 
There is the criminological and sociological approach, 
which describes what the various forms of sentence entail 
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as far as the person undergoing the sentence is 
concerned, and may also suggest what sentences are 
the most effective in deterring and/or reforming 
criminals. There is the approach which concentrates 
upon the decisions of the Court of Appeal, seeking to 
extract from those decisions an approved sentencing 
pattern for common types of crime." (30) 
It is submitted that elements of that description are revealed 
in the article of the academic writings that follows, an article 
that does not purport to be wholly comprehensive but rather 
highlights the more important contribution. The different 
approaches suggest various early works but for present purposes a 
start may be made with Leo Page's The Sentence of the Court 
published in 1948. This small book is essentially a monograph on 
the philosophy behind the sentencing powers of the English courts 
at that date. The findings in the book are based on the author's 
own observation as, for example, chairman of the committee of 
management of a Remand Home. In comparison with modern texts 
Mr Page's approach is highly subjective and many of the 
statements result from an argument from the particular to the 
general. It is worth noting that the author felt that the 
novelty of his study was such that he had to apologise for 
his: 
"boldness is criticizing old-established legal 
practice and convention." (31) 
and also: 
"It is with diffidence that one discusses the 
right aim of legal punishment qjnce there is 
necessarily implied a criticism of preset-day 
practice even in the higher courts." (32) 
The paralled development of the discipline of criminology in the 
universities clearly affected the literature of sentencing. 
Professor Herman Mannheim of the London School or Economics and 
Political Science is an important figure in that development as 
he was responsible for two influential articles in 1958 (33). 
The subtle influence of a good teacher is reflected in the 
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achievements of a pupil. A graduate of LSE, Roger Hood, produced 
a small but important study in 1962: Sentencing in Magistrates 
Courts: A Study in Variations of Policy owed its origins to the 
simple observation that the use of prison sentences by different 
magistrates courts in England shows considerable variations. 
Again the novelty of such a work is shown by Dr Hood's statement 
in discussing the value of explanatory research that: 
"The material will be presented so that the facts 
can be primarily seen as possile explanatory factors 
accounting for local differences in practice. There 
is no intention of criticising the decisions taken in 
any of the courts. It will be critical only in the 
sense that various readers might see these factors as 
invalid criteria for administering justice." (34) 
Dr Hood's study was not concerned with individual judges (35) but 
rather with how magistrates in different areas dealt with broadly 
comparable offences and offenders. Notwithstanding Dr Hood's 
apology cited above, the result of his study was to show some 
disturbing features for by means of objective criteria and 
statistical evidence he indicated disparities in sentencing 
policies. The study appeared at a time when the idea of a 
separate law of sentencing was beginning to gel. The highly 
influential Streatfeld Committee (36) had alerted the legal 
profession and other interested parties to the fact of increasing 
complexities in this area of law. The Report of the Committee 
is now a fundamental document in the literature of sentencing and 
not least was its considerations of the philosophy or theories of 
sentencing. The Committee recognised five objects of sentencing: 
(1) The retribution or denunciatory theory of punishment which 
sought to make the punishment fit the crime; 
(2) The general deterrence theory of punishment which sought to 
deter potential offenders by example from committing the same 
offence; 
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(3) The specific deterrence theory of punishment which sought to 
deter the particular offender from offending again; 
(4) The preventive theory of punishment which sought to prevent 
the particular offender from trying society again by 
incarcerating him for a long period; 
(5) The rehabilitative theory of punishment which sought to 
enable the offender to fake his place as a responsible and law-
abiding member of society; 
Mr Keith Devlin referred to these at the "commonly identified 
aims" and added that: 
"The practical outcome of these theories can be 
observed in the reports of the judgements of the 
higher criminal courts ..... " (37) 
About four years after these words were written Lord Justice 
Lawton took advantage of a fairly unexceptionable appeal against 
sentence to expand on the justifications of punishment and he 
stated the "classic principles" at considerable length (38). 
It was a discussion of the five theories that marked the arrival 
of Dr D A Thomas when in an article in 1964 (39) he analysed the 
part these theories play in the sentencing policy of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal as revealed in the decisions of that Court in 
appeals against sentence. Dr Thomas used these theories to 
clarify the examination of the cases and it is this analysis of 
reported and unreported that emphasises the importance of his 
work. A further important atricle was published (40) in 1967 and 
the two parts of this article read with that of 1964 provide the 
skeleton of Dr Thomas' important work Principles of Sentencing 
(41). The essential thrust of this book is a sustained study of 
the sentencing policy of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
for England and Wales. The shaping of that policy is entrusted 
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substantially to the judiciary and within the judicial hierarchy 
the Court of Appeal has appellate jurisdiction over almost all 
sentences passed in the Crown CQurt. By studying the cases 
before the court Thomas sought co adduce the general principles 
being applied. This pioneering work has assisted in our 
understanding of the sentencing process especially in setting 
down and clarifying (42) to find a mental concept, the primary 
decision and the tariff. Dr Thomas had argued in his 1967 
article that the courts had increasingly come to consider the 
offender as an individual, whose needs, rather then whose guilt, 
,(~ ~ would form the basis of a sentence passed. This movement was 
.§:~ 
• 
said to reflect the growth of a number of individulized measures 
made available to the courts. This 'individulisation' of 
sentences was used by Dr Thomas as a term which included 
preventive as well as rehabilitative measures. The older order 
was based primarily on the concepts of retribution and general 
deterrence and it was known as "the tariff". These two concepts 
came to exist together. The primary decision then was described 
in this way; 
"The sente.ncer is presented with a choice: he may 
impose, usually in the name of general deterrence, 
a sentence intended to reflect the offender's 
culpability, or he may seek to influence his future 
behaviour by subjecting him to an appropriate measure 
of suspension, treatment or preventive confinement." (43) 
It is interesting that Dr Thomas appears between 1964 and 1970 to 
have used the word "primary" in slightly different senses. In 
the 1967 article he refers to the primary decision as being 
followed by a secondary decision, the latter being the question 
" where on the tariff the sentence is to be 
located, or precisely what individualised measure 
is to be used." (44) 
The use of the terms primary and secondary here implying, it is 
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submitted, that the secondary decision is the less important or 
less difficult perhaps. In the textbooks, and certainly by the 
second edition in 1979, there is no suggestion of a "secondary" 
decision in the sense suggested although there is a description 
of this as being a "secondary process". (45) 
In Principles of Sentencing the learned author considers at great 
length the process by which the length of sentence of 
imprisonment is determined once that opinion is considered 
necessary. The application of the tariff involves relating the 
~ gravity of the offence to the established pattern of sentences 
for offences of that kind, and then making allowance for such 
imitigating factors as may be present which tend to reduce the 
offender's apparent culpablility (46). For the individualized 
sentence the sentencer must 'search among' the measures 
available for the one most suited to the particular offender. 
The choice of individualized measure is made empirically in 
each case, on the basis of an assessment of the individual 
offender's needs (47) Dr Thomas' critical -assessment of the 
cases and of the statutory provisions provided a theoretical 
basis for much of the work of the Court of Appeal as well as 
rationalising what had gone on before. 
In 1970 Dr Roger Hood reappeared, with Richard Sparks, as 
authors of Key Issues in Criminology. About that time a 
commentator wrote that: 
"Until recently there has been little analystical 
enquiry into and exposition of the art of 
sentencing. Sentencing has ~een regarded as a 
matter of experience, transmitted folk love and 
commonsense. Now a more informed and scientific 
approach is coming in ...... ". (48) 
The result of Dr Thomas and also Dr Hood and Mr Sparks endeavours 
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certainly marked the 'new approach'. The importance of Hood and 
Sparks lies in Chapter 5 which deals with the decision-making 
process in sentencing. They argued that it was then a subject 
that had received comparatively little attention from 
criminologists, partly because the then existing model for 
research was inadequate. The authors sought to take into account 
all the factors which might influence the judicial activity of 
sentencing. For Hood and Sparks j it seems, the questions of 
research design and techniques of investigation loomed as large 
as the essential questio~sof sentencing. The value of their work 
~ lies in their provision of a model of the sentencing process 
which represents the structure of the whole system. 
1.20 Various writers have emphasised that criminology may be 
approached from many angles. Professor Nigel Walker has produced 
several major studies of sentencing, generally within the context 
of penology. In his book Crime and Punishment in Britain the 
professor describes objectively the aims, assumptions, and the 
. 
techniques of current penal measures and he outlines the existing 
ways of defining, accounting for, and disposing of offenders. 
Part Four of the book is concerned with sentencing and in essence 
the considerations which govern sentences and the practical 
effect of sentences (by assessing their efficacy in obtaining 
their aims) are discussed. It is interesting now to see how 
Professor Walker broke down the factors which seem to influence 
the court's actual choice of penal measure into legal and semi-
legal categories (49), the former being employed by the law 
itself, the latter by 'judicial convention'. Whereas the 
professor was content to support his individual considerations 
with individual examples or authorities, a similar approach was 
not taken by Dr Thomas because of his extensive study of 
unreported cases (50). But the importance of Professor Walker's 
book was really to assist in establishing sentencing as a 
~ ~ 
~ 
• 
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separate subject within penology or rather criminlogy in general. 
In the course of this process the author offered an intellectual 
de~cription of the penal system as being in fact a system and not 
simply a collection of rules. 
In a later book Sentencing in a Rational Society Professor Walker 
described (51) the law of sentencing as Cinderella's 
"illegitimate baby". If that metaphor accurately reflected the 
then hostility to the suject of sentencing~ it ma~ now be said 
fairly that the endeavours of the professor have brought the 
subject maturity and respectability. In the book last mentioned 
Professor Walker continued his analysis of penal philosophies but 
he was not satisfied simply with criticism. The book contained 
several new ideas which may in the event prove to have been well 
ahead of their time. In broad terms it is argued that while the 
courts should retain their present powers short of ordering 
imprisonment, their powers with regard to that sentence should be 
curtailed vigorously. On the first occasion on which a court 
thought it necessary to commit an offender, all that a court 
would be able to do would be to impose a sentence of imprisonment 
of two years of which six months would certainly be spent in 
custody. For the remainder of the period the offender might be 
released at the discretion of the executive. But the courts 
would have power further to impose a sentence of five years 
imprisonment on an offender who had already served two years as 
described previously. The minimun period of custody during the 
sentence would be six months longer than that for which the 
offender was actually in custody during his previous sentence. 
What has been set out are essentially the very general proposals 
of a thoughtful work which is intended for society which is 
"peaceful, affluent and (penolgically) ignorant, but aspires 
to rationality". Professor Walker also pays considerable 
attention to other penological aspects such as general deterrence 
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and that was outlined further in his James Seth Memorial Lecture 
given at Edinburgh in 1966 (52), which may now been seen as a 
precursor of his 1969 book. 
Professor Walker's most recent book is Sentencing: Theory, Law 
and Practice which is a synthesis of the great volume of work 
done earlier by him. He describes the system in terms of its 
law, underlying theories and effects in practice. While he 
seeks in the Preface to exclude the book as a comprehensive 
work of reference, the professor's exposition of matters give 
the book an important status. In comparative terms this new 
text now over shadows The English Sentencing System by 
Sir Rupert Con and Dr Andrew Ashworth. The former of the joint 
authors had written and revised three editions and the latter 
took over for the fourth edition following Sir Rupert's death. 
This small volume was influential for its pioneering approach, 
enhanced by Sir Rupert's scholarship, of combining succinctly a 
broad statement of the law with a study of the theoretical 
reasoning behind it. Dr Ashworth had been active in the area 
of sentencing and in 1983 he had published his Sentencing and 
Penal Policy. This too was a most thorough study but is 
different from others in that it was concerned more with the 
legal aspects of sentencing in England rather than philisophical 
~ justifications and that it more topically placed the subject of 
sentencing against the background of criminal justice policy. 
Close attention is paid by the author to the formation and 
implementation of penal policy since the 1970's. In round terms, 
Dr Ashworth concludes on the practical point that those who have 
formulated penal policy have.until recently had too little regard 
for sentencing and that a means must be found to achieve greater 
co-ordination of policy. 
1.23 
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Mr Neil Morgan, in reviewing Professor Walker's Sentencing: 
Theory, Law and Practice, noted that there were "some astonishing 
absences from the text and from the list of references" (53). 
The most obvious ommissions were said to be Dr Ashworth's 
Sentencing and Penal Policy and Judge V.G. Hines' Judicial 
Discretion in Sentencing by Judges and Magistrates. It certainly 
seems odd that the professor should not refer to Dr Ashworth's 
contribution given the latter's varying approach. Equally, with 
three years separating the works the professor ought to have had 
time to consider Judge Hines' book. The latter was said by 
Mr Morgan in his review to be "excellent but academically 
neglected." Judge Hines has produced a work blending research 
and practice, research of reported cases and much of what 
practice he has had at the Bar and on the Bench. There is a 
valuable historical introduction which places many English 
sentencing matters properly in context but there is a lack of 
a philosophical or theoretical background. The substantial 
volume is no doubt an excellent reference book for practicing 
lawyers but the learned author lays great stress on the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal giving an appearance, it is submitted, of 
laying down authorities to be followed as precedents rather than 
guidlines. 
This necessarily superficial review of the English authorities 
indicates the large and growing body of literature in English 
law dealing with sentencing. It follows, it is submitted, that 
the larger base of researchers and cases means in turn that the 
apex is higher. This is not to concede that standards or the 
sense that the literature makes is of a different order in 
England, but rather simply that there is more to study. Much 
of the content of the literature in England can be ignored by 
Scots lawyers especially descriptive studies of powers and legal 
developments. The same cannot be recommended of the theoretical 
or philosophical works. 
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Northern Ireland 
By way of a simple historical introduction, a recent 
commentator on the law of Northern Ireland has said that: 
"After the reconquest of Ireland in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the law 
in Ireland and England developed along much 
the same lines for about 300 years. The 
countries were administered differently, 
but the actual content of the law was almost 
identical." (54) 
The continuing closeness of legal links between England and 
Northern Ireland has meant that English precedents have in 
Northern Ireland been accorded the greatest respect and will 
be followed unless there are very strong reasons for not doing so 
(55). Similar considerations apply to English legal text books 
although there are a number of Northern Irish textbooks including 
one on sentencing: Professor Kevin Boyle and Mr Michael Allen in 
Sentencing Law and Practice in Northern Ireland purpots to give 
an account of the subject matters and also of those aspects of 
penal administration which relate to the implementation of 
sentencing decisions. The authors seek to provide a text that 
offers a systematic treatment of the various options, their 
purposes and the principles to be considering when deciding on 
their application. The greater emphasis is on the legal aspects 
of sentencing. The book is an exposition of the general (English) 
princilpes of sentencing adapted to Northern Ireland given the 
variations of statutory authorities. It is perhaps an implied 
comment on the nature of things in Northern Ireland that as late 
as 1983 there was a special section for the sentencing of road 
traffic offenders but not drug offenders (56). Still, the 
authors locate a few drugs cases, discussed later in this work, 
in the general scheme of things and their book is of use for that 
purpose. 
1.26 
-21-
Methodology 
Professor Mannheim has posed an important question that 
represents, it is submitted, the dilema in the methodology of 
research in general: 
"It is preferable in research to have a worthwile 
subject for investigation, even if it can be 
studied only by second-rate methods, or to be able 
to apply first-rate methods to a subject of doubt 
for significance to the progress of criminology." (57) 
Some description of the methodology used in trying to establish 
the sentencing policy, if any, in relation to the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971 is now necessary. A conventional approach is to start 
with a definition of the word "methodology": viz, 
" the system of methods and principles used 
in a particular discipline." (58) 
Definitions, we are told (59), provide a boundary and shape to 
the subject but Professor Nigel Walker dismisses this: 
"If - as so often happens - someone opens his 
discussion of a concept by reciting a dictionary 
definition, this suggests to me that he himself is 
unsure of what he is talking about. In any case, 
if the concept is sufficiently controversial to 
merit discussion, the dictionary is probably 
misleading. Dictionaries are after all compiled 
by people in backrooms, consulting publications 
rather than listening to contemporary conversations. 
Even when they look at the printed word they seldom 
think of legal usage." (60) 
This is perhaps a little harsh for philosophers of punishment 
who might, on another view, be considered to be people in 
backrooms and just as most people get through life without 
requiring to consult a dictionary, so many people who participate 
in the criminal justice system never need to know why things are 
done in a certain way or ought to be done in another. Further, 
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reciting a dictionary definition does not necessarily mean that 
one accepts it or that one is unsure about one's subject but, on 
a more mundane level, it may simply be that the definition is a 
convenient starting point. If the latter point is so then the 
defence to the charge by Professor Walker might simply be one of 
necessity. 
The methodology of this work is generally similaroto that of any 
extended discussion on a legal topic. The starting point is the 
law - statutory and common. For the former, reference is made to 
the statutory provisions in the form of the principal statutes 
and statutory instruments. For the latter, one must look to the 
cases decided by the judges. This study will consider a large 
number of reported cases. In doing so the circumstances of the 
crime or offence are narrated and occasionally these are outlined 
in much detail with the judgement for, as Lady Warnock has said: 
"Conclusions are valueless and positively misleading 
without some at least of the reasoning which led up 
to them being set out." (61) 
It is notable that a feature of all aspects of controlled drugs 
now - including legislation and case law - is the rapid 
development in a short time. Perhaps in 1956 Arthur Koestler 
might have spent a single afternoon's comfortable reading -
having disposed earlier that day of diminished responsibility 
in mastering the then law of dangerous drugs. Now the volume of 
sources is large and continues to grow so that the aim of the 
study is to set the sentencing decisions in a rational order to 
best reach meaningful conclusions. 
Heavy emphasis in this work is placed on reported cases. But 
what is the value of case law in the decision-making process of 
sentencing? In Scotland the tendency has been not to rely as 
heavily on precedents as in England, and the smaller appellate 
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'pose' means that the case law is less important in Scotland. On 
the surface the development of the case law would appear in 
England to reflect their tradition of a steady building of case 
upon case. Dr Ashworth, however, has indicated (62) three 
differences. First, the value of sentencing cases appears to be 
less than in cases involving the substantive law and sentencing 
cases are used less. The tradition is, it appears, that 
speeches in mitigation do not refer to appellate decisions and 
the Court of Appeal is reluctant to cite its own previous 
decisions. Second, the scope of appeals is limited in that only 
the convicted person may appeal and, in England but not in 
Scotland, the appellate court cannot increase a sentence. Third, 
the sentencing rules settled in the Court of Appeal are at 
variance with the needs and practices of the courts below. In 
short, judicial decisions on sentencing have not developed as a 
source of law to the same extent as the appellate courts' 
decisions on other matters. 
Thus, if the statutory provisions form the skeleton of the 
sentencing policy on controlled drugs then the case law, however 
limited, provides some of the flesh. The methodology of the 
present work is to consider the criminal offences of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971 and the reported cases of sentencing decisions 
for those offences. Now might be a suitable point to consider a 
distinction that goes to the heart of this work and which limits 
the terms of study. Dr Ashworth has written that: 
" under existing conventions, penal policy is for the 
Government and sentencing policy is for the courts. This 
has been made possible by the high maximum penalties 
provided by the criminal law, and the separation has 
gained strength from the principle of judicial 
independence. There is now some evidence that the 
separation is being challenged. Government ministers have 
with increasing frequency addressed remarks to sentencers, 
and the judges have declared that they are taking account 
of the gross overcrowding in the prisons." (63) 
1.30 
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This work is concerned only with sentencing policy; with trying 
to discover what it is that the courts do with drug offenders. 
The challenge referred to above affects, as we shall see, drug 
offenders and an aspect of penal policy must be considered. 
The essence of this work is the study of the reported cases of 
sentencing decisions. The Hungarian criminologist M Vermes has 
said that: 
"Analystical activity implies that the interrelations 
hidden in the phenomenon under study will be explored 
by dividing them into parts. With synthesis as a 
method we acquire the knowledge of a phenomenon by 
summing up the movements of the part elements. In 
this phenomenon then the interrelations of the 
component factors and their sum total of movements 
will become reality." (64) 
The drugs trade is a hidden complex of trades and relationships 
and understanding the relationship in these prescribed activities 
is essential, it is submitted, for improving the legislation and 
for dealing most suitably with individual offenders. Vermes has 
also observed: 
"Incriminality observation extends in two directions; 
viz, in those of objective and subjective observations. 
In objective observation the external process of the 
criminal offence, its form of manifestation, the method 
and means of its perpetration, any other circumstances, 
and its consequences are drawn into the sphere of 
observation. The knowledge of the external circumstances 
of the offence permits the drawing of conclusions as to 
the abilities, character and attitude of the offender 
ie to his personality as a whole, and so this knowledge, 
will be underlying the observation in a subjective sense, 
or more precisely, the personality study." (65) 
Of all the disciplines that contribute to criminology it may be 
that law promotes most an objective study, in contrast say to 
psychology (66). This work is an objective study of the drug-
offenders with not real attempt at assessing a personality study: 
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with perhaps a short study of sentencing drug addicts as an 
exception. 
Finally, the case law studied is solely that of reported cases. 
These cases appear in a wide variety of journals and full 
reference is made to circumstances of the offence and to 
judgements where given. It was entirely a personal decision to 
limit the study in this way and to exclude the unreported cases 
of which there is an unknown but substantial number. The reasons 
for imposing such a limitation are ones of finance and time, 
given that this is self-supporting and part-time research. There 
is a risk that lurking amongst the unreported cases there are 
important and influential decisions but given the close attention 
that is paid to the courts and their work it seems to be a not 
unreasonble assumption that if something has been crucial it 
would have been seized upon. However, the term 'reported case' 
has been taken in its widest sense. Edward Smithies in his 
readable book Crime in Wartime: A Social History of World War II 
deals with reported cases in a study of war on patterns of crime. 
He considers reports of cases in the legal journals and also in 
newspapers, books and magazines and that is what has been done 
here. It may be that the latter are more sensational and less 
correct technically but they frequently report the comments of 
the judiciary and thus give an indication of the reasoning behind 
decisions. 
Controlled Drug Literature 
Two books, falling more within the province of the sociology of 
law, have been most influential in the literature of controlled 
drugs. Mr Philip Bean's book The Social Control of Drugs 
purpots to show how the control system, as he describes it, 
developed mainly as a response to the social composition and 
values of the drug takers rather than to the addictive qualities 
of the drugs. The emphasis is on the legal system as a control 
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agent. In elucidating the changes in the law within this social 
setting Mr Bean provides an important analysis that explains how 
existing legislation came to be what it is. Harvey Teff's Drugs, 
Society and the Law had a different emphasis from Mr Bean's 
sociological perspective of drug abuse. Mr Teff was more 
concerned with the legal view and his study of drugs pursued 
jurisprudential concepts such as possession. Both of these books 
contribute to our understanding of what has happened in the past. 
Practising lawyers, in court, would cite a different type of 
book. 
P.W.H. Lydiate was the author of The Law Relating to the Misuse 
of Drugs in 1977. This text set out the ingredients of each 
offence with penalties and case law. The extensive nature of 
Mr Lydiate's research were shown in the large numbers of reported 
cases cited and the detailed subsiduary legislation quoted. 
Regretably much information was repeated and the net result is a 
tedious book to read. The author did not include any discussion 
of sentencing policy but he simply stated the maximum penalties. 
In 1984 W.T. West's Drugs Law appeared. This singularly 
unexciting and, truthfully, insignificant work at best brought 
some of the case law to the notice of the legal public. The book 
was superficial, and over priced, and did not consider the 
sentencing of drug offenders at any point. 
Two years later Mr Richard Lord brought out Controlled Drugs: Law 
and Practice which commenced with a short but balanced historical 
introduction and helpful description of the nature and effects of 
controlled drugs. The case law is discussed and set in context 
and the work is altogether_a suitable legal text book. In 
Part IV of the book the matter of sentencing the drug offender is 
taken up perhaps for the first time in print. Mr Lord's 
treatment of the topic is considered later as is that of Messrs 
Bucknell and Ghodse. Their book Misuse of Drugs is a most 
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substantial work which with regular supplements promises to be 
the leading textbook for sometime. As the .latter co-author is 
medically qualified the book has a strong medical/pharmacological 
aspect but this is balanced by Mr Buchnell's legal contribution. 
Finally in 1986 Mr Keith Bovey's Misuse of Drugs appeared. This 
workman like study is the result of the author's experience as 
the leading Glasgow practitioner specialising in controlled 
drugs. The book is helpful for the practitioner but it is 
unlikely to stand the test of time as compared to the two works 
preceeding it. Regretably the author has nothing to say on 
sentencing drug offenders. 
(1) 
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PART THREE: OFFENCES 
Chapter 2 OFFENCES AND SENTENCES 
2.1 Introduction 
In seeking to establish the sentencing policy with regard to the 
1971 Act, close attention must be paid to a small number of cases 
which reveal explicitly and in detail part of that policy, for 
England and Wales at least. It is rare to have in sentencing 
matters such open statements of policy as these cases reveal. 
The cases are not binding in the manner that reported cases in 
point of substantive law are although they are perhaps more than 
highly persuasive: in R v Bibi (1) Lord Lane C.J. said that: 
"We are not almlng at uniformity of sentence; 
that would be impossible. We are aiming at 
uniformity of approach." (2) 
This weakening of what might otherwise be a binding effect of 
precedent was confirmed in R v Tanner (3) where the same court 
observed that: 
"Reports on sentencing have a limited value; 
sentencing is an art that must be flexible and 
adaptable to the circumstances of the case, 
including those of the offence, the accused and 
the victims." 
Part of the reason for this is explained, it is submitted, by 
Professor Fitzgerald when he wrote that: 
" in sentencing an offender the court is 
attempting at least in part a measure of Social 
control. Whether such control will be achieved 
can only be calculated by reference to existing 
evidence as to the effects of different sorts of 
punishments both on the offender himself and on the 
rest of the community. A court passing sentence, 
therefore, should have its eye to the future, as 
2.2 
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compared with the advocate in the trial, who is 
concerned not with what will happen but with what 
did happen." (4). 
Perhaps one of the succinct statements of the value of reported 
cases in sentencing cases comes from Dr Thomas in his commentary 
on R v Guiney (5): 
"While the doctrine of precedent in the strict 
sense cannot apply in this context, previous 
decisions do provide an essential framework of 
reference." (6) 
As will be shown in this chapter there are now many reported 
cases on sentencing but these must be read critically for as 
Mr Christopher Emmins cautions: 
"The great bulk of them cannot be regarded as 
precedents in the full sense of the word. They 
are merely rulings, turning upon the unique facts 
of an individual appellant's case, that the 
sentence passed by the Crown Court either was or 
was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. 
When comparing the facts of an earlier case with 
the facts of the case presently before the Court, 
it will almost certainly be possible for their 
Lordships to point to some significant differences 
which ought to have a bearing on sentence." (7). 
Notwithstanding that, there have now been sufficient cases 
through the appeal courts for a clear classification of 
sentencing decisions to be attempted. Mr Emmins has divided 
the decisions into four separate categories:-
(a) Binding Precedents 
A tiny minority of cases decide a point of sentencing law and, 
as to that point, the case is a binding precedent. 
(b) Cases of general application 
Although binding precedents are few, a rather larger number of 
sentencing cases contain general statements as to sentencing 
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practice which are obviously applicable beyond the particular 
circumstances which give rise to the appeal. No doubt, it is 
said, such statements are strictly speaking obiter dicta but 
both Crown Court judges and the Court of Appeal in subsequent 
cases are likely to treat them as authoritative. (8) 
(c) GuidlinES cases 
These cases are described by Mr Emmins as: 
" a peg on which to hang general guidance 
about sentencing levels." (9) 
These are contrasted with general statements on sentencing 
practice in that in a guideline case the Court spends most of its 
time setting out the guidelines which it thinks will assist Courts 
and only incidentally perhaps at the end of the judgement deals 
with the merits of the particular appellant's case. In cases of 
general application the statement on sentencing practice arises, 
it is said, naturally out of the subject matter of the appeal. 
(d) Other cases 
The great bulk of sentencing appeals do not raise a point of law 
or even provide an opportunity for the Court to set out 
guidelines or to make statements of general applicability. They 
are simply decisions turning on the unique facts of the 
appellant's case. 
2.3 It is submitted that the distinction between the second and third 
categories is not as clear as Mr Emmins appears to suggest. On 
one view the distinction might be regarded as one without merit 
for the main difference on Mr Emmins' definitions appears to be 
how far the Court goes from the facts of the case. In any event 
the analysis of the important cases, however described, that 
follows covers the whole judgement in each case. Each judgement 
covers a wide variety of variables that are considered separately 
~ .. 
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in the remainder of the thesis but the influence of these 
judgements lies in the comprehensive nature of what the Courts 
held. 
2.4 (a) R v McCay (10) 
The judgement in McCay's case is that of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in Northern Ireland on 11th December 1974. McCay and 
ell> 
seven others ~ere convicted of offences relating to possession, 
supply and incitement to use certain drugs. One case was an 
appeal against sentence with the leave of a single judge, while 
the other seven were applications for leave. After argument had 
been heard the court dismissed the appeal and refused the 
applications. Regretably, the report of the case gives little of 
the facts of the case but in the course of the hearing Lord 
Lowry, Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, made certain 
important observations on drug offenders. The general approach 
by the trial judge to the problem of sentencing the drug offender 
had been to condemn the practice of taking drugs otherwise than 
on a doctor's order. Lord Lowry held that this was the correct 
approach because of the "social evil" that results from the 
crime. The trial judge was also held to have properly· condemned 
the "heinous practice" of supplying drugs or providing a setting 
condusive to their use: 
" practices which are more sordid and worthy 
of punishment where the offender profits 
financially." (11) 
The trial judge had envirenated three principles: 
"1. Possession of a drug is less serious than 
supplying it to another. 
2. Introducing drugs to someone with no previous 
experience is more serious than supplying drugs 
to someone who is already using them. 
3. Possessing or supplying LSD or heroin is 
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worse than possessing or supplying cannabis." (12) 
No authorities were cited in support of these principles, nor did 
the trial judge purport to found on his own experience of these 
matters coming before him. Certainly the terms of the offences 
in the 1971 Act taken with the maximum penalties provided for in 
the Schedule to the Act would support the first and third 
principles. There are, as we shall see, some authorities to 
support the second principle but it has been stated in such wide 
terms that it is simple to postulate theoretical circumstances -
that are not improbable - can put doubt on the sense of the 
principle: for example, supplying drugs to an individual who is 
known to be addicted but is attempting to end his or her 
dependency is arguably worse than supplying a very small quantity 
of cannabis to a beginner for his first 'puff.' 
2.5 By inference the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld these three 
principles and added: 
"As to the third point there is, no doubt, a 
further distinction to be made between heroin and 
LSD; but the latter is said to be so unpredictable 
as to constitute a grave danger to its users. We 
agree with the learned judge that it would be wrong 
to encourage the impression that the so-called "soft" 
drugs are not dangerous and destructive. Point is 
added to the learned judge's remarks by the emergence 
of liquid cannabis in concentrated form." 
The Court then proceeded to frame futher principles: 
"4. In connection with the offences of supplying 
and permitting premises to be used, a previous 
conviction for a similar offence should weigh 
heavily against the accused. 
5. A previous clear record in connection with drug 
offences is relevant but is not by itself a clear 
indication against a custodial sentence. 
6. In possession cases, and to a lesser extent in 
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cases of supply and permitting premises to be used, 
a previous criminal record unconnected with drugs is 
of minor importance. 
7. Severe sentences, including custodial sentences 
of any kind, are of assistance in signifying the 
community's rejection of drug-taking and its 
hostility to traffickers in drugs and even to those 
who supply them free of charge. 
8. The importation of drugs, especially when done 
for gain, ought to be very severely punished. 
9. One who runs an establishment or organises 
parties or groups to encourage drug-taking 
sould normally receive a heavy prison sentence. 
10. The same principle applies strongly to those 
who in relation to drugs corrupt young people in 
this fashion or otherwise. 
11. The fact that the offence involves a group or 
"cell" of people may constitute a circumstance 
calling for heavier punishment than would be 
appropriate in purely individual cases." (13) 
As stated earlier, there were then, and with developments there 
are now, several authorities to support the principles. The 
judgement is notable for the way in which the court in Northern 
Ireland anticipated how sentencing policy would develop. 
Further, such a detailed statement of policy covering various 
aspects would have come as~~lcome assistance to those members 
of the judiciary who were faced with drugs cases for the first 
time. McCay's case is an example of a guidlines case but the 
judgement itself is flawed for failing to give any meaningful 
details or facts of the appellant's actions and also for failing 
to give any justification, explanation or authority for the 
principles stated. 
2.6 The Court of Criminal Appeal took these matters further in 
R v Magee (14). There the convictions consisted of supplying 
cannabis, mainly in the form of cannabis resin, of possession of 
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cannabis, of permitting premises to be used for the supply of 
cannabis and of permitting cannabis to be smoked on premises. 
The trial judge passed a variety of sentences on these charges in 
what was a most complicated series of Indicements. In sentencing 
all but three of the eleven defendants to prison sentences of 
varying degrees of severity the trial judge was clearly disturbed 
by the great hardship which would be caused to the individulas, 
most of whom were students. But his Lordship felt compelled to 
take a stern line because of the serious public policy issues 
at stake and because of the view taken by the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in R v McCay. Although five of the accused applied for 
leave to appeal against their sentences and three of them had 
their effective sentences reduced, the appeal court approved of 
Mr Justice Kelly's analysis of drugs sentencing policy. He said 
that: 
"Sentencing offenders for drug offences is not 
always easy. It is recognised that drug taking 
and drug dependence and complex phenomena, and 
offenders are invariably young people, usually of 
good character. Frequently, they are students, 
showing ability and well set on course to professional 
or technical achievement. Deterrent custodial sentences 
imposed in such cases mean the interruption and sometimes 
the end of a career of promise. 
While these considerations above may point to an 
individualised sentence, and in many cases to a 
non-custodial one, there are clearly other matters 
to be weighed and given effect to in sentencing." 
And later: 
"Undoubtedly there is a community rejection of drug-
taking and a public will that it should be firmly 
discouraged. This is reflected in the continuance of 
misuse of drug legislation and underlined by the 
maximum penalties a court can impose ... These 
factors - the antagonism of the community to drug-
taking and the increase of prevalence of drug-abuse 
in a particular community will generally outweigh, 
in my opinion, the personal considerations of the 
~ ~ 
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individual offender which I have mentioned and 
invariably lead to custodial sentences not only for 
the unlawful supply of drugs but for the possission 
of cannabis." (15) 
The trial judge also indicated that there were exceptions to the 
rules of policy indicated: 
"Of course there will be cases where a non-custodial 
sentence may achieve the near certainty of permanent 
abandonment of drug-taking by a drug dependent and 
other cases where the personal claims of the 
individual offender are so outstanding that a 
non-custodial sentence is justified but these will 
be exceptional cases although I have encountered 
some." (emphasis added)(16). 
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal approved R v McCay but 
observed that the decision in that case: 
" did not purport to lay down what the 
appropriate term of years should be in any other 
cases not purports to fix any rigid guide-lines 
to rule other cases. That is, of course, as it 
should be because each case must be considered on 
its own merits, and on its own merits in the light 
of the particular circumstances, and in cases of 
this kind, the background history of the individual 
concerned in relation to such offences. No court 
could do more than suggest a bracket term as being 
appropriate to a specific class of offence, while 
leaving it to the Court dealing with the individual 
case to determine where within that bracket the case 
before it falls; or whether there are factors peculiar 
to the case which require a less severe or a more grave 
view to be taken than the harm would suggest. The 
importance of R v McCay is, therefore, that it sets 
out the relevant factors to be considered by the Court 
dealing with the individual case and it is for that 
Court then to decide with those factors in mind and 
having regard to the circumstances of the individual, 
what the appropriate sentence in each case would be." (17) 
Both dicta from these two cases are important for the broad 
principles set down by the Court. It seems a reasonable 
inference that the spectre of drug-abuse must have loomed large 
then for the Court to have dealt in such extensive detail. These 
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cases were considered by Mr Desmond Marrinan in a lengthy 
article along with many other unreported cases from the 
courts in Northern Ireland (18). His conclusion was that the 
principles in R v McCay were clear and broadly in line with the 
English position although the Northern Irish court seemed to 
prefer a harder line towards the first offender possessing 
cannabis and similar drugs but not concerned with supplying them 
for gain. Both courts have advocated and imposed. severe 
deterrent sentences on suppliers . 
. ~ ~ 2.8 (b) R v Aramah (19) 
Aramah's case attained importance of the first rank on judgement 
being given on 17th December 1982 and it has retained that 
position since then. The facts of the case - as with many 
fundamental cases - are simple. John Uzu Aramah was convicted 
of being concerned in the importation of 59 kilogrammes of 
herbal cannabis. He had previous convictions of offences 
involving cannabis, and he had served previously a sentence of 
three years imprisonment. He was then sentenced to six years 
imprisonment and he appealed but it was held that his sentence 
was entirely appropriate. The judgement sets out the facts of 
the case and the appellant's personal circumstances as these were 
both matters which the court had to take into consideration 
before disposing of the appeal. Then the court made some general 
observations about the level of sentences for drug offences as 
these were thought by the court to be of some assistance. The 
Court noted that the list of appeals for that day was "entirely 
composed of such crimes." 
2.9 The judgement in Aramah's case has been divided and numbered in 
this work to assist with the analysis although the Court did not 
necessarily follow the same order. It will also be seen that the 
judgement is by no means a fully comprehensive statement of a 
.'" , .. _,.iI': 
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whole sentencing policy for all controlled drugs. On the 
contrary it is highly selective and this can be seen from the two 
principal categories concerned. (20). 
A. Class "A" Drugs and particularly Heroin and Morphine. 
The judgement commences with the assertion that it is common 
knowledge that Class A drugs and particularly heroin and morphine 
are the " ..• most dangerous of all addictive drugs," and there 
are said to be a number of reasons for this. Before considering 
these reasons it is submitted that they will reveal that the 
danger referred to by the Court does not seem to relate solely to 
the welfare of the consumer. The reasons given are:-
(i) these drugs are easy to handle. Small parcels can be made up 
into huge numbers of doses; 
(ii) the profits are so enormous that they attract the worst type 
of criminal; 
(iii) the huge profits produced ought to be considered when bail 
is applied for; 
(iv) the heroin addict frequently resorts to crime to pay for the 
habit and this may result in dealing and thereby disemminating 
the drug further; 
(v) " the most horrifying aspect ... ", the degredation and 
suffering and not infrequently death which the drug brings 
to the addict: 
"Consequently, anything which the courts of this 
country can do by way of deterrent sentence on 
those found guilty of crimes involving these class 
'A' drugs should be done." 
The Court then turned to what in the broadest of terms may be 
said to be essence of the crimes contained in the 1971 Act. 
Again, each of these is described with particular reference to 
heroin and morphine. 
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(a) Importation 
The Court held that large scale importation was where the street 
value of the consignment was in the order of £100,000 or more and 
for this, sentences of seven years and upwards was appropriate. 
There will be cases where the values are of the order of 
£1 million or more, in which circumstances the offence should be 
visited by sentences of 12 to 14 years. It will seldom be that 
an importer of any appreciable amount of the drug will deserve 
less than four years. But it was at this point that the Court 
gave a sizeable limit to those who found themselves in custody: 
"This, however, is one area in which it is 
particularly important that offenders should be 
encouraged to give information to the police, and 
a confession of guilt, coupled with considerable 
assistance to the police can properly be marked by 
a substantial reduction in what would otherwise be 
the proper sentence." (21) 
(b) Supplying 
The Court emphasised that in this aspect as in any Criminal 
enterprise the sentence will largely depend on the degree of 
involvement, the amount of trafficking and the value of the drug 
being handled. But, more explicitly: 
"It is seldom that a sentence of less than three 
years will be justified and the nearer the source of 
supply the defendant is shown to be, the heavier will 
be the sentence." 
The Court warned that there may well be cases where sentences 
similar to those appropriate to large scale importers maybe 
necessary and observed that it is unhappily all too seldom that 
"those big fish" amongst the suppliers get caught. 
2.11 
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(c) Possession 
The Court made it clear that simple possession was being 
considered at this point: 
"It is at this level that the circumstances of 
the individual offender become of much greater 
importance. Indeed the possible variety of 
considerations is so wide, include often those 
of a medical nature, that we feel it impossible 
to lay down any practical guidelines. On the other 
hand, the maximum penalty for simple possession of 
Class "A" drugs is seven years imprisonment and/or 
a fine, and there will be many cases where deprivation 
of liberty is both porper and expedient." 
B. Class "B" Drugs, particularly Cannabis 
The Court selected from amongst the Class B Drugs that which was 
most likely to be exercising the minds of the court; viz Cannabis 
(a) Importation 
The judgement starts this section with what may, it is submitted, 
almost be regarded as a concession: importation of very small 
amounts of cannabis use can be dealt with as if it were simple 
possesion. 
"Otherwise, importation of amounts up to about 
20 kilogrammes of herbal cannabis, or the equivalent 
in cannabis or cannabis oil, will, save in the most 
exceptional cases, attract sentences of between 
18 months and three years, with the lowest ranges 
reserved for pleas of guilty in cases where there has 
been small profit to the offender." 
The Court then set down principles relating to couriers, a 
subject which has been fraught with hard decisions for the 
Bench: 
"The good character of the courier (as he usually 
is) is of less importance than the good character 
of the defendant in other cases. The reason for 
this is, it is well known, that the large scale 
operator looks for couriers of good characters and 
for people of a sort which is likely to exercise 
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the sympathy of the court if they are 
detected and arrested. Consequently one 
will frequently find students and sick and 
elderly people are used as couriers for two 
reasons: first of all they are vulnerable to 
suggestion and vulnerable to the offer of quick 
profit, and secondly, it is felt that the courts 
may be moved to misplace sympathy in their case. 
There are few, if any, occasions when anything 
other than an immediate custodial sentence is 
proper in this type of importation." 
The Court continued later: 
"Medium quantities over 30 kilogrammes will attract 
sentences of three to six years imprisonment, 
depending upon the amount involved, and all the other 
circumstances of the case. 
Large scale or wholescale importation of massive 
quantities will justify sentences in the region of 
10 years imprisonment for those playing other than 
a subordinate role." 
(b) Supplying 
The supply of "massive quantities" will justify sentences in the 
region of 10 years for those playing anything more than a 
subordinate role. Otherwise, the Court held, the bracket should 
be between one to four years imprisonment, depending on the scale 
of the operation. Sentences within the bracket could be 
distinguished on the following basis: wholesaling, or supplying 
a number of small sellers, comes at the top of the bracket. 
Retailing a small amount to a consumer will come at the lower end 
of the bracket. In concluding this aspect the Court held, by 
implication, it is submitted, that the commercial element is not 
necessarily the sole deciding factor for even where there is no 
commercial motive (for example, where cannabis is supplied at a 
party), the offence may well be serious enough to justify a 
custodial sentence. 
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(c) Possession 
"When only small amounts are involved being for 
personal use, the offence can often be met by a 
fine. If the history shows, however, a persisting 
flouting of the law, imprisonment may be necessary." 
Aramah's appeal was dismissed because of his involvement in the 
importation of "a very large quantity of cannabis, 
59 kilogrammes." As the value of this quantity was put between 
£100,000 and £135,000 the case fell to be considered at the top 
of the range. Further, there was no feature of the case which 
amounted to a mitigating aspect. Aramah contested the case so 
that no discount could be given for a guilty plea and he had a 
previous conviction for a very similar offence for which he had 
been imprisoned. The Court considered that the six years 
imprisonment in the present case was entirely appropriate. 
Dr Thomas' initial view of Aramah's case was that it constituted 
a restatement of existing sentencing policy, and a. convenient 
source of reference, rather than a change of direction. (22) 
The Court of Appeal had in a number of earlier cases laid down 
guidlines but this case was the most comprehensive judgement. 
This was considered by the learned commentator as "a welcome 
development." But that judgement does not cover all the offences 
in the 1971 Act not all the controlled drugs in the schedule to 
that Act. Later, Dr Thomas came to describe this case a 
guideline case: 
" which seem likely to become the most 
important vehicle for the formulation and 
dissemination of judicial sentencing policy." (23) 
That view was also expressed in the commentary to R v de 
Havilland (24) which is itself of importance in sentencing 
matters. De Havilland was convicted on two charges of rape both 
involving substantial violence. He was sentenced to life 
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imprisonment. On appeal against that sentence it was argued by 
the appellant's counsel that it was wrong in principle to impose 
a sentence of life imprisonment in the absence of any medical 
evidence supporting the judge's view tha~ the appellant was a 
danger to the public. The Court of Appeal held that a judge, 
who takes the reponsibility for sentencing, ought to be satisfied 
on all the evidence, including any medical evidence, that an 
indefinite sentence was the correct one. A medical report was 
then before the court and, on considering it, the Court of Appeal 
held that the trial judge had been correct in forming the view 
that he did and the sentence was upheld. But the case is 
important for the view that the Court expressed, viz, that apart 
from statutory restrictions the appropriate sentence is a matter 
for the discretion of the sentencing judge. 
"It follows that decisions on sentencing are not 
binding authorities in the sense that decisions of 
the Court on points of substantive law are binding on 
the Court itself and lower courts; decision on 
sente'ncing are no more than examples of how the 
Court has dealt with a particular offender in 
relation to a particular offence. As such they may 
be useful as an aid to uniformity of sentence for a 
particular category of crime, but they are not 
authoritative in the strict sense. Occasionally, 
the Court suggests guidelines for sentences dealing 
with a particular category of offence or offender, but 
the sentencer retains his discretion within the 
guidelines, or even to depart from them if the 
particular circumstances of the case justily 
departure." (24) 
Uniformity of approach is essential for, as Dr Thomas points 
out, with over 1000 judges of different kinds sitting in the 
Crown Court in England and Wales it is necessary for some such 
harmonizing force at work (25). Accordingly, to assess the 
importance of Aramah's case one must look for a case where the 
guidelines have been considered and accepted or rejected. There 
have been a substantial number of these cases with at least, it 
is thought, nine cases in the year following the judgement. 
• ~ 
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There appears as yet to be no case in which the guidelines in 
R v Aramah have been departed from so that the details of these 
individual cases have been left to be considered within the other 
cases for the relevant offence (26). Perhaps the single case to 
be considered here ought to be R v Gilmore (27). Where the 
appellant had been convicted of possessing cannabis resin with 
intent to supply. The report cited does not give further 
details of the facts and circumstances except to say that 
Gilmore was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. On the face 
of it, that sentence was well in excess of the bracket of one to 
four years as suggested in R v Aramah and it was presumably on 
that basis that an appeal against sentence was taken. However, 
the Court of Appeal held that: 
"The time had come when clearly it was necessary 
to move up the level of sentencing for serious 
drug offences. The number of such offences was on 
the increase, and had been on the increase since 
sentencing guidelines were given in R v Aramah." 
Accordingly, as the sentence passed was entirely justified the 
appeal was dismissed. Gilmore's case then is an example of how 
sentencing guidelines may be exceeded by a trial judge and yet 
subsequently receive sanction from the higher court. The report 
of Gilmore's case does not, it is to be regretted, reveal any 
statistical authority that may have been relied on by the Court 
as indicating the increase in the number of relevant offences. 
It may be inferred therefore that the Court was relying on its 
own subjective experience. 
(c) R v Martinez (28) 
The explicit judgement in Aramah's case contains a number of 
principles which were broadened and explained in R v Martinez. 
Martinez was a citizen of Columbia who had lived in England 
since 1974. He was convicted of importing cocain with a street 
value of about £3000 by receiving a letter addressed to him 
A_-f· .
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containing 23.7 grams of the drug. He was of previous good 
character and he was sentenced to four years imprisonment and 
he appealed. Lord Lane C.J. delivered the judgement of the 
Court and in doing so produce a more explicit and detailed 
policy statement that would be difficult if not impossible 
to equal. The judgement commenced with what is the ratio of 
the case; viz: 
"No distinction is to be drawn between the 
various types of class A drugs. The same 
considerations as applied to heroin applied 
equally to other class A drugs. Any idea 
that those who imported or otherwise dealt 
in cocaine or LSD should be treated more 
leniently was wrong." 
The judgement continued to explain that the reason why particular 
mention was made in Aramah's case was that at that time heroin 
in terms of availability presented "the greatest threat to the 
community." Thereafter, the Court appeared to take judicial 
notice, although not stating so overtly, that: 
"The illicit importation of cocaine hydrochloride 
and its abuse was on the increase. It was time to 
draw attention to that increasing use of cocaine and 
the dangers of its abuse and to dispel the myth that 
cocaine was merely some sort of social aid and was 
non-addictive." 
Ther.eafter, the Court gave a full explanation of the dangers 
cocaine and its place in the international drug trade with 
reasons for the growth in the supply of and demand for that 
drug. Statistics were cited in explanation of these matters 
as they existed in November 1984. The Court also displayed 
of 
an 
appreciation of the adverse effects of the drug on addicts 
through habitual use and indicated strong disapproval of the 
perpetuation of the "false elitism" that accompanied the use of 
the drug particularly by "the wealthy, the influential and the 
intellectual." The Court held that so far as Martinez was 
~ 
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concerned an "appreciable amount" was involved. It was accepted 
that the amount was small in comparison with some of the amounts 
illicitly imported but the trial judge had been correct to put 
the case in the bracket which in Aramah's case suggested that it 
merited four years imprisonment. The sentence could not be 
faulted and the appeal was dismissed. (29) 
~ ~ 
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Section 3: Restriction of Importation and Exportation of 
Controlled Drugs 
Section 3(1) 
" (a) the importation of a controlled drug ... 
(is) hereby prohibited." 
It may be said that there are generally two types of smuggling; 
that is to say, smuggling goods of an innocent nature to avoid 
paying government duties and smuggling goods which by virtue of 
the nature of the item involved attract the heavier penalties of 
the criminal law. Hume referred to the former type saying: 
"When discoursing of the offence which have relation 
to trade, we cannot pass over that of smuggling, or 
importing goods from abroad without payment of duties 
laid thereon, by national authority, towards the aid 
of the public service. This sort of trespass, which, 
in all its shapes, exposes the offender to pecuniary 
penalties and forfeiture of the goods, has, in the more 
ardacious modes of it, been found necessary to be 
repressed with chastisement of a higher kind. And 
in this respect the law is marked with progressive 
severity, both as to the punishment and the 
description of the offence, in proportion to the 
growing temptation and frequency of such transactions, 
occasioned by the increase of duties on importation, 
and the consequent higher profit of evading them."(l) 
It is a tribute to the brilliance of our institutional writers 
that such a clear exposition is still as valid today as it was 
when written and, futhermore, that the generalisations apply 
equally to the two types of smuggling. What follows in this 
work is essentially a study of smuggled goods of the second 
type. Controlled drugs can be and are imported lawfully but 
the frequency of such transactions is probably now out numbered 
by illegal importations or attemptes at such illegal importation. 
In this work the term 'importation' is taken in its broadest, its 
popular context in order to try to find the sentencing policy. 
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As a matter law the offences relating to the importation of 
controlled drugs are to be found in the Customs and Excise 
Management Act 1979. That act provides as follows:-
(i) Penalty for improper importation of goods. 
Section 50(3): 
"If any person imports or is concerned in importing 
any goods contrary to any prohibition or restriction 
for the time being in force under or by virtue of 
any enactment with respect to those goods, whether 
or not the goods are unloaded, and does so with 
intent to evade the prohibition or restrictio~, he 
shall be guilty of an offence under this subsection 
and may be arrested." 
In MacNeil v H M Advocate (2) a number of men were convicted 
of importing, and others of being concerned in the importing, 
of cannabis into an anchorage within the appointed Port of 
Strathclyde. The first and second appellants were sentenced 
to twelve years imprisonment on charges of importing about 
2/3rds of a ton of cannabis and possession of cannabis. The 
third appellant was convicted of being concerned in the 
importation and he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. 
In their appeals against sentece the first appellant agrued 
that the sentence was excessive, and the third appellant 
that the sentences failed to distinguish adequately between 
importing and being concerned in importing. On appeal, the 
High Court was of the opinion, delivered by the Lord Justice 
Clerk (Ross) that counsel for the first appellant had 
recognised that: 
" importing prohibited drugs and possession 
of large quantities of controlled drugs with 
intent to supply them to another on a large 
scale are very serious matters calling for 
severe sentences." (3) 
~. ~ 
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In all the circumstances, the Court was in no doubt that the 
sentences imposed could not possibly be described as excessive. 
On the third appellant's additional ground of appeal the Court 
held that: 
"In our opinion there is no reason for the view 
that the offence libelled in the second alternative 
version of the charge is any less serious than the 
offence in the first alternative." (4) 
In short, importini". and being concerned in importing ranked 
equally in principle. 
(ii) Penalty for fraudulent evasion of duty. 
Section 170 
(1) " ... if any person - (a) knowingly acquires 
possession of any of the following goods, that 
is to say ... 
(iii) goods with respect to the importation 
or exportation of which any prohibition or 
restriction is for the time being in force 
under or by virtue of any enactment; or 
(b) is in any way knowingly concerned in 
carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, 
keeping or concealing or in any manner dealing 
with such goods, and does so ... to evade any 
such prohibition or restriction with respect 
to the goods he shall be guilty of an offence 
under this section and may be arrested." 
(2) " •.• if any person is, in relation to any goods, 
in any way knowingly concerned in any fraudulent 
evasion or attempt of evasion - (b) of any 
prohibition or restriction for the time being 
in force with respect to the goods under or by 
virtue of any enactment he shall be guilty of an 
offence under this section and may be arrested." 
By Section 170(4) and Schedule 1 to the 1979 Act there are 
variations of punishment for certain offences relating to 
controlled drugs under the Act mentioned. 
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CLASS A 
(1) Cocaine 
In R v Ribas (5) there was an appeal against a sentence of 
8 years imprisonment imposed for the fraudulent evasion of the 
prohibition on the importation of 161.49 grammes of cocaine. 
The substance was of a very high degree of concentration and 
indeed most of it was almost 100 per cent pure cocaine. After 
dilution for resale there would be about 300 grammes or 
10 ounces available, possibly more. The defence mitigation was 
that Ribas passed through London to purchase photographic 
equipment required in his professional life. He was carrying 
that quantity of cocaine for personal use over the next few 
months. On appeal this submission was expanded and it was 
further stated that this instance of smuggling was analogous 
to simple possession. It was for the point that it was 
argued that the sentence was too severe. The first point, 
about personal use, was disbelieved at trial and on appeal. 
The second point was rejected at appeal because simple 
possession of a class A drug in the 1971 Act then had a 
maximum of seven years imprisonment and for possession with 
intent to supply a maximum of 14 years. For smuggling the 
drug the maximum penalty was 14 years irrespective of 
intent. Lord Justice Bridge said that; 
"The view which this Court takes is that Parliament 
has provided for the smuggling of prohibited drugs 
to be treated as a category of offence on its own 
which is seperate and distinct from the categories 
of possessing a drug once it has got into this 
country, which may be either simple possession or 
possession with intent. Up to the maximum penalty 
of 14 years imprisonment, it seems to us that the 
gravity of the smuggling offence depends primarily 
on the quantity smuggled and secondarily on all other 
relevant circumstances. But if a large quantity, and 
a quantity certainly capable of providing a substantial 
commercial supply is brought into this country in 
~ WJl&!I 
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contravention of the statutory prohibition on 
the importation then, irrespective of any specific 
intent to put that quantity into circulation, 
Parliament has provided for it to be treated as a 
grave offence. Importation, whatever the specific 
intent of the importer, as was pointed out by Lord 
Justice Shaw in the course of the argument, involves 
at the very least the risk that the quantity imported 
will find its way on to the home market and the 
object of the prohibition is to protect the home 
market, and to secure that supplies of these 
virulent drugs will not be made available there."(6) 
It followed then that the Court would examine critically any 
mitigation. While the Court of Appeal disbelieved the story 
from Ribas, it held that the offence was of considerable 
gravity but that the sentence passed was wrong in principle 
and one of five years imprisonment was substituted. 
But, only a month later in R v Bayona (7) about 8Yz ounces 
of cocaine was smuggled into England by a manager of a pop 
group, and perhaps by inference for that group. He was 
sentenced to two years imprisonment and recommended for 
deportation. He appealed and then it was held that although 
the drug was not supplied for the market at large it was still 
"a very dangerous drug." Appeal dismissed. In R v Kence (8) an 
Australian was passing through London and he was found to have 
914 grammes of cocaine. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 
three years imprisonment. On application for leave to appeal 
it was held that the fact that the cocaine was not to be used, 
sold or distributed in the United Kingdom, if not wholly 
irrelevant, was of little importance. Three years was a 
moderate sentence even taking into account all the facts. 
Application refused. An appeal against sentence also arose 
in R v Rospigliosi (9) where the appellant had imported about 
half a gramme of cocaine. This was said to be, and it was 
apparently not contradicted that it was, for his own use. The 
sentence was not open to criticism as he was an intelligent 
young man who knew perfectly well that it was wrong to import 
such a drug into this country. But, in the circumstances the 
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sentence of eight years was varied to six years. 
In R v Ford (10) the appellants were convicted, or pleaded guilty 
to, a variety of charges including importing cocaine, The 
quantity of cocaine was said to be worth more than £200,000 on 
the market. They were sentenced to terms of imprisonment 
ranging from 10 years imprisonment to five years, according to 
the parts played by each. On appeal it was held that the 
sentence of 10 years imprisonment on one appellant who has 
played an important role was the proper term, as were the 
sentences of eight years on an appellant who had acted as courier 
and six years on one who acted as distributor. The sentences on 
the two other appellants who had played less significant parts 
were reduced to four years, partly in view of personal 
circumstances. Lord Lane C.J. held that: 
"It scarcely needs emphasis that the smuggling 
of cocaine on this scale (the market value of this 
consignment was put at more than £200,000) must be 
sharply discouraged. At the moment cocaine is not 
in widespread use illegally in this country; but we 
are told that there has been something of a cocaine 
explosion in the United States; and, unhappily, what 
happens on that side of the Atlantic tends to travel 
across to England almost inevitably. It must be made 
absolutely plain that, whether cocaine is as dangerous 
as heroin or L.S.D., it is a Class A drug, and that 
those who provide or try to provide distributors with 
that sort of drug will find themselves in prison for a 
very long time." (11). 
In R v Suermondt (12) a sentence of 10 years imprisonment was 
upheld for importing a total of about 10 kilogrammes of cocaine 
in three consignments. A few days later the same court, but 
with a different combination of judges, had occasion to 
consider the appeal against sentence in R v Taan (13). There 
Tann had been convicted to being concerned in the fraudulent 
importation of a quantity of cocaine. Strangely, given the 
importance of the matter, no weight for the cocaine is given in 
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the report cited but the value was said to be £2Yz million. The 
appeal court was informed that the quantity was the biggest 
haul of cocaine ever brought in or detected in this country. 
The cocaine was clearly intended for onward transit, probably 
to Damasws. The cocaine was actually found to be in the 
possession of two others but Taan's part in all this was 
essentially to organise their travel and to provide funds for 
the courier's costs. The trial judge in sentencing Tann said 
that he was satisfied that his part was in the organisation and 
that this called for severe punitive and deterrent sentence. 
The Court of Appeal held that this approach was correct and 
that the sentence of 12 years imprisonment could not be the 
subject of any valid criticism. Lower down the scale, in 
R v Parada and Rodriguez (14) the appellants were sentenced on 
the basis that they were "underlings" (15). Each received six 
years imprisonment for smuggling cocaine to the value of about 
£1/2 million. Cocaine was put firmly in its place in 
R v Martinez (16) where it was observed by the court that the 
illicit importation and abuse of cocaine was on the increase, 
and that it was then time to draw attention to the dangers of 
its abuse and to destroy the myth that cocaine was some sort of 
social aid and was not addictive. Martinez had smuggled in 
23.7 grammes of cocaine valued at just over £3000. This the 
Court said was an appreciable amount, it was more than a 
trivial amount. Accordingly, the sentence of four years was 
correct in principle and in length. 
R v Keach (17) became an instant cause celebre because of the 
involvement of an American film and television actor and his 
secretary. Keach pleaded guilty to smuggling 36.7 grammes of 
cocaine, said to have a street value of £4500, through 
Heathrow. The drug was hidden in an aerosol and in a bag. A 
small amount of the drug was found in a hankerchief in the 
secretary's pocket. The plea was put forward on the basis that 
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the drug found was in Keach's possession solely for his own use. 
He was sentenced to nine month's imprisonment and ordered to pay 
£500 prosecution costs. Appeal against sentence was heard a mere 
eleven days after the trial, (18). The Court of Appeal held (19) 
that importation of cocaine is prohibited irrespective of the 
intention of the importer with regard to the disposal of the 
drug. The appellant was clearly aware of the risks that he ran. 
An immediate custodial sentenc~ was necessary for importations of 
such a large quantity of cocaine and the sentence could not be 
faulted as being too long. The second appellant, the secretary, 
was involved in the offence in a minimal way and it was due to 
her association with Keach. Her sentence would be varied to two 
months imprisonment, suspended for two years. Keach's case 
indicates the determination of the courts to pursue the drug 
problem with some vigour. The case also emphasises how the 
Courts are influenced by the intention of the smuggler as to 
the ultimate disposal of the drug.(20). 
In R v Fraser (21) the accused had been convicted of smuggling 
8.6 kilogrammes of cocaine worth £1 million and also possessing 
cocaine with intent to supply. He and two others were said to 
be involved in a worldwide drugs distribution network. The 
trial judge in passing sentence observed that there had been 
many: 
" attempted invasions of the UK since 1066. 
They have all failed - and the invasion by 
drug-pushers will also fail." 
Fraser was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment on each charge and 
the judge made the periods of imprisonment consecutive producing 
the longest prison term ever in Britain for drug offences. The 
trial judge took the view that Fraser played a leading role as 
"organiser and paymaster" (22). Even allowing for Fraser's 
position as a drug smuggler of the first rank, it is submitted 
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that the sentence was harsh. It is perhaps indicative of the 
lack of public sympathy for those convicted of this type of 
drug offence that there was no public reaction or interest 
in Fraser's fate. One would have thought that an appeal 
against sentence was inevitable but as yet no report of such 
an appeal has appeared. 
Finally, in R v Darby (23) the appellant pleaded guilty to being 
concerned in evading the prohibition on the importation of 
cocaine. He had been detected at an airport with 2.95 kilo-
grammes in various packets which were strapped to the back of 
his body and to his shins. The report narrates that the cocaine 
was in fact cocaine hydrochloride of 80 per cent purity. The 
drug was valued at £472,000. He was sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment and he was refused leave to appeal against 
sentence. The Court of Appeal held that the sentence fell 
within the limit suggested for large scale importation of 
Class A drugs in R v Aramah. The sentence was right. 
(2) Diamorphine 
In R v Li (24) the appellant was convicted of importing 
7 kilogrammes of heroin valued at £200,000. Li was actively 
engaged in the early planning, in the smuggling and in the 
resale of the drug. He was sentence to nine years imprisonment. 
He appealed and it seems to have been part of the mitigation that 
the sentence was too harsh because Li had not financed the 
purchase of the heroin. The Court of Appeal held that this 
factor was not of great materiality. It was Li's organisation 
that had led to its import in the course of a commercial 
enterprise. The sentence was a proper one. Li's case involved 
a very large quantity of a drug that was then uncommon. A much 
smaller quantity was involved in R v Po (25). The appellant, 
another Chinaman, attempted to smuggle in 167 grammes of heroin 
with a retail value of £24,000 to £45,000. Po was sentenced to 
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six years imprisonment and he was fined £5000 or 12 months imp-
risonment consecutive in default. The trail judge had indicated 
that the proper sentence was seven years imprisonment that that 
he, the judge, wanted the deterrent effect of the sentence 
to operate also against future carriers. He observed that 
nearly all carriers belonged to an organisation, the funds of 
which were available to its member. He proposed to regard the 
means of the organisation as Po's means. On appeal it was said 
that on one view Po was not prejudiced by the order as no 
complaint could have been made against a seven year sentence. 
However, the actual sentence did offend against the principle 
that a fine should not be imposed on a person who had not the 
means to pay it. There was no reason to suppose that an 
organisation, of which Po might or might not be a member, would 
pay the fine and it would be quashed. 
In R v Dom (26) three individuals were caught smuggling heroin 
from Singapore to London. Dom, a Malaysian police inspector, 
was found in a search of his suitcase by customs to have 
2735 grammes of heroin. He admitted an earlier smuggling trip. 
His two accomplices had got through customs on both occasions 
but they were arrested later at a hotel. The total value of 
both trips was said to be about £1 million. Dom was sentence 
to 10 years imprisonment, the ringleader to 12 years imprisonment 
and the third accomplice to 10 years also. On appeal against 
sentence it was held that: 
" •.. it was idle for persons who allow themselves 
to become involved as carriers in drugs cases to 
complain. Sentences must be deterrent. Those who 
succumb to pressure, even if their resistance is 
weakened by drug addiction, must realise that there 
can be no mitigation." 
Dom and the ringleader had their sentences confirmed but the 
third accomplice, being less involved, had her sentence varied 
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to seven years. 
A further example of the degree of participation in the venture 
as a material variable is R v Jusoh (27). Jusoh was a member of 
the crew of a ship which arrived in Cardiff from Bang Kok. 
Customs officers found 27 pounds (about 12.2 kilogrammes) of 
heroin with an estimated street value in excess of £1 million. 
Jusoh's participation had been to assist the 'primary 
comspirators' to secret the heroin aboard the ship in return 
for a quantity of cannabis. He was sentence to 12 years 
imprisonment. The view of the Court of Appeal was that: 
"Heroin was a permlclous drug whose effects 
were destruction of human life, and severe 
sentences were to be expected. However, it 
was not correct to impose an extremely long 
sentence on a minor participant in a conspiracy 
to import, in order to indicate what the major 
participants might expect if brought to justice. 
Without minimising the gravity of the offence, the 
court would reduce the sentence on the appellant 
to eight years imprisonment, on the basis that 
he was not one of the 'big fish'." (28) 
The same view of heroin as a 'permicious' drug was expressed in 
R v Echteld (29) where an appeal against a sentence of six years 
imprisonment was dismissed. Echteld had tried to smuggle 
281.1 grammes of heroin valued at between £125,000 and £200,000. 
The appeals in R v Poh (30)were against the sentences imposed on 
Poh and another following conviction of smuggling heroin. The 
appellants, aged 64 and 58 years respectively, were involved in 
an attempt to import two cars in which a total of 32 kilogrammes 
of heroin were concealed. Each was sentenced to 14 years 
imprisonment. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Roskill emphasised 
that the court had been told that this was the largest heroin 
haul that had been made in this country. It was said that the 
drug was destined for France but the Court took the view that 
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such a point was wholly irrelevant. He held that: 
"The death and destruction which the 
distribution of this quantity of heroin 
could have caused in any country anywhere 
in the world is all too easy to visualise." (31) 
The defence submissions on appeal were that, firstly, these 
men were not principles but merely engaged in the transit of 
the drugs and, secondly, given the ages of the appellants the 
then maximum sentences ought not to be passes, on humanitarian 
grounds. The Court said that it simply could not accept the 
former proposition and so for the latter: 
" ... these men have forfeited all rights to have 
any humanitarian considerations to be taken into 
account at this stage. They were prepared to 
hazard the lives of literally hundreds, if not 
thousands, of people of all ages up and down the 
Continent of Europe. Why we in this Court are 
now being asked to extend mercy to them merely 
because of their ages is something which this Court 
finds difficult to understand .•. It could be too 
clearly realised that if persons engage in this 
type of trade the penalties must be as heavy as 
the law allows them to be." 
In dismissing these appeals the Court thought it relevant to 
state that in their own country these men would be facing the 
death penalty and in the event of conviction 
" there would be little doubt what their fate 
would have been." 
Again in R v Inglesias (32) the appellant and three others were 
convicted of smuggling heroin. Inglesias was sentenced to eight 
years imprisonment and the others were sentenced similarly. 
Applications for leave to appeal against sentence were refused. 
Stephen Brown J.Delivered the judgement of the court, presided 
over by Lord Lane C.J., and said that the smuggling of heroine 
into this country from Pakistan was a matter of the gravest 
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nature. Further 
"It dealt in death, for it only took a 
very few doses of heroin to give rise to 
addiction which could not be resisted -
a physical addiction which involved a 
craving for more. In that condition those 
who suffered were vulnerable to the pressures 
of the unscrupulous operators who required 
assistance in the further dissemination of 
the drug." (33) 
But the Court of Appeal clearly seeks to maintain a sense of 
relativities in dealing with heroin cases for in R v Monazah 
(34) the appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment 
for smuggling 29.9 grammes of heroin. This was said to be 
valued at £3000. He had pleaded guilty. On appeal, it was 
held that taking into account the comparatively small amount 
of heroin involved and the plea of guilty the sentence was 
excessive and it was varied to three years imprisonment. In 
Scotland there have been fewer opportunities to develop these 
distinctions: in H M Advocate v Nazir (35) the panel smuggled 
three kilogrammes of heroin into this country. It was said by 
a Customs and Excise officer that the drug in that quantity had 
a street value of £4Yz million (sic). Nazir was sentenced to 
seven years imprisonment and Lord McCluskey warned that: 
"The public interest demands that the trafficking 
in enormous quantities of such a highly dangerous 
drug must be severely dealt with." 
(3) Lysergamide 
In a recent book reveiw Piers Brandon observed laconically that: 
"Drug abuse was invented in 1965, a couple of 
years after sexual intercourse." (36) 
At the commencement of the drug problem as a major social matter 
in the 1960's, Lysergamide, or LSD as it was more commonly known, 
featured very prominently. But, so far as can be ascertained, 
~.~ 
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the earliest reported case on smuggling LSD into the United 
Kingdom was as late as 1971. In R v Owens and Weinberger (37) 
two American students came to England with LSD tablets. The 
report cited indicates 100 of these tablets were discovered by 
the police but there is no specifications of the weight or 
potential use of them. Owens was sentenced to six years 
imprisonment and Weinberger to five years. On appeal it was 
submitted that they were not professional dealers and the scale 
of their transactions was not great. In upholding the sentences 
the Court was of the view that the drugs were not simply for the 
appellant's own use, their value was substantial (although 
unspecified in the report) and it was evident that they were 
at least hoping to make sufficient profit to pay for their trip 
to England. Further, the profits available from this kind of 
traffic were so substantial that the courts would not be doing 
their duty if they failed to impose such sentences as would make 
it clear that this kind of crime would not be allowed to pay. 
In R v Humphrey (38) a sentence of three years imprisonment for 
smuggling LSD was upheld notwithstanding the previous good 
character of Humphrey. The aggravating factors were held by the 
court to be the planning that went into the venture and the 
deliberate commission of the offence for profit. The smuggling 
of a very small quantity of LSD for personal use resulted only in 
a fine of £100 in R v Perkins (39). And, in H M Advocate v Jones 
(40) the panel had smuggled in LSD by way of impregnated paper 
sent in a letter. The quantity of the drug was said to be 
sufficient for 250 doses. It is difficult to know from the 
newspaper report whether the drug was intended for the use of the 
panel and a co-accused only or whether it was for resale or 
partially both. In any event the principle panel appears to have 
been sentenced on the basis that it was the middle option of the 
three stated. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment. 
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(4) Opium 
In R v Quadir (41) the appellant smuggled 3703 grammes of opium 
into this country by means of a false bottom in his suitcase. 
He was sentenced to three years imprisonment. But, on appeal, 
the Court took the view that such importation of a large amount 
of a prohibited drug "had to be severely dealt with" although 
the sentence may on another view be considered to be lenient. 
In R v Nazari (42") a young Iranian was sentenced to four years 
imprisonment for smuggling 1:95 kilogrammes of opium. He 
appealed on the matter of deportation but he did not appeal 
against imprisonment. The sentence of imprisonment was held "by 
the appeal court (43) to be in line with the kind of sentence 
which are passed on those who try to smuggle drugs into the 
country. 
A substantially higher quantity was involved in R v Gerani (44), 
namely, 8.87 kilogrammes of prepared opium in the form of 
cigarettes concealed in tins ostensibly containing sweets. 
Gerani and a co-defendant were sentenced to a total of eight 
years imprisonment each. On appeal against sentence it was held 
by Tudor Evans J. that: 
" ..• for this offence the sentence of eight 
years passed on Gerani for the fraudulent 
importation of a large quantity of opium was 
fully justified. Evidence before the court of 
trial from a police inspector was that the demand 
in England for opium out strips the supply, and that 
it did not used to be a locally abused drug, but it 
is becoming one." (45) 
Appeal dismissed. By way of contrast in R v Tennant (46) the 
accused was fined £200 for smuggling 7.4 grammes, a very small 
quantity, of opium with a street value of £37. The defendant 
was a drug addict and it was accepted that this quantity of drug 
was for his own use. 
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(5) Morphine 
Perhaps the earliest reported case dealing with the sentencing of 
a drug offender is R v Miyagawa (47) involving an appeal against 
conviction and an appplication for leave to appeal against a 
sentence of three years imprisonment. In considering this 1924 
case Lord Hewart C.J. simply observed that the sentence was not 
too severe (48). Of greater contemporary interest is R v Ahmad 
(49) where the appellant was an employee of an airline. He was 
caught attempting to carry 991 grammes of morphine through 
customs in a bag with a false bottom. He was sentenced, 
notwithstanding his previous good conduct, to seven years 
imprisonment. On appeal against sentence Lord Lane C.J. recorded 
that the Court had been told that the quantity of morphine had a 
street value of £250,000 and noted the appellant's personal 
circumstances: 
"He has a wife and three children who will suffer 
severely if the prison sentence is to be served. 
Of course, one feels for the wife and children in 
this case, as one feels for the millions of people 
whose lives are made miserable by the trafficking 
in these drugs. It is very important that those 
who act as couriers should be dealt with seriously 
when they are caught because if the couriers can be 
discouraged the trade will suffer a grave blow." (50) 
In these circumstances the defendant in R v Johnson (51) may 
consider himself lucky to receive only six months imprisonment 
for smuggling 110 grammes of morphine. The newspaper report is 
unclear as to the evidence, if any, of the defendant's intended 
disposal of the drug. But the trial judge is quoted as saying 
that: 
"The importing of drugs into this country 
is steadily rising. The effect on people 
into whose hands they fall is totally 
devastating and not infrequently fatal." 
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CLASS B 
(1) Cannabis 
The English appeal court has stressed that smuggling Class B 
drugs involves penalties that are less heavy than those for 
Class A drugs. Such a principle has authority in the maximum 
penalties contained in Schedule 4 to the 1971 Act, but there 
relevant cases: R v Murbank (52) is the first reported case 
on the point and it was considered again in more detail in 
Rv Williams (53). In the latter the appellant was sentenced 
to five years. imprisonment for smuggling 14~ pounds of 
cannabis resin. The ground of appeal was that the sentence was 
too long wh~n compared with sentences imposed for much larger 
quantities of Class A drugs, such as cocaine. The appeal court 
held that. it was not possible to be lenient with carriers and 
that the sentence was not excessive. 
"It was the stated policy of Parliament that 
trade in cannabis should be stopped and of 
necessity that meant passing severe sentences." 
In R v Taroh (54) the appellant assisted in smuggling 
4~ kilogrammes of cannabis into England by collecting a parcel 
from Manchester Airport. He hoped to earn some £3000. He was 
sentenced to three years imprisonment. On appeal it was held 
that although this was a serious offence, it was less serious 
than importing a 'hard' drug. As it was also his first offence 
and he had pleaded guilty, the sentence was varied to two years 
imprisonment. 
To try to elucidate the policy on smuggling cannabis it is 
necessary to return to 1962 when the Court gave an early 
indication of its views: in R v Hussain (55) the appellant 
arrived at London airport from Pakistan in possession of three 
tins of cannabis which he tried to take through customs. The 
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report of 1962 does not indicate the quantity of drug involved. 
Hussain had been convicted to two offences, namely unloading 
prohibited goods from an aircraft and possessing a dangerous 
drug. The Court of Criminal Appeal, with Lord Parker presiding, 
held that generally the appropriate way to deal with two offences 
arising out of the same transaction was by giving concurrent 
sentences. However, 'as Hussain had commited a serious offence 
and to deter others the sentences of two and three years 
imprisonment consecutive were varied to two and five years 
concurrent! 
In R v Daher (56) the appellant had pleaded guilty to two 
charges concerned with his importation of 9~ pounds of cannabis 
resin. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment. In 
dismissing the appeal Salmon L.J. said that: 
" this trade of smuggling drugs into the 
country and peddling them to people is a 
terrible and dangerous trade, and it is the 
duty of the Courts to do all that it can to 
stamp it out. It is impossible in those 
circumstances for us to hold that the (trial 
judge) was wrong in principle when he imposed 
this sentence which was clearly intended to be 
a deterrent sentence." (57) 
The same appeal court judge made trenchant remarks in 
DPP v Dott (58). Doot and four others pleaded guilty to 
importing cannabis and were sentenced. On appeal the Court 
quashed the convictions on legal grounds but certified a point 
of law of general importance. The House of Lords allowed the 
Crown appeal and restored the convictions. In the course of his 
speech Lord Salmon, as he had then become, narrated (59) how the 
appellants had imported a total of 129 kilogrammes of cannabis 
resin in two consignments valued then at not less than £60,000 
in total. 
~~ ~ 
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"This was not a case of merely being in 
possession of a small quantity of dangerous 
drugs for one's own use and that of one's 
friends. It was a case of trading on a vast 
scale in dangerous drugs for gain. The 
minimum sentence normally imposed for unlawfully 
importing £30,000 worth of cannabis alone is 
certainly worth not less than four years 
imprisonment for a defendant with a clean record. 
Indeed, I have known the Court of Appeal, on 
more than one occasion, to refuse leave to appeal 
against a sentence of six years for such an 
offence. These were carefully planned crimes ... 
(Certain of the defendants were sentenced respectively 
to) twelve months and eighteen months imprisonment on 
the conspiracy count and concurrently to nine months 
imprisonment each on the counts for unlawfully 
importing the vast quantities of cannabis. Doot, 
who master minded the whole operation, was sentenced 
to thirty-three months imprisonment and (another 
defendant), his chief lieutenant, to twenty-seven 
months in all. So far as I am concerned, these 
sentences pass all understanding. No factor 
mentioned when the sentences were pronounced in 
anyway explains them .•. I think it right and 
indeed necessary to take the exceptional course 
of commenting on these sentences lest silence 
might lead courts, in the future, into the belief 
that such sentences could be appropriated for crimes 
of this extreme gravity." 
Later, in R v Hancock (6) 17.2 kilogrammes of cannabis were 
involved. Hancock was recruited by a man called Holdgate and 
between them they continued to smuggle the drug from Sri Lanka 
to Canada via England and America. They were caught when 
Holdgate was detained in London. He was sentenced later to 
five years imprisonment and Hancock to four years. The court 
considered that it was a special consideration that both men 
were on the "bottom rung of a ladder" involving drug smuggling. 
On appeal it was held that the sentences were right in principle, 
not excessive and correctly reflected the lesser involvement of 
Hancock. Dr D A Thomas' commentary on the case included his view 
that: 
-73-
"In the majority of cases of importing cannabis 
which have been before the courts in recent years, 
the court has upheld sentences within the bracket 
of three to five years, inside that bracket the 
sentence upheld depends on the quantity of cannabis 
imported, the degree of sophistication and organisation 
involved in the attempt, and the role of the 
individual offender." (61) 
The continuous flow of drugs cases through the courts and 
thereafter through the appeal courts led to the types of 
distinctions enumerated by Dr Thomas in his commentary cited. 
In R v Williams (62) the appellant arrived at London Airport 
carrying suitcases containing 5.15 kilogrammes of cannabis. 
The Court accepted that the appellant intended to use the 
cannabis for his own consumption, and to sell some to his 
fellow members of the Rastafarian sect. The Court, therefore, 
was not faced with the usual example of commercial importation 
by a professional smuggler. Cantley J. referred to these 
special circumstances of the appellant: 
"He belongs to a sect in Jamaica called 
Rastafarians. There are persons in this country 
who profess whatever beliefs Rastafarians have. 
The Court was informed, and accepted, that 
Rastafarians make an extensive, and indeed 
spectacular use of cannabis. The Court was 
informed by counsel that this appellant would 
probably consume a pound or two of cannabis in 
a week, smoking some of it and using the rest of 
it in some concoction such as tea, and this was 
not only a pleasure, but a form of religious rite. 
The Court was informed, and accepted, that the 
intention of the appellant was to sell the 
cannabis, or some of it, and was confined to 
selling to Rastafarians in this country." (63) 
But the Court wished to make it clear that the appellant was to 
be treated as a smuggler, but not as a professional one as he 
had a good job in Jamaica. On those grounds the sentence of 
three years imprisonment was reduced by the appeal court to two 
years. The Court's policy was stated clearly and succinctly in 
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the penultimate and ultimate sentences of the judgement: 
"Anyone.who does what he did must except to 
be imprisoned as he has been. The only question 
is for how long." (64) 
In R v McLurkin (65) the accused was convicted of smuggling 
cannabis said to be worth about £18,000. His part seemed to be 
restricted to the removal from London Airport of certain items 
in which the drug was concealed. On appeal against sentence of 
three years imprisonment it was held that knowingly to take part 
in an international plan to import cannabis into the United 
Kingdom by the sophisticated means used was a very serious 
offence and that sentence was by no means severe. Alternatively, 
in R v Forsythe (66) the accused was sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment. He was convicted of three offences of smuggling 
about 160 kilogrammes estimated to be worth £200,000 at retail 
and £78,000 to the importer. The accused was to receive about 
one quarter of the proceeds of sale. On appeal it was sumbitted 
that the total sentence was out of accord with sentences passed 
in comparable cases. The Court of Appeal held that the sentence 
of imprisonment was excessive and instead imposed five years 
imprisonment. The trial judge had ordered the forfeiture of 
£2700 found in the possession of the appellant as part of the 
proceeds of sale. This part of the sentence was upheld by the 
appeal court. 
The 1980 case of R v Bibi (67) has become a classic in its own 
right as it contained an explicit statement of general policy. 
In the judgement on appeal Lord Lane C.J. pointed out that it 
was no secret that our prisons were dangerously overcrowded. 
This was so much so that sentencing courts must be particularly 
careful to examine each case to ensure if an immediate custodial 
sentence is necessary, that the sentence is as short as possible, 
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consistent only with the duty to protect the interests of the 
public and to punish and deter the criminal (68). This unusual 
step was taken to advise the courts of the general appellate 
Court in England. That view was that many offenders could be 
dealt with as justly and effectively by a sentence of six or 
nine months imprisonment as by a sentence of eighteen months or 
three years. A number of categories of individuals to whom this 
might apply were set out including fringe participants in more 
serious crimes. However, it stated explicitly that medium or 
longer term sentences would continue to be appropriate in a 
number of other categories of crime, including planned crime for 
wholesale profit, and large scale trafficking in drugs. 
Mrs Bibi was a 49 year old widow and she was convicted of 
smuggling cannabis into this country but there was no question 
of her being an organiser or a carrier. The whole plan was 
conceived by her brother in law in whose house she lived and to 
whom she was subservient. Her sole act was to unpack cannabis 
from a parcel that had been sent to the house through the post 
from Kenya. She had been sentenced to three years imprisonment 
but, on appeal, applying the new principle and since she was a 
first offender only on the fringes of the enterprise and any 
prison sentence would be traumatic for her that sentence was 
quashed. In turn, a sentence of six months' imprisonment 
was substituted. On the same principle the appellant in 
R v Stafford (69) had participated as a principle in smuggling 
18 kilogrammes of cannabis into this country and his appeal was, 
on that basis, refused. Again, in R v Chisti (70) the appellant 
pleaded guilty to being concerned in smuggling one third of a 
ton of cannabis in a wooden crate. He was sentenced to nine 
years imprisonment and recommended for deportation. On appeal 
Sheldon J. held: 
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"This was a very serious offence, in which the 
appellant played a leading and important part. 
Anyone involved in any such activity must expect 
a substantial sentence of immediate imprisonment. 
This Court agrees more over with the learned trial 
judge that it was necessary to pass a deterrent 
sentence. On the other hand, however important 
the appellant was to the success of the venture, 
this Court accepts that he was not the principle 
in the transaction, for whom such a sentence as 
that now under review would have been appropriate." (71) 
Accordingly, the appellant's sentence was reduced to six years 
imprisonment with the recommendation for deportation upheld. 
The principle of immediate imprisonment of a medium term was 
emphasised further in R v Abdul (72) where the appellant had 
attempted to obtain delivery of three crates which had arrived 
by air from Ghana. The crates contained 43.65 kilogrammes of 
cannabis with a street value of £65,000. He was sentenced to 
five years imprisonment and recommended for deportation. On 
appeal Balcome J. held that: 
" •.• this was an offence - the large scale 
importation of drugs - for which the Court has 
said on many previous occasions that a prison 
sentence of a substantial amount is necessary." (73) 
But, said the Court, having regard to the fact that the drug 
involved was Class B rather than Class A and that the appellant 
was aged 43 years and of previous good character, that a sentence 
of three years would be appropriate and in accordance "with the 
general principles on which the Court acts." Appeal allowed and 
varied as stated. 
In R v Nesbitt (74) the appellants were convicted of smuggling 
17 kilogrammes by sea from Kenya and into this country by means 
of a corrupt dock worker. After a lengthy trial the appellants 
were sentenced to six years, four and a half years and two and a 
2.45 
-77-
half years respectively. The main ground of appeal was that the 
sentences imposed were outside the bracket of sentences which is 
clearly regarded as appropriate for a single act of smuggling a 
consignment of cannabis. In the judgement of the Court three 
distinct points arose: firstly, one the the appellants denied 
that he was the ringleader or the organiser of the venture. The 
trial judge having heard all the evidence formed the view that 
this particular appellant was the "managing director". The other 
appellants had been sentenced in relation to that alleged 
director so that much turned on his status. The Court of Appeal 
observed that: 
" it would be most reluctant, after a trial 
of that length (in fact, 29 working days), to 
substitute its own view as to the relative 
criminality of these men for the view of the 
learned judge. If the matter had been dealt with 
by a plea, or dealt with on documents, different 
considerations might apply. But where, after a long 
trial, a judge has formed a view that one man is the 
ringleader, then, in the view of (the Court of Appeal), 
unless there is strong evidence to indicate that he 
was not, this Court should not interfere." (75) 
Thus it is that the appellate court will not extend its 
jurisdiction to include those matters that are properly for a 
trial judge. 
The second point arising is the attention that the appellate 
court in England pays to the views of academic writers. Counsel 
for one of the appellants drew the attention of the Court to the 
case of R v Forsythe and the commentary on that case by Dr Thomas 
in his book on the Principles of Sentencing (76). There the 
learned author summarises matters by saying that sentences upheld 
for the importation of cannabis are: 
" usually in the bracker of three to five 
years." 
L-_____________________________________________________________________________________________ ~._. , 
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The Court of Appeal observed in R v Nessbitt that 
" the limits of brackets are not 
sancrosanct, and the circumstances of 
particular cases may be such that the 
judge is justified in imposing a sentence 
which is longer than the normal limits 
accepted as being appropriate for the 
offence." (77) 
It is interesting that the Court did not mention that the 
judge in a case may pass a sentece lower than the lower limit 
of the brackets but perhaps that was so obvious as to be 
unworthy of mention. In any event the dictum indicates 
perhaps one of the central difficulties of this study. Just 
as attempts are made to synthesise the views of the Bench on 
any topic and to consider limits so these limits are said to 
be for guidance only. 
The third point arising is that, notwithstanding the first and 
second points, the Court held that the sentence imposed on the 
principal participant, the "managing director", was outside the 
normal range of sentences which are considered appropriate for 
offences of this kind! There were no aggravating circumstances 
to justify a longer sentence. Accordingly, the six years was 
reduced to four years imprisonment and there was an appropriate 
adjustment in the sentences of the "lieutenants" to, reflect the 
differential culpability. And a further example of a sentence 
being held to be out of the usual run for similar cases is 
R v Omisore (78). The appellant had been sentenced to five years 
imprisonment for smuggling 4 kilogrammes of cannabis. On appeal 
the sentence was reduced to three years imprisonment, partly for 
the reasons stated, but also for the adverse effect that prison 
was having on the appellant's health. His family was in Nigeria 
and he was unable to eat the food in prison. (79). 
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Section 3(1) 
" (b) the exportation of a controlled 
drug is hereby prohibited." 
The Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 provides by 
Section 68: 
"(2) Any person knowlingly concerned in the 
exportation ... or in the attempted exportation 
of any goods with intent to evade any such prohibition 
or restriction ... shall be guilty of an offence under 
this subsection and may be arrested." 
The punishment is in terms of Section 68(4) and Schedule 1 to the 
1979 Act. It seems clear that exportation is a comparatively 
rare offence to come before the Courts. But as drug traffickers 
can be seen as participants in the economic process of meeting 
the demand for goods by supplying what is sought then exportation 
may occur not infrequently. With exportation the controlled 
drugs are being removed from the home jurisdiction to another 
elsewhere. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot (1) an 
appeal was taken by prosecuting authorities against a decision 
of the Court of Appeal to quash certain convictions. The House 
of Lords allowed the appeal and restored the convictions. 
Lord Salmon held: 
"It is surely no mitigation that the defendants 
intended to commit further crimes by exporting 
the prohibited drugs from this country ... it 
hardly seems in accordance with the rules of 
international comity that our courts should 
treat the defendants with special leniency because 
their crimes were more likely to ruin young lives 
in the United States of America than in this 
country." (2) 
The same principle was upheld in R v Dhingra (3) where the Court 
said that the fact that a controlled drug is intended for 
re-export and consumption outside the United Kingdom is not 
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a relevant consideration. 
The rarity of the offence of exportation means that there is a 
dearth of case law and little indication of detailed policy. 
The following two cases contain something of the policy view 
but the offences of which the accused where convicted were not 
those of exportation.' Nevertheless, it is submitted, the 
circumstances of each case amounts in effect to an exportation 
of the drug concerned. In R v Yont (4) the appellant was an 
American citizen who was engaged in smuggling 77 poun&of 
herbal cannabis into the United States. He was arrested en 
route in England and he pleaded guilty to possessing the drugs. 
He was sentenced to three years imprisonment and recommended 
for deportation. The Court of Appeal held that as the appellant 
was very ill and there was no reason why he should be supported 
and cared for in England, his sentence was varied so as to allow 
his release in thirty days and to enable arrangements to be made 
for his deportation. The Court took note especially that the 
offence was directed by the appellant against his own country 
rather than this one. The view of the Court in Yont's case 
was expressed in 1967 and in Doot's case in 1972. In the 
former the Court seemed happy in the circumstances to 'move on' 
the appellant whereas in the latter the Court would not. Perhaps 
the distinction is that Yont was taking the drugs to his own 
country whereas Dott was not. This distinction, it is submitted, 
was confirmed in effect in R v Otjen (5) where the appellant was 
a Nigerian national travelling by air from Nigeria to Amsterdan. 
He was required to disembark at Heathrow only because the 
aircraft was withdrawn form service. When his hand luggage was 
inspected as he was about to board the replacement aircraft, he 
was found to be in possession of 3.84 kilogrammes of herbal 
cannabis. He had previously served a sentence of imprisonment 
in England for importing cannabis. He was sentenced to 30 months 
imprisonment and recommended for deportation. On appeal, counsel, 
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argued for the appellant that this was a "technical importation" 
because goods are imported into this country the moment the 
aircraft lands. Secondly, it was never intended that these 
drugs should be distributed in this country as they were always 
destined for Amsterdam. Lord Justice Griffiths held that: 
" this is a case which has to be viewed 
against the undoubted fact that the drug trade 
is an international business carried on to the 
detriment 'of citizens in all civilised countries, 
and this country owes a duty to other civilised 
countries to do all in its power to deter this 
trade, whether or not the drugs are intended for 
consumption in this country or some other country. 
It would be quite wrong for this country to say, 
having apprehended a courier carrying a very large 
quantity of drugs, "well, we will have nothing to do 
with it, because the drugs were destined for another 
country." If we were to take that attitude, it 
would be inviting all the couriers to use our 
airports for the purpose of distributing illegal 
drugs." (6) 
In dismissing the appeal it was observed that as the appellant 
had been given credit for his guilty plea and had 0 similar 
previous conviction there were no grounds on which it would be 
right for the Court to interfere with the sentence. 
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Section 4: Restriction of production and supply of controlled 
drugs 
The offences in section 4 of the 1971 Act strike at the most 
commercial aspects of the drugs trade. Professor John Kaplan 
has said in his important book The Hardest Drug: Heroin and 
Public Policy that: 
"The effects of the criminal law upon the heroin 
problem arise mainly from two categories of 
governmental actions - those aimed at the supplier 
and those aimed at the user of the drug. Law 
enfor~ement efforts of the former type attempt to 
lessen the availability of heroin; those of the 
latter kind try to prevent or reduce the use of 
heroin by people who manage to gain access." (1) 
It is submitted that the policy aim of section 4 is to try to 
lessen the availability of all controlled drugs, such 
availability as there is by way of production and supply. 
Production 
Section 4 
(1)" it shall not be lawful for a person 
(b) to produce a controlled drug; 
(2) " ... it is an offence for a person -
(a) to produce a controlled drug in contravention 
of sub-section (1) above:" 
It is worth noting that by section 37(1) of the 1971 Act it is 
provided that "produce" where the reference is to producing a 
controlled drug, means producing it by manufacture, cultivation 
or any other method, and "production" has a corresponding 
meaning. Accordingly, if the whole of the drugs trade is seen as 
a continuum then the offence of production represents one extreme 
of the line. The overt acts which Parliament seeks to punish are 
best illustrated by the case which has come to the known by its 
tfila 
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police title, Operation Julie (1). The reported cases dealing 
with that operation are strictly concerned with the crime of 
conspiracy to contravene Section 4 of the 1971 Act. Thus the 
cases of R v Kemp and R v Cuthbertson are considered elsewhere 
in this work. 
To be concerned in the production 
Section 4 
(1)" it shall not be lawful for a person -
(a) to produce a controlled drug;" 
(2) " ... it is an offence for a person ... 
(b) to be concerned in the production of such 
a drug in contravention of that sub-section by 
another." 
This part of the offence has been widely drafted to involve 
persons who may be involved only on the periphery of any 
production but who nevertheless contribute something to the 
whole process. There are no relevant reported cases to be 
considered here. 
Supply 
This part of the whole offence contained in Section 4 comprises 
four separate offences namely: 
Section 4 
(1) " ... it shall not be lawful for a person -
(b) to supply or offer to supply a controlled 
drug to another;" 
(3) " ... it is an offence for a person - (a) to 
supply or offer to supply a controlled drug to 
another in contravention of sub-section (1) above; 
or (b) to be concerned in the supplying of such 
a drug to another in contravention of that sub-section; 
or (c) to be concerned in the making to another in 
contravention of that sub-section of an offer to 
supply such a drug." 
Each of these offences is considered in turn below. 
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1. Supply 
Section 4(3)(a) can be subdivided into supplying and offering to 
supply controlled drugs although it would seem that there is only 
one reported case concerened with the latter offence. This 
section is itself nevertheless divided into sub-categories, as 
the court in R v Anderson observed: 
" while all dealing with unlawful substances 
was serious, dealing in Class A drugs was more 
serious than dealing with Class B drugs such as 
cannabis. Parliament had placed LSD in Class A 
and it was the duty of the courts to accept that 
categorisation." (3). 
It is on that authority that the various controlled drugs are 
categorised in this work. It has been said before that in 
many cases the facts and the offences are complicated and not 
made especially explicit in the report. For example in 
R v Rollings (4) the accused was convicted and sentenced on the 
following charges: 
'1. unlawful supply of cannabis resin: 4 years imprisonment. 
2. possession of heroin with intent to supply: 6 years 
imprisonment. 
3. unlawful possession of heroin: 5 years imprisonment. 
4. possession of cannabis resin with intent to supply: 
4 years imprisonment.' 
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently making a sentence 
in effect of 6 years imprisonment. The appeal against sentence 
was dismissed on the basis that there was nothing wrong in 
principle with these sentences. The report does reveal something 
of the background to these offences but, it is submitted, these 
are insufficient to explain fully how the sentences were arrived 
at. Further, it is difficult to decide where to place Rollings 
in the scheme of things because of his varied involvement with 
different controlled drugs. 
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Class A 
(a) Amphetamine Sulphate 
In R v Emson (5) the appellant supplied a drug taker with between 
8 and 10 packets of amphetamine sulphate. She was a 22 year old 
woman with a two year old son. It appears that the appellant had 
told the police that she knew she would be caught one day but she 
treated the matter as a game. She committed two similar offences 
a month later when she sold further quantities of the drug. She 
was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years. On appeal it 
was held that as prison reports had shown that the appellant had 
learnt her lesson and medical reports indicated that both she and 
her son would benefit if her sentence was reduced to one or two 
years imprisonment. The sentences of four years were too severe. 
(b) Cocaine 
The only reported cases concerning the supply of cocaine are 
newspaper articles. The considerable detail in the first article 
is attributable to the involvement of a journalist in revealing 
the offence and the fact that the defendant is the daughter of a 
Member of Parliament. In R v Freud (6) the defendant had sold 
journalists three grammes of cocaine on two separate occasions. 
The matter was reported to the police and Miss Freud was charged 
and appeared in Croydon Crown Court. She pleaded guilty. She 
was of previous good character and she was expecting a child. 
She alleged that she had been 'pestered' by a friend into 
supplying the drug. In sentencing, Judge Clay observed that: 
"Those who supply drugs to others must expect 
lengthy sentences of imprisonment, but in this 
case, in my view, the circumstances where unusual, 
certainly most unusual, and I trust they will never 
be repeated." 
The sentence was one of 15 months imprisonment suspended, £500 
fine and prosecution costs estimated at £3000. The aim of 
,A 
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counsel's mitigation was to move the judge to impose a suspended 
sentence rather than immediate imprisonment and to that extent 
was successful. The remainder of the judge's comments were 
taken up with the criticism of the nature of the involvement of 
the journalists, (7) for present purposes however it is clear 
that the supply of cocaine attracts a term of imprisonment. That 
was certainly borne out in H M Advocate v Clayton (8) where the 
panel was convicted of supplying inter alia cocaine. The trial 
judge, Lord Mayfield, made no comment on the principle we are 
now considering but a sentence of eight years imprisonment was 
passed. A total of £62,000 in bank notes and a quantity of 
cocaine said to be worth £400 was forfeited by the Court. 
However, the judge did say that: 
"The Courts have made it clear that people like 
you will be severely ,dealt with to try and eliminate 
this terrible epidemic of drug addiction which affects 
the lives of many people, particularly the young." 
(c) Diamorphine 
As a matter of drafting it is perhaps worth noting that in 1967 
Lord Edmund Davies L.J. indicated that: 
"For future guidance it might perhaps be desirable 
to state that, since heroin is a word which does 
not appear to be included in any of the schedules 
to which we have been referred, it would be preferable 
that the term employed in the Schedule - namely, 
diamorphine - should also be employed in the 
indictment, followed in parenthesis by some such 
words as "commonly known as heroin". In that way, 
any dubiety which might otherwise exist would be 
demolished very rapidly." (9) 
Much of the notoriety of diamorphine or heroin follows from its 
popular status as a 'hard' Drug. Professor Kaplan has questioned 
this status, and he may well have been the first to do so, in 
print at least: 
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"It is not at all clear why heroin should be the 
'hardest' drug. It is, after all, a white powder 
indistinguishable to the eye from cocain, mescaline, 
various amphetamines and barbiturates, nicotine and 
caffeine - some of which are 'soft' and others not 
popularly considered drugs at all. It is true that 
heroin is addicting, but this complex property ... is 
shaved by many other drugs we do not consider 'hard' 
at all." 
The professor continues later to provide some sort of answer: 
"In all probability, the hardness of heroin, in 
the public view, stems from a combination of factors 
the condition of those users who come to our attention; 
the public attitude towards the kinds of people who 
use the drug; the serious criminal penalties for its 
sale or use; the strong social disapproval it evokes; 
and the enormous social cost to the nation attributed 
to its use." (10) 
As an indication of the strong legal disapproval that heroin 
evokes one cannot do better than cite Henry Brinton's view that: 
"Murder is perhaps a lesser sin than trading in 
heroin, and it is difficult to envisage a penatly 
severe enough to punish one who makes a profit out 
of the degredation and destruction of human lives." (11) 
It is submitted that some of these factors outlined by Professor 
Kaplan will be noted in the judgements of the appeal cases 
involving heroin. Indeed, of several reported sentencing cases 
predating the 1971 Act perhaps the most interesting is 
R v Macauley (12) where the appellant had been convicted of 
supplying six heroin tablets to a boy who was fifteen years old. 
The report does not indicate whether these tablets were for the 
boy's own use or for onward transmission, but perhaps the former 
can be inferred from a fair reading of the judgement. At any 
rate, Macauley received the then statutory maximum of ten years 
imprisonment and the court said that: 
a 
-
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"Ten years was the maximum sentence, and that 
fact of itself causes the Court to pause and ask 
itself anxiously whether that was the right sentence 
to impose. Holy Writ has in dread terms declared what 
in the fitting fate of those who place a stumbling 
block in the path of the young. And Parliament has 
rightly had regard to the growing menace of drug 
addiction. Anyone supplying a mere child, a boy of 
fifteen, a hard drug is doing a most terrible deed 
which calls for grave punishment." (13) 
The appeal was dismissed. There can be no doubting the 
seriousness of Macauley's actions and, it is submitted, that the 
Court was correct in forming the view that an exemplary sentence 
was required. It is perhaps an indication, however, of the state 
of knowledge or experience of drug offences that Macauley should 
be placed at the top of the supplier's scale. He seems not to 
have made a profit or much of a profit and the quantities 
involved were not great, although it is conceded that by the 
standards of 1967 six heroin tablets might have been substantial. 
The principle aggravation in the case would seem to be the 
recipient's age. 
Seven years later the Court had developed a more subtle approach 
to the drugs trade. In R v Owens (14) the appellant was 
convicted of supplying and possessing heroin. 8.5 grammes of 
heroin, done up in 120 twists and valued then at £1000, was 
found at her home. She was alleged to have admitted that it was 
hers and that she had been selling heroin obtained from Chinese 
sources. A sentence of five years imprisonment was appealed. 
The special considerations were that she was a registered heroin 
addict but that she was weaning herself from her addiction. It 
was said that she had been drawn into a chain of suppliers and 
she did not make large profits. The sentence was passed as a 
punishment for taking part in an offence which caused much 
suffering and as a deterrent to others. A probation officer 
expressed the view that the sentence could have a detrimental 
effect on her personality. On appeali t was held that it was an 
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" anxious and unhappy case" and that the sentence was 
severe but not so severe as to warrant interfering with it. 
Thus it is that notwithstanding the drug addiction of an acccued 
person medium terms of imprisonment were passed for supplying 
heroin. 
R v Chatwood (15) is essentially an authority for a point in the 
law of evidence but one of the accused had appealed against 
sentence. He had pleaded guilty to possessing controlled drugs 
and also to supplying heroin. He was sentenced to three years 
imprisonment on the supply charge and six months imprisonment 
concurrent on each of the possession charges, it was said, was 
excessibe. Forbes J held that: 
"A sentence of three years for supplying heroin 
cannot, in the view of this court, be regarded as 
excessive or wrong in principle." (16) 
The appeal was dismissed. Again, in R v Ashraf (17) the accused 
pleaded guilty to possessing heroin and to supplying heroin and 
he admitted supplying heroin on one occasion. He was sentenced 
to seven years impriosnment. The second accused in the same 
case, a man called Huq, pleaded guilty to possessing heroin and 
offering to supply heroin. He had been arrested for having an 
offensive weapon, and he was found to be in possession of two 
packets containing 52 grammes of heroin, estimated to have a 
street value of £5200. He was sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment. On sentencing these two men the trail judge said: 
"Every person who has any knowledge of drugs 
whatsoever knows that heroin is one of the most 
addictive drugs known to man. It is a drug which 
has the power to destroy a man both physically and 
morally and those who deal in it are merchants of 
total misery to its recipients." 
The Court of Appeals indicated that it agreed with that entirely 
and found that the trial judge could not be criticised in any 
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way. The appellate court held that: 
"Beginners or not, anyone who trades in 
dangerous drugs, particularly heroin, must 
expect, when caught, very severe sentences. 
Those who deal are caught perhaps more 
frequently than those who supply to them, 
and it may be that if those who deal and 
those who are minded to deal realise the 
courts will pass severe sentences, they will 
be less inclined to indulge in this dangerous 
and miserable trade." (18) 
In R v Gee (19) the appellant was convicted of selling heroin 
and methadone to obtain money to purchase heroin for himself. He 
pleaded guilty to a number of offences, some of which were 
committed while on bail for others. He was sentenced to six 
years imprisonment. On appeal it was held that while the case 
merited an immediate and substantial sentence of imprisonment. 
Mustill J. observed that it was: 
II essential to realise that there are gradations 
in the gravity of offences of this type, and it is 
essential in each case for the Court to do its best 
to place the particular offences at the correct part 
of the scale of seriousness. 
Where do the present offences lie on the scale? 
At the bottom of the scale is the small social 
supplier, the man who does supply drugs, but only 
within the limited circle of friends and not for gain. 
Markedly higher up the scale, though substantially 
below the top of it, is the small professional middle 
man who supplies drugs in order to make a profit. 
It seems to us that this appellant lies between the 
two points on the scale which we have identified .•. " (20) 
This was considered in R v Guiney (21) where the appellant 
pleaded guilty to two charges of supplying heroin and possessing 
534 milligrammes of heroin with intent to supply. He had been 
arrested in possession of the quantity of heroin stated which 
was in 20 paper wraps and £375 in cash. He admitted that he had 
bought the heroin the previous day and had sold some to 
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customers. He claimed that he sold only to friends and to 
existing addicts. He was sentenced to six years imprisonment. 
On appeal, counsel argued, firstly, that no discount had been 
given for the guilty plea and, secondly, that the sentence was 
excessive in the light of the decision in Gee's case. The Court 
of Appeal said that: 
" the appellant in·Gee had come somewhere 
between the small scale social supplier supplying 
friends without profit, and the small scale 
professional middleman supplying drugs for 
profit." (22) 
The scale description would fit Guiney and on the basis that the 
appellate court has an important function of trying to achieve 
consistency, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to reduce the 
sentence to four years. But the Court added the observation that 
if in the future the menace of heroin continued to increase in 
the way in which it had then the scale of penalties as 
reflected in the authorities would have to rise. If that was so 
then others in the position of Gee and Guiney might have to be 
sentenced to terms in excess of those particular appellants. 
Further, in the wider context Dr Thomas saw R v Guiney as 
providing an illustration of both the value and acceptability 
of the citing of previous decisions of the Court in comparable 
cases as a basis for argument in appeals dealing simply with 
length of sentence. He argued also (23) that the decision of 
the Court to follow R v Gee indicates a recognition of the fact 
that consistency, said to be one of the major reasons for the 
Court's existance, can be achieved only if previous decisions 
are considered in deciding whether a particular sentence is 
excessive or not. On a lower level the decision in R v Guiney 
confirms the Court's views on the sentence for a small scale 
heroin dealer. 
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(d) Lysergamide 
In R v Vickery (24) there was a plea of guilty to supplying LSD. 
It seems that Vickery had bought a motor cycle from another for 
200 LSD tablets, a fur coat and £25. He then assisted the other 
to find buyers for the tablets. Vickery was sentenced to three 
years imprisonment. He had two previous convictions relating to 
drugs. In dismissing his appeal against sentence, the appellant 
was told that: 
" LSD tablets were a very dangerous form of 
drugs and three years imprisonment could be 
regarded as the minimum sentence for supplying 
them~ in the absence of extenuating circumstances. 
In the present case there was an element of 
aggravation because Vickery had helped the other 
man to sell the tablets. Those who supplied drugs 
should be treated much more severely than those 
who possessed them, as had been recognised by 
Parliament. The sooner it was appreciated that 
those who supplied drugs would get severe sentences 
the better it would be." (25) 
This approach was repeated almost seven years later in 
R v Musgrove (26) where the presiding judge in the Appeal Court 
was Lord Lawton L.J. Musgrove pleaded guilty to supplying and 
possessing LSD. He was a first year undergraduate university 
student. He bought drugs and resold them to other students at 
cost price. His position was that he did not make a profit but 
he was rendering a service. He was sentenced to three years 
imprisonment. The Court said that it was desperately sad when a 
young man got himself into this situation but there was a duty to 
say in unmistakeable and unambiguous terms that this kind of law 
breaking, using prohibited drugs and dealing in them among 
students would not be tolerated and would be dealt with by severe 
sentences. The appeal against sentence would be dismissed as the 
sentence imposed was a proper one. 
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In R v Virgin (27) there were guilty pleas to supplying LSD, 
possessing LSD with intent to supply and possessing LSD, 
amphetamines and cannabis resin. Virgin had sold five LSD 
tablets to a young man for £10 and he had also been found to 
be in possession of enough LSD to provide about 48 doses. He 
was sentenced to three and a half years imprisonment concurrent 
on the two counts relating to the supply of LSD with concurrent 
sentences for the other offences. He appealed against sentence 
and his plea in mitigation was that he only supplied drugs in a 
small way to enable him to buy others for his own consumption. 
In short, Virgin contended that he was the last link in the chain 
of supply. On appeal Sheldon J. held that: 
"The extreme dangers of LSD are, or should be, 
common knowledge and need no emphasis. They are 
such that, bearing in mind the relative ease with 
which the drug can be distributed by any who might 
wish to do so, those who are convicted of supplying 
it must anticipate a substantial prison sentence." 
Later, after further consideration, the Court continued that: 
"In a recent social inquiry report ... , the reporting 
officer said that the appellant was "shocked by the 
length of prison sentence he received" and that it 
was to be anticipated that it would have a salutory 
effect on any future involvement by him with drugs. 
So it is to be hoped - such indeed is one purpose of 
a sentence such as this." (28) 
Class B 
(1) Cannabis 
The availability of cannabis and its various forms is such that 
convictions relating to it are common place and so too are 
appeals. Of the many cases that are reported, only a handful 
have exceptional facts and circumstances or meaningful statements 
of principle on sentencing. There is clearly an historical 
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aspect to this part of the study: the first two cases indicate 
the hard line taken by the English appeal court in the 1960's. 
In R v Williams (29) a sentence of five years imprisonment was 
upheld for a 38 year old man who invited a 14 year old girl 
into his house. There he gave her a cigarette containing 
cannabis which she smoked and was later sick. He told her 
various things about drugs. His defence was complete denial. 
Again, in R v Sang (30) police officers had kept Sang under 
observation for some time before approaching him. They asked 
him if he had any cannabis for sale and he replied "you'll get 
a good deal from me. I'm the best pusher round here." He then 
offered them twenty-two deals of cannabis for £10. According to 
the report, he pleaded guilty to possessing cannabis although he 
was certainly sentenced as a supplier. He had previous 
convictions for possessing cannabis. The appeal court held that 
having regard to Sang's previous convictions and his description 
of himself (which he had denied in evidence) the sentence of six 
years imprisonment was not excessive. 
Dr Thomas said in his commentary of Sang's case that the sentence 
did seem excessive or, as he put it, "rather more than usual". 
(31). But if these earlier cases represent a fierce resistence 
to this new menace the courts in England with experience soon 
came to temper their views. In R v Marchesi and Wakeford (32) 
the first appellant was found in a car in which there was 
2 kilogrammes of cannabis resin with a street value of £1900. 
The second appellant admitted selling cannabis to another man 
for £40 but he said that the first appellant had arranged it. 
The mitigation appeared to be that the first appellant was 
doing well at college and that the second appellant traded in 
drugs to pay for his heroin addiction. Both were addicted but 
had tried to rid themselves of the addiction. On appeal, it was 
held that, taking into consideration the mitigating factors which 
the trial judge had ignored, the court would vary each sentence 
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of three years imprisonment to 18 months imprisonment. In 
R v McAuley (33) the appellant pleaded guilty to a number of 
charges concerning cannabis, especially to supplying it. It is 
an important aspect of this case that McAuley was frank with the 
police when he was arrested. He admitted supplying cannabis but 
that, he said and it was accepted by the prosecution, was only 
to a circle of friends. But the appeal court held that: 
" the danger is that such circles are apt to 
widden as the news gets round and as more and more 
people become addicted or take up the habit, learning 
no doubt from one another." (34) 
There were considerable personal mitigating factors but the main 
ground of appeal was that although the supply was for profit it 
was to a closed circle of friends. The court observed (35) that 
had that circle not been closed then the sentence would have been 
considerably longer. In all the circumstances the original 
sentence of 18 months imprisonment was upheld as "perfectly 
correct". 
In R v Platt (36) the appellant pleaded guilty to several charges 
of supplying cannabis. He was sentenced to 15 months 
imprisonment concurrently for each charge. He had bought eight 
ounces of cannabis in Reading and resold it in parcels of one or 
one half ounce in Cornwall. The purchase price was £180 and the 
resale price about £256 making a profit of £76. An appeal 
against sentence was dismissed, the approach to sentence being 
correct in principle and the sentence not excessive. Boreham J 
said that: 
"This was a substantial amount of cannabis. The 
profit, though not vast, was by no means negligible. 
He was deliberately distributing amongst a 
substantial number of people, and in these 
circumstances, he had no ground for complaining 
about the result." (37) 
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But trial judges have to be cautious not to· infer too much from 
the known circumstances: in R v Rogers (38) a guilty plea was 
tendered to one transaction of supplying 10.53 grammes of 
cannabis to another. The trial judge sentenced Rogers to 18 
months imprisonment which seemed to be in line with prevailing 
policy. However, the same judge indicated his view that this one 
transaction was probably only the "tip of the iceberg." In 
quashing the sentence, the Court of Appeal seemed influenced by 
the fact that there was only one transaction and by the existence 
of a dependent girlfriend and child. A sentence of six months 
imprisonment was substituted. As other appellants have had 
similar dependents it is submitted that not much turned on that 
factor. It seems then that the appeal court placed greater 
emphasis on the trial judge erroneously expressing a view 
unwanted by the facts. Nevertheless, Rogers may be said 
fairly to have been a lucky appellant. 
In McNab v H M Advocate (39) the appellant pleaded guilty to 
offering to supply cannabis resin with a street value of £40 
to two policement in a public house. The Sheriff took the 
view that the appellant had acted in the knowledge of the 
attitude of the courts to such offences, and imposed a sentence 
of nine months imprisonment. An appeal against sentence was 
refused as the High Court held that the Sheriff was entitled to 
take the view he did, and that the sentence could not possibly 
be regarded as excessive. (40) 
2. Concerned in Supply 
In R v Gharni (41) the accused was a Pakistani who came to 
England and was then concerned with two others in supplying 
heroin with a street value of £40,000 but he was not involved 
in a conspiracy, as others were. The report of the case states 
that there was no suggesction. __ that Ghani was a dealer in the 
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drug. In sentencing him to six years imprisonment the trial 
judge stated that he believed that Ghani had brought the drug 
with him from Holland. On appeal against sentence it was held 
that the appellant had been sentenced on the basis that the trial 
judge suspected him of being the importer of the drug, whereas 
there was no evidence that this was so. The sentence was varied 
to four years imprisonment with a recommendation for deportation. 
In McIntosh v H M Advocate (42) the panel was convicted of being 
concerned in the supply of cannabis resin and amphetamine. He 
was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The High Court held 
in a brief opinion that such a sentence could not be regarded as 
excessive as the appellant was seriously concerned in the supply. 
2.69 In Beattie v H M Advocate (43) the panel pleaded guilty to being 
concerned in the supplying of Class A and Class B controlled 
drugs and to 15 related ("sub-charges") under the 1971 Act. The 
Indictment was framed in such a way that the sub-charges were 
relied on as specification of the manner in which the panel was 
alleged to have been concerned in the supplying of controlled 
drugs, subject to the principle charge. The trial judge passed 
sentences, some consecutively and some concurrent, totalling 
16 years for the 15 sub-charges. Although the maximum which 
could then be imposed in respect of the principal charge was 
14 years, the trial judge considered it competent, having 
regard to the manner in which the pleas were tendered, to treat 
each offence separately. The appeal against sentence was on 
the issue inter alia of whether it was competent to pass 
sentence in such a way as to exceed the maximum which could have 
been imported for the principal charge. It was held by the High 
Court, allowing the appeal, that the nature of the charge and not 
the manner in which pleas of guilty were tendered determine the 
sentence which could be imposed. Although it was competent to 
impose a sentence for each sub-charge, because of the way the 
Crown had chosen to frame the Indictment it was incompetent to 
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sentence cumulatively to more than 14 years. Further, where 
the appellant had for a number of years organised and 
financed a substantial drug ring an exemplary and primitive 
sentence was appropriate. Accordingly, a sentence of 14 years 
was substituted. Finally, in Dowell v H M Advocate (44) a 
sentence of ten years imprisonment for being concerned in the 
supply of heroin was held, on appeal, not to be excessive. 
3. Concerned in Making of an Offer to Supply 
R v Ng and Dhalai (45) is perhaps of greater interest as an 
example of the quantum of discount on sentence following a guilty 
plea. But, Ng did plead guilty to being concerned in making an 
offer to supply heroin and the part played by him in the saga 
was one of setting up the deal. The heroin involved had a sale 
price of £4000, although the report does not indicate weight or 
purity. Ng was sentenced to five years imprisonment. On appeal 
against sentence it was held that more credit should have been 
given to Ng for pleading guilty and for assisting the Crown by 
giving evidence. There should be, it was said, "a visible 
difference" between his sentence and those passed on the others 
involved in the scheme. Ng's sentence was reduced to four years 
imprisonment. Dhalai had been convicted after trial of supplying 
heroin and he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment and of 
his appeal against sentence it was said that the sentence was not 
wrong. 
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Section 5: Restriction of Possession of Controlled Drugs 
Section 5 
(1)" it shall not be lawful for a person to 
have a controlled drug in his possession." 
(2)" it is·an offence for a person to have a 
controlled drug in his possession." 
1. Class A 
(1) Cocaine 
It is perhaps surprising that it was as late as 1981 before there 
was any indication of the Bench's attitude to the simple possession 
of cocaine, and even then the matter was not absolutely clear. In 
R v Omashebi (1) a sentence of 12 months imprisonment was passed by 
a trial judge on a 40 year old man convicted of possessing 3.5 
grammes of cocaine. Omashebi had been seen sitting in his car with 
a package in his hand; when challenged by a policeman he ran away 
into a building and after a struggle the package was found nearby. 
The appellant had a previous conviction for possessing drugs, 
including cocaine. The view of the Court of Appeal was (2) that 
if the appellant had been found guilty of possessing cocaine with 
intent to supply then the sentence of 12 months would have been 
"a very modest one". But he had not been so convicted and the Court 
said that they had to deal with a man who simply had possession of 
3.5 grammes of cocaine, which was held to be not a very large 
amount, for his own consumption. As the drug was cocaine a sentence 
of imprisonment was deserved but the right way to deal with the 
appellant was said to be "a short, sharp sentence of imprisonment." 
On that basis the 12 months imprisonment was reduced to six months. 
A different view was taken in R v Ball (3) where the defendant, 
an actor, pleaded guilty to possessing 9.05 grammes of cocaine. 
The newspaper report of the hearing stated the drug to be worth 
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about £60 a gramme making his quantity worth £543. He was fined 
£700. In the whole circumstances, especially as compared to 
Omashebi, the sentence could reasonably be described as lenient. 
Equaly in R v Capri (4) the defendant, an actress, was fined £200 
for possessing 31 grammes of cocaine. The regretably brief 
newspaper report gives little of the surrounding circumstances of 
this case but on the face of it the sentence is extra-ordinary. 
Again, in R v Summers (5) th~ magistrates at Uxbridge fined the 
defendant, described as a top fashion designer, £1000 of possession 
of 2.98 grammes which seems harsh by the standard of the case 
immediately preceding it. The pendulum swung the other way in 
R v Diamond (6). The appellant was sentenced on the basis of the 
simple possession of 13.6 grammes of cocaine. He was described as 
a wealthy professional man, being a lawyer in the Isle of Man, with 
no previous convictions. He had been sentenced to 8 month's 
imprisonment (6 months of which was suspended) and he was fined 
£4000. On appeal, it was held by Lord Lane C.J. that the appellant 
was found in possession of " ... a not insignificant amount of a 
Class A drug." He had led a successful life and he could not claim 
the have been driven to drugs through the misfortunes of life. The 
sentence imposed was said to be correct and the appeal was 
dismissed. 
(2) Diamorphine 
The leading English case in this regard is of course R v Aramah (7). 
There the view taken was that the simple possession of heroin might 
often be a problem more of a medical nature than a criminal one. 
Further, given the possible variations in the personal circumstances 
of each defendant the Court of Appeal felt constrained to limit its 
views. The sting in the tail, so to speak, was the observation that 
the sentence could still amount to seven years imprisonment and a 
fine so that there could still be cases in which deprivation of 
liberty was "both proper and expedient." That seems also to have 
been the view in Scotland for in Ramsey v H M Advocate (8) the panel 
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pleaded guilty at the High Court in Edinburgh to two charges of 
possessing heroin. The first quantity was described as minute 
and the second was 1.56 grammes. The trial judge sentenced the 
panel to four years imprisonment in respect of each of these 
charges to run concurrently. On appeal it was held that the 
learned trial judge in proceeding to sentence had exceeded the 
bounds of what would be an appropriate sentence for possession 
alone. As the evidence had shown that the appellant had barely 
more that one day's supply in his possession, the sentences passed 
were excessive. Accordingly, notwithstanding the previous 
convictions, the sentence was quashed and a period of two years 
imprisonment substituted. Again, by way of contrast, in R v Long 
and Smith the appellants had pleaded guitly to possessing heroin 
and it had been accepted that the drug was only for personal use. 
Each appellant had a previous conviction for possessing cannabis. 
On appeal, it was held that a custodial sentence was right, but nine 
months was unnecessarily long and three months would be more 
appropriate. 
(3) Lysergamide 
There are no authorities on this point except Lennon v Copeland (10) 
which is less than helpful. Lennon was convicted of possessing LSD. 
The judgement does not specify the quantity. The learned Sheriff 
then sentenced him to three months imprisonment. He presented a 
Bill of Suspension against the sentence of imprisonment but the 
High Court, in considering the Bill, held that: 
"The offence is clearly a serious one, the 
punishment imposed is within the limits laid 
down in the statutory provisions and no valid 
ground has been stated to us to show why we should 
disturb the sentence which the Sheriff decided to 
impose for this offence." 
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(4) Opium 
In R v Helfrich (11) the appellant was found in possession of 
22 grammes of opium and 5.9 grammes of cannabis resin. The opium 
was said to have been his first purchase which cost him 300 dollars. 
He was sentenced to six months imprisonment for the opium offence 
and three months imprisonment for the second offence. The trial 
judge had said that such an amount of opium "required a custodial 
sentence." On appeal, the appellant, an American airman who was 
well spoken of by the USAF, had appreciated the gravity of the 
offences and he had worked hard and conscientiously in prison. 
The Court of Appeal, therefore, substituted such a sentence as to 
result in his immediate release. This in effect was a sentence of 
three months imprisonment. It is interesting, it is submitted, 
that the report of the decision of the Court of Appeal contains 
nothing by way of a correction that simple possession of opium 
requires a custodial sentence. 
(5) Dextramoramide 
In R v Constantinou (12) there was a guilty plea of possession of 
five tablets containing dextramoramide tartrate. This substance 
is essentially a salt of dextramoramide which is a synthetic 
opiate and has the trade name of Palfium (13). The appellant was 
stopped in the street by a policeman just after he had left a 
house. He struggled with him. He pleaded guilty to unlawful 
possession, obstructing a policeman and assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm. He was sentenced to three months, six and six months 
imprisonment, all concurrent. On appeal, a submission that 
probation was the proper sentence was rejected. The Court said that 
Constantinou was an educated man, a teacher aged 29 who knew fully 
the difference between right and wrong. It could not be said in the 
circumstances that the sentences were wrong or excessive. 
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(6) Diconal 
In R v Brewer (14) a woman pleaded guilty to unlawful 
possession of 15 diconal tablets. He had obtained them lawfully 
on prescription. They had been living together in temporary 
accommodation. There was no suitable place there in which the 
tablets could be locked up securely. She had taken the tablets 
out with her in her handbag to look after them. The report does 
not report the way in which she came to the notice of the police. 
She was sentenced to three months imprisonment, suspended. On 
appeal it was held that: 
" as the case involved possession of a 
Class A drug, a prison sentence had been 
considered by the sentencer, and if the case 
had been one of possession for an unlawful 
use of the drug, there was no doubt that a 
sentence of imprisonment would have been 
appropriate, probably an immediate sentence 
even for an offender of previous good 
character. The hall mark of the mitigation 
in the present case was that no unlawful use 
of the tablets was intended." 
The Court considered that a sentence of imprisonment was not, 
strictly speaking, appropriate in this case and a conditional 
discharge was substituted. 
2. Class B 
(1) Amphetamine 
In R v Bramley (15) the appellant guilty along with nine other 
youths to possessing a total of 459 "pep" pills. He was 
sentenced to six months detention. He appealed as the other 
youths had all been fined and he felt that he had been unfairly 
treated. He had been in custody two months awaiting the appeal. 
The appeal court held that having regard to the prevalence of the 
offence, detention was a proper sentence but in the circumstances 
it would be varied to a fine of £50 with three months imprisonment in 
~ v 
~ 
• 
2.79 
-113-
default. It is to be presumed that the fine was imposed to avoid 
disparity as between accused. In R v March (16) the appellant 
was charged on Indictment with unlawful possession of 362 tablets 
and 461 capsules of amphetamine sulphate, 631 capsules containing 
amphetamine, 185 tablets and 88 capsules containing amphetamine 
sulphate,102 capsules containing amphetamine. On the two charges 
based on these items, March was sentenced to six months and six 
months imprisonment consecutive. On appeal, as a matter of law the 
six months imprisonment could not have an identical period 
consecutive and so it would not be suspended. The Court held 
however that a proper sentence would have been 12 months 
imprisonment. These two cases were heard in 1967 and 1970 
respectively. Although there is no suggestion of supply by the 
appellants in either case it would seem that that was something 
that may well have been considered by the Court. Such a 
consideration would not be unreasonable given that firstly the 
quantities involved were substantial and secondly that these were 
convictions under the old legislation which did not include the 
offence of possession with intent to supply. 
In R v Withers (17) the appellant was 28 years old with no previous 
convictions and she was living with a man. She had lived with that 
man for eight years and they had two children. The drug squad 
went to her flat and found 9.8 grammes of cannabis and 4400 tablets 
of amphetamine hidden in various places. The drugs were said to 
have been in her possession for about three months and men were 
said to have threatened her and her children if she did not comply 
with their requests to dispense the drugs. She was sentenced to 
four years imprisonment and her boyfriend to three years. On appeal 
it was held that it was an aggravating factor that the flat was 
used as a sub-depot where the drugs were distributed. Although the 
drugs concerned were "soft" not "hard", the case called for an 
immediate custodial sentence such as would deter others. Appeals 
dismissed. Again, although the report cited is concerned with the 
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possession of the drugs it seems more likely than not that the 
element of supply loomed large in the mind of the Court. 
It is submitted that while these authorities might seem to support 
a proposition that the simple possession of amphetamine attracts 
an immediate custodial sentence that is not necessarily so. These 
authorities all have very heavy overtones of commercial activities 
and little reliance ought to be placed on them. On the other hand, 
in R v Faithfull (18) the defendant there was, and still is, an 
ageing rock star who was found at Gatwick Airport in possession of 
6 grammes of amphetamine. She pleaded guilty to unlawful possession 
and she was fined £200, this case is in all porbability a better 
reflection of prevailing attitudes. 
(2) Cannabis 
The first few cases to be considered now represent a wholly 
different approach from that adopted by the courts in the 1980's. 
In R v Welsh (19) a 42 year old man was arrested in a cafe when 
he was found with cannabis. He had six previous convictions 
involving firearms, drugs and prostitution with various sentences 
of up to 18 months imprisonment. Welsh was sentenced in the first 
instance to 3Yz years imprisonment and on appeal this was held to be 
not wrong in principle. Similarly in R v Da Silva (20) the 
defendant was convicted of possessing a small quantity of cannabis 
and he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. He too had 
previous convictions. The report narrates that he had been 
sentenced "on the basis of trafficking in drugs" but that there 
was no evidence that he "dealt in large amounts." On appeal it 
was held that the sentence was out of scale in that it did not 
allow room within the maximum for a really bad offender. A 
sentence of three years imprisonment was substituted. 
It is submitted that there is a fairly strong suggestion in both 
these cases on a fair reading that each defendant was sentenced 
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heavily for the previous convictions. Although Da Silva was only 
convicted of simple possession the court inferred the supply to 
others from the circumstances, this seems to have been accepted 
practice before the 1971 Act. Neither report gives quantities of 
the drug concerned. Accordingly, these reports are really of little 
assistance. But in the next relevant decision (21) in 1967, 
R v Hopkins, (22) a sentence of nine months imprisonment was imposed 
on the appellant who was convicted of possessing 74 grammes of 
cannabis. This was varied on appeal to four months imprisonment. 
The Court of Appeal also came to consider the implications of some 
of these hard sentences. In R v Perdu (23) the appellant pleaded 
guilty to possessing two grains of cannabis resin. He was sentenced 
to 12 months imprisonment. The appeal court held that the sentence 
was too severe having regard to the quantity involved and if he 
appeared before a court on a drugs charge again it would give a 
false impression. The sentence was varied for that reason to three 
months imprisonment. 
The appellants in R v Robson and Molins (24) were both students 
and when their house was searched 300 grammes of cannabis, a pair 
of scales and cigarette ends and a pipe with traces of cannabis 
were found. Each was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. Neither 
had any previous convictions. The special considerations were that 
both appellants had been in prison for a month before being released 
on bail. They had completed their studies and received their 
degrees. They had given an assurance that they had ceased smoking 
cannabis. On appeal the Court noted that it had been submitted on 
the appellant's behalf that this type of offence should only attract 
a financial penalty. The Court wished it to be known that this was 
not so for possession of this quantity of cannabis. The sentence 
could not be faulted in any way but having regard to the new 
circumstances the court felt able to take a more merciful course 
by suspending the sentences for two years. It may be that justice 
was obtained by this result but for present purposes there are two 
~ ~ 
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unanswered questions: what quantity was the lower limit for 
custodial sentences? Would possession for example of 150 
grammes merely attract a fine? Secondly, what aspect of the 
change in circumstances merited a suspended sentence? Was the 
attaining of graduate status the deciding factor or was it the 
assurance that the appellants had given up smoking the stuff or 
was it both? 
The decision in the case of Robson and Mollins invites immediate 
comparison with that of R v Francis(25). Francis pleaded guilty 
to possessing 100 grammes of cannabis and this was made up into 
22 lots marked with prices from £1 to £5. He said that he had 
bought the cannabis in London for £48 and that he hoped to sell 
it for £100. He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. 
Francis was given leave to appeal in the light of Robson and 
Mollins. In mitigation, if it was such, Francis said that he 
sold the cannabis to West Indians only and he himself had 
determined to give up smoking it. Toe Court observed the 
R v Robson and Mollins was a remarkable decision and 
" did not establish any sort of principle. 
Every case must be dealt with on its own facts." 
It was impossible to say that the sentence passed on Francis was 
~ wrong in principle. In the view of the Court a custodial sentence 
was the only proper way of dealing with Francis. In his commentary 
on Francis' case in the Criminal Law.Review Dr Thomas sought to 
distinguish the cases on the basis that Robson and Mollins them-
selves were very much younger than Francis and there was no evidence 
in their case to suggest a persistent course of dealing in cannabis. 
It is not too much to say that Dr Thomas has not necessarily 
convinced himself of the validity of his own distiction. 
2.85 In R v Winter (26) the appellant pleaded guilty to possession of 
1.64 grammes of cannabis. He was sentenced to six months 
~ 
• 
2.86 
-117-
imprisonment. He was then 31 years old and he had three previous 
convictions for possessing cannabis. He appealed on the grounds 
that the sentence was severe having regard to the amount of 
cannabis found in his possession and that in fact he was "only 
a consumer." (27). In the judgement of the Court the appellant, 
who was a chartered accountant, had been given many chances. 
Accordingly, the sentence imposed was not wrong in principle nor 
excessive. It would seem that the Court considered it to be an 
aggravation that Winter had been previously convicted for identical 
offences and that he had thereafter refused to co-operate with the 
courts. R v Paley (28), however, represents the simplest possible 
case for the Court of Appeal to consider. Miss Paley, a student 
aged 17 years, was convicted with her brother of possessing two 
cigarette ends containing cannabis. She was fined £75. She was 
of previous good character and her only income was a student grant 
of the now devisory sum of £90 per annum. On appeal it was held 
that the fine imposed was much too high, the offence not being a 
serious offence of its kind, and out of proportion to her financial 
position. Justice, it was said, would be done by reducing the fine 
to £25. (29) 
But if it appeared to be a principle that a conviction for 
possession of a small quantity of cannabis involved only a fine 
then that could not be said to be the case invariably: in 
R v Minott (30) the appellant was convicted to two charges of 
possessing cannabis amounting to 2.32 grammes. He had previous 
convictions including several for taking motor vehicles and one 
for a minor drug offence. He was sentenced to three month's 
imprisonment. On appeal it was held that the sentencer was 
" ... entitled to take the view that an immediate 
custodial sentence was required, and the sentence 
imposed was in no way excessive." 
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Dr Thomas' succinct commentary on the case was that: 
"The court did not indicate whether there were 
special reasons for adopting what appears to be 
an unusual course in this type of case." 
The head-note to this case indicates, even if the report itself 
does not, that the possession of the cannabis was for personal 
consumption only. Even allowing for the previous convictions it 
is difficult to see why Minott should be singled out for this 
treatment. Certainly imprisonment for longer periods had been 
~ upheld about that time by the Court of Appeal but in each case the 
personal antecedents of the accused had been far more damning (31) 
or the quantity of the drug much greater (32). 
2.87 A mere three months after Minott's case the Courts of Appeal came 
to consider R v Leaman (33). The appellant was convicted of 
possessing 2.1 grammes of cannabis resin and she was sentenced to 
four months imprisonment, suspended for 18 months. On appeal 
against sentence Lord Lane C.J. said that: 
"This is really the simplest case in the world. 
One cannot imagine how there could be any 
complications." 
And later: 
"It is contended today that this is an 
exaggerated approach to a simple case and that 
no prison sentence, whether immediate or 
suspended, was appropriate. We think that 
is right. We think this is a case which could 
well have been dispensed of by a financial 
penalty without, in any way, reducing the 
importance of cannabis as a lead-in drug at 
the present time." (34) 
The appeal was allowed, the sentence was quashed and a fine of £10 
substitued, with one month's imprisonment in default. Leaman's 
case was described by Dr Thomas as the normal approach of the Court 
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of Appeal to cases of simple possession of small quantities of 
cannabis and the decision in Minott's case must be considered 
therefore as an "unexplained departure from the usual pattern." (35) 
R v McLaren (36) left the Court of Appeal with the problem of how to 
punish a defendant who had been convicted repeatedly of offences of 
simple possession. McLaren was a confirmed smoker of cannabis. 
He had pleaded guilty to possessing 127 grammes of cannabis resin 
and 9.59 grammes of cannabis. He was then aged 56 years and he had 
six previous convictions for similar offences going back as far as 
1950. McLaren had no other previous convictions and he had never 
served a term of imprisonment. He was sentenced to two years. On 
appeal, counsel for the appellant conceded that the trial judge was 
left with very little option but to impose a custodial sentence. He 
submitted that a more appropriate sentence would have been one of 
imprisonment for between six and nine months. The Court of Appeal 
agreed that a sentence of nine months would have been appropriate 
and varied the sentence. This prevailing policy was reaffirmed in 
R v Jones (37) where the appellant was convicted of possessing 
3.2 grammes of cannabis resin. He had been convicted of cultivating 
and possessing cannabis about five years previously, and fined £30. 
In the present case he was sentenced to three months imprisonment, 
suspended, and fined £50. On appeal Glidewell J. held that: 
"The main point which he makes in his note of 
appeal is that a sentence of imprisonment of any 
sort, suspended or not, for an offence of possessing 
a small quantity of cannabis, when there is, as in 
this case, no suggestion that he was supplying or 
doing anything of that sort, because the possession 
was purely for his own use, is wrong, even though he 
has a previous conviction. In respect of that he 
points out that something like five years had elapsed 
between his earlier conviction and the offence which 
led to his conviction. The Court is disposed to agree 
with the point he makes." (38) 
It was on those grounds that the suspended sentence was quashed. 
2.89 
2.90 
-120-
In the appeal of R v Robertson - Coupar (39) the Court of Appeal 
took the opportunity to restate explicitly what their policy was 
and that has been expressed in the course of the decisions 
discussed above. There were two appellants in the case. The first 
appellant was convicted of possession of cannabis and the second 
of possession of cannabis and cultivating cannabis plants. The 
police had searched the house where the appellant lived and found 
various small parcels or packets containing cannabis (the total 
amount discovered being less than one ounce). Some small cannabis 
plants were found growing in the garden. Each appellant had 
previously been convicte9, on the same occasion, of possessing about 
one eighth of an ounce of cannabis. The first appellant was 
sentenced to one month's imprisonment, suspended, and the second 
to six month's immediate imprisonment. 
It is perhaps worth noting that at trial the appellants had not 
been legally represented. They presented their own defence which 
in essence was one of conscience. This was not a defence in law 
but rather a statement of the views of the appellants that the 
criminalization of the possession and the use of cannabis was 
wrong. It appears that the trial judge was offered by the behaviour 
of the two appellants and he stated that he did not accept their 
views which had been canvassed before the jury. On appeal it was 
held that: 
"Whatever the merits or demerits of the argument 
about cannabis, the fact remains that for the 
moment it is a criminal offence to smoke it. It 
cannot be smoked in this country with impunity. 
Those who do choose to smoke it and to cultivate 
it must expect to receive punishment for it. There 
is a bigger principle at stake here than the merits 
or not of cannabis and that is the fact that if you 
choose to live in our society you must obey the laws 
for the time being in force. If you want to go and 
smoke cannabis, it would appear from the material 
placed before us that there may be other places where 
you can go and live and do so." 
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In so far as sentencing policy is concerned the Court continued to 
say: 
"But in a series of decisions of this Court it 
has been said that where the offence is the 
possession of cannabis in very small quantities 
for one's own consumption, as a general rule it is 
not appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment. 
The proper penalty in the ordinary course of events 
is a financial one. But I would say this, that 
even for the possession of cannabis, if there is 
continuous and persistent defiance of the law there 
may come a time when the Courts will have no 
alternative but to impose a custodial sentence. 
The law cannot countenance a continual florting of 
the statute." (40) 
The Court decided that in this case, it only being a second 
offence for both appellants, it was not appropriate to impose 
prison sentences. Accordingly, the first appellant had the 
suspended imprisonment quashed and a fine of £50 imposed. The 
second appellant had his sentence of imprisonment varied to allow 
his immediate release: this in effect was a three month sentence. 
But, in R v Osborne (41) the general principles outlined were 
reconsidered in one respect. The appellant was convicted of 
possessing 3.83 grammes of cannabis. He had six previous 
convictions involving cannabis over a period of 15 years and he 
had previously been sentenced to imprisonment for possessing a 
large quantity of cannabis in 1968 and for supplying in 1972. He 
was sentenced for the present offence to six months imprisonment. 
On appeal the Court of Appeal restated the principle that in 
ordinary circumstances a very small quantity of cannabis, where 
it is apparently for the person's own use, would not result in a 
custodial sentence. However, the Court now said, with respect 
to R v Jones, that that case must not be taken "as a blanket 
decision that no cases of possession ever qualify for a 
custodial sentence." The Court outlined the previous 
convictions of Osborne, which were more serious and in greater 
number than Jones, and concluded that it was, on those facts, 
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not wrong in principle for the Court to consider a short custodial 
sentence. But, having regard to the delay between the commission of 
the offence and the trial, the three weeks he had served in prison 
was enough. The sentence would be varied to allow his immediate 
release. (42) 
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Section 5 
(1)" it shall not be lawful for a person 
to have a controlled drug in his possession." 
(2) " ... it is an offence for a person to have a 
controlled drug in his possession, whether 
lawfully or not, with intent to supply it to 
another in contravention of Section 4(1) of 
this Act." 
1. Class A 
(1) Cocaine 
In R v Atkins (1) the appellant pleaded guilty to possessing 
cocaine hydrochloride with intent to supply. He had been 
arrested after being observed in a street, and he was found to 
be in possession of a package containing 17.9 grammes of the 
substance which had an estimated street value of between £1000 
and £1500. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment. On 
appeal it was argued that there was no evidence that the 
appellant was engaged in dealing on a substantial scale. The 
Court held that taking the least serious view of the matter 
established by the evidence, the appellant was shown to have 
been part of a chain of distributors of hard drugs for illicit 
purposes. The sentence was a proper sentence and it was not 
excessive for such activities. 
The view of the Court was further explained in R v Davies (2) 
which involved two men. The first pleaded guilty to possessing 
6.5 grammes of cocaine with intent to supply, having purchased 
10 grammes from the second for £180. The second was convicted 
of possessing 20 grammes of cocaine with intent to supply. 
They were sentenced to 15 months and four years imprisonment 
respectively. On appeal the Court dealt with the appellants 
separately. Davies had no previous conviction and he came from 
what was described as an excellent family. The prison report 
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showed that he was serving his sentence sensibly and that he 
was making a good efforT. at this work. But, in the view of the 
Court, 
" there can be no doubt whatever that at the 
time of this offence he had chosen quite deliberately 
to trade in hard drugs. That is an exceedingly 
serious offence. The damaged done, mostly to young 
people, by hard drugs needs no further stressing to 
this Court, and it is a shameful way of life to 
seek to make money by exploiting their weakness." 
While Counsel at the hearing of the appeal sought to stress 
the elements of the mitigation, the view of the Court was that 
all those factors were very fully reflected in "as short a 
sentence" as that of 15 months imprisonment. Further, it was: 
" inevitable that people supplying hard drugs 
will be sent to prison and as a general rule the 
sentence of imprisonment is to be measured in 
terms of years and not months. It is one of the 
most serious offences in the criminal catalogue." (3) 
In these circumstances the appeal by Davies was dismissed. The 
Court dismissed the appeal of the second appellant in as few as 
six written sentences in the judgement. A sentence of four 
years imprisonment was justified on two grounds: firstly, this 
man was in possession of a larger quantity of drugs than 
Davies. Secondly, the house in which the appellants and the 
drugs were found belonged to the second appellant and the Court 
placed emphasis on the aggravating factor that this house had 
qui te clearly been fortified by means of steel lined doors and 
windows! 
(2) Diamporphine 
The earlier cases concerning heroin were, strictly speaking, 
concerned with the actual supplying of the drug or with simple 
possession. The possession of heroin with intent to supply 
has, in the twelve or so years that have passed since the 1971 
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Act came into force, been the subject of few cases. In 
R v Hyam (4) the appellant pleaded guilty to possessing heroin 
with intent to supply, unlawfully possessin heroin, unlawfully 
possessing cannabis and having an offensive weapon in a public 
place. Hyam had agreed to supply two plain clothes policemen 
with four ounces of heroin for £4600, when he met them to 
deliver the heroin; he was arrested and found to be in 
possession of a container of ammonia solution. Some £2,250 
and small quantities of heroin and cannabis were subsequently 
found at his home. He was sentenced to six years imprisonment 
on the charge of possessing heroin with intent to supply, with 
concurrent terms of imprisonment on the other charges. On 
appeal it was held that the trial judge had sentenced Hyam on 
the basis that he was a professional supplier of drugs, in view 
of the sums of money found in his possession. In the view of 
the Court of Appeal there was insufficient evidence to show 
that this was so. Applying the principles in R v Aramah, 
discussed earlier, six years was 'rather too much'; a sentence 
of four years could be substituted on the principle charge. 
(3) Lysergamide 
R v Bennett (5) concerned the possession of 25 tables of LSD 
each valued at £150. Bennett admitted the possession and the 
intent but he claimed that he only intended to supply his 
friends. He also admitted possessing a small quantity of 
cannabis and supplying a small quantity of cannabis to a friend 
who helped him. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment 
on the LSD charges and three months imprisonment concurrent for-
the cannabis charge. He appealed on the ground that the 
sentence was too severe as he was only supplying drugs to 
friends. The appeal court held that sentences for drug 
offences must be severe because 'when someone starts taking 
drugs no one knows where it will end.' The Court observed that 
the "facilitation" of drug taking was a very serious offence 
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and the appeal would be dismissed. 
In R v Bowlnan-Powell (6) the appellant pleaded guilty to 
possessing LSD with intent to supply and to possessing cannabis 
resin. He was found in possession of 92 doses of LSD and he 
admitted that he intended to sell about half of the LSD to a 
regular set of friends and customers. He had previous 
convictions for drug offences. He was sentenced to four years 
imprisonment. On appeal it was held, considering R v Aramah 
and R v Virgin, the Court could see nothing wrong with the 
sentence. Indeed Lawton L.J. said that: 
"A great deal has happended in the last few 
years with regard to drug cases. Their supply 
is becoming more and more common and the public 
are becoming more and more concerned about it. 
The time has come when it must be made clear 
to those who supply drugs and particularly those 
who supply Class A drugs like LSD, that they can 
expect to lose their liberty for a long time." (7) 
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 
2. Class B 
(1) Amphetamine 
In R v Davies (8) the police searched Davies home and found 
two grammes of amphetamine divided into eleven packets. She 
and her husband lived on social security and for some time 
they had used that money to buy amphetamines for resale at a 
profit. Her husband bought and sold the drug and Davies kept 
the accounts. She had a previous conviction for possessing 
amphetamine. She was sentenced to nine months imprisonment. 
On appeal it was submitted that her marriage had broken down 
and she was no longer under the influence of her husband. 
Further, her young child was showing signs of distress at 
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being separated from her and it was a proper case for probation 
However the appeal court held that a trial judge had to 
decide between the public interest, calling for punishment, 
and Davies' personal circumstances. The decision that it was 
a case in which it was important to emphasize that those who 
possessed drugs with intent to supply should receive an 
immediate custodial sentence was one with which there was 
nothing to entitze the Court of interfere. 
(2) Cannabis 
It may be said of the early cannabis cases that the very 
brief reports indicate cases decided in wholly different 
prevailing attitudes than now. Certain of these cases 
have an historical interest but most would contribute little 
to this study. Nevertheless in R v Williams (9) the appellant 
Williams and another man were convicted of possessing 150 
grains of cannabis which had been found in packets and at a 
bar in a public house. Each man had been employed there for 
a short time. Each was sentenced to two years imprisonment. 
Both had been convicted previously. It appeared that the trial 
judge had sentenced them on the basis that they had been 
heavily engaged in peddling drugs over a long period. On 
appeal the Court held that severe sentences for possessing 
large quantities of drugs for distribution are proper, and in 
cases of peddling it is only in quite exceptional cases that a 
custodial sentence could be avoided. In the present case, the 
Court held, the sentences were out of scale considering the 
quantity of drug involved and the short time they had worked 
at the public house and the sentences were varied to one year 
each. Dr Thomas, in his brief commentary on the case in the 
Criminal Law Review, saw it as a possible indication that the 
Court was then prepared to draw distinctions between different 
degrees or classes of distributors. 
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In R v Watkins (10) the appellant pleaded guilty to possessing 
and supplying cannabis. His house had been watched and a 
number of persons were seen to visit. He was found in 
possession of 140 grammes of cannabis. He admitted that he had 
recently bought 6 ounces of cannabis and that he had been 
supplying it to others in the form of reefer cigaretts. 
He had been sentenced to one and six years imprisonment 
consecuti ve; .and a suspended sentence of six months passed in 
1968 for possessing cannabis was ordered to take effect 
consecutively. The decision of the appellate judges was that 
"a stern sentence" was called for because he was a supplier. 
But, having regard to the quantity of the drug involved, the 
sentence was too severe and would be varied to one year and 
four years concurrent, with the suspended sentence taking 
effect consecutively. Dr Thomas expressed his view saying 
that: 
"While a custodial sentence is invariably upheld 
in cases involving the supply of cannabis, the 
Court generally distinguishes clearly between 
cases involving large amounts of the drug 
distributed on a commercial basis and those 
where only very small amounts are involved. 
This distinction is clearly reflected in this 
case, but even though the eventual sentence appears 
to be rather longer than has been considered 
appropriate in broadly comparable cases: 
R v Williams ... " 
The amounts of controlled drug involved in each case above, 
namely William's case and that of Watkins, are similar and of 
the same drug. The sentence of imprisonment for Williams was 
substantially shorter than that for Watkins. But both cases 
were concluded before the 1971 Act was passed and therefore 
both were not in a position to be tried on a charge of 
possession with intent to supply, an innovation in that Act. 
The accused in the Williams case were sentenced on the basis 
that they had in fact been involved in supplying. The 
accused Watkins was convicted of supplying. Dr Thomas may be 
2.100 
-132-
correct in saying that these two cases were 'broadly 
compatable' but the accused in Williams case were only 
convicted of simple possession in law and that may explain 
the lower sentences. 
R v Bailey (11) appears to be the first reported case concerned 
with sentencing for possession with interit to supply. Bailey 
was in possession of 33.6 grammes of cannabis resin in a jar 
and four pieces of foil containing 452 mil1igrammes of 
amphetamine. He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment 
concurrent on each charge. On appeal it was held that it was 
impossible to say that the sentence of imprisonment was wrong 
in principle for two charges of possessing drugs with intent to 
supply, even on a small scale. In R v Bebbington (12) the 
appellant was convicted of possessing 225 grammes of cannabis 
with intent to supply and of a further charge of possessing 
cannabis. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment on the 
first charge and to 18 months imprisonment concurrent on the 
second (13). On appeal against sentence the appeal court's 
view was expressed by Chapman J.: 
"The learned judge seemed to accept the view 
that the appellant did intend to smoke most of 
the cannabis himself, but at the same time 
indicated that a severe sentence was necessary, 
regarding him as a link in a chain. Indeed 
the scales (14) indicated that a severe sentence 
was necessary, regarding him as a link in a chain 
in which cannabis resin was supplied, but the 
quantity involved here was certainly small and 
if it was a fact, as the learned judge seemed to 
have said, that most of it was for his own 
consumption, it could not be regarded as a very 
serious case of intending to supply. If it 
had been a case of intending to supply on a 
substantial scale, a sentence of this order would 
not be questioned at all, because, as the judge 
said, people who supply other people and corrupt 
other people by supplying them with material of 
this kind have to be dealt with severely. That 
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view is certainly right." (15) 
Accordingly, the sentence of four years imprisonment was 
quashed and a sentence of 30 months substituted as being more 
appropriate. 
In R v Singh (16) the appellant was found in possession of 
cannabis resin in" oil form estimated to be worth £16,000 at 
retail. A sentence of six years imprisonment was upheld. The 
interest in this case is that the appellant had been convicted 
of possession with intent to supply. Throughout the judgement, 
however, the Court refers to him as a courier. It is clear on 
the facts that there could be no possibility of the possession 
being for personal use only. But limitations have been sought 
by way of mitigation on the extent to which others use the 
controlled drugs: in R v Thorpe (17) the appellant was 
convicted of six charges of possessing controlled drugs with 
intent to supply, and pleaded guilty to two such charges and to 
ten charges of possessing a controlled drug. He lived in a 
university town. Five of the charges arose from a visit by the 
police to a house in search of drugs. Thorpe was smoking a 
cigarette containing cannabis and he had 18 grammes of 
cannabis, 16 grammes of cannabis resin and a capsule containing 
amphetamine in his possession. He said that some of the 
cannabis was for his own use and some for re-sale but he 
subsequently said that it was all for his own use. Three 
months later the police searched Thorpe's house and found about 
42 grammes of cannabis and cannabis resin in various 
containers, a pair of scales and four capsules of amphetamine. 
He said that all the drugs were for his own use. He had a 
conviction for possessing cannabis in 1979 when he was fined. 
He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. On appeal it was 
submitted that the sentence was too long because he did not 
supply drugs to persons who were not already users, and he had 
no previous convictions for supplying drugs. The appeal court 
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held that the appellant was quite uninfluenced by what had 
happened to him earlier and was proposing to continue his 
ways in a university setting. The sentence was intended to 
be a deterrent one and in the circumstances it could not be 
said to be excessive. 
Introducing new users to. controlled drugs is clearly regarded 
by the courts as a serious aggravation of an offence of 
smuggling or possession with intent to supply. In R v Lawless 
(18) the appellant pleaded guilty to possessing 906 grammes of 
cannabis with intent to supply. He claimed that he had bought 
the cannabis on behalf of a group of friends who had 
contributed to the funds with which it was bought. It was said 
that there was no intention to peddle as a dealer. On appeal 
against a sentence of two years it was held there was nothing 
before the court to challenge the appellant's claim that he 
had bought the cannabis: 
" as a member of a social syndicate of 
cannabis smokers." (19) 
Further, where a member of such a syndicate who obtains its 
supplies is caught, a sentence of immediate imprisonment is 
certainly appropriate, but this case could not be treated as 
an ordinary case of possessing with intent to trade 
commercially in cannabis, and a sentence of nine months would 
have been adequate for this offence by this offender. The 
sentence of two years was thus reduced to allow the appellant's 
immediate release, he having served about six months 
imprisonment. Thus it is that courts take a more generous view 
of supplying or intending to supply to a restricted group. 
Again, in R v Daudi (20) Daudi himself and another man pleaded 
guilty to possessing cannabis with intent to supply and the 
latter pleaded guilty to a further charge of possessing a 
controlled drug. They had been stopped by the police while 
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driving on a motorway, and found to be in possession of a very 
large quantity of cannabis. The report does not state a 
weight for that quantity. It was accepted that they had 
purchased the cannabis on behalf of fellow members of the 
Rastafarian sect, and that they had no commercial motive in 
obtaining the cannabis. They were sentenced to three months 
detention and six month's imprisonment respectively. On appeal 
against sentence it was held that the appellants, whatever 
their motives, had deliberately committed a very serious 
offence, and their sentences could not be considered excessive 
or wrong in principle. The Court believed it to be a denial of 
justice to say that because the appellants were Rastafarians 
they were entitled to be treated entirely differently from 
other members of the community if they chose to break the law 
relating to the supply of cannabis. As the sentences were 
right at the lower end of the bracket for the offence the 
appeals would be dismissed. The judgement was not without 
sympathy for the sect but the Court could not discriminate 
amongst offenders on the basis of religious beliefs, even 
if those entailed the use of cannabis. The judgement 
concluded: 
"Sadly they must pay the price of 
consciously and knowingly breaking 
the law." (21) 
The Scots case of Vavley v H M Advocate (22) illustrates the 
conventional sentencing policy here with regard to possessing 
cannabis intending to supply it to others. The appellant 
pleaded guilty to possessing 666.96 grammes of cannabis resin 
with a street value of £2500 with intent to supply it to 
others. He was a musician and he claimed that the cannabis, 
which was found concealed in a garden, was intended to be 
supplied only a limited circle of friends. He had two minor 
previous convictions for contraventions of the 1971 Act, one 
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for possessing and one for cultivating cannabis. He was 
sentenced to four years imprisonment and he appealed to the 
High Court. There the Court noted the mitigating circumstances 
which included the claim that as the appellant lived in the 
country he acquire the drug, not for general supply, but 
"merely as a stock" which would enable him to provide for 
himself and for certain friends. The Court's policy was 
stated: 
"It is well known that this Court is 
determined to pass severe sentences for 
possessing drugs, Class A or Class B with 
intent to supply others." 
In the circumstances the Court held that the sentence: 
" appears to us to have been restricted 
to four years by giving close attention to the 
good feature's in the appellant's history." (23) 
The appeal was refused. On the authority of the cases cited it 
would seem that purely commercial motives warrant deterrent 
sentences although such sentences need not necessarily follow 
with supply to a restricted group. A comparison between 
England and Scotland is difficult with so few cases but in a 
broad sense the sentences in Scotland are heavier even 
although for the restricted group supply as outlined. (24) 
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Section 6: Restriction of Cultivation of Cannabis Plant 
Section 6: 
"(1) ... it shall not be lawful for a person 
to cultivate any plant of the genus Cannabis. 
(2) ... it is an offence to cultivate any such 
plant in contravention of subsection (1) above." 
This section is derived from Section 6 of the 1985 Act except 
that the earlier statute provided for the offence of "Knowingly" 
cultivating such a plant. The offence in Section 6 of the 1971 
Act is not one of strict liability for the same Act provides for 
statutory defences by Section 28. The first two reported cases 
on sentencing for cultivation pre-date the 1971 Act. In 
R v Landsowne (1) an appeal was taken against a sentence of 18 
months imposed for growing cannabis for one's own consumption. 
It was held to be a special consideration that Landsowne was not 
a dealer, had not bought the drugs in the black market and was 
not in contact with other users of drugs. His dependence on 
drugs arose from a personality disorder. He had pleaded guilty 
and he had assisted the police. The Court, presided over by 
Lord Parker C.J., varied the sentence to one of six months 
imprisonment and stated that: 
" growing cannabis for one's own use is a 
matter which will attract imprisonment." 
Five years later the same Court, but with different judges, 
heard the appeal in R v Brown (2). The appellant pleaded 
guilty to cultivating cannabis plants and possessing cannabis. 
He was found to be growing 119 plants in the back garden of his 
house. He said that they were grown for the use of himself and 
his co-defendant who lived with him. A bag containing cannabis 
was found hidden in the garden. He said that he had received it 
from a dealer and hidden it because he no longer wished to deal 
~ 
~ 
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with such people. Although the appellant had no previous 
convictions he was sentenced to 18 months.imprisonment and six 
months consecutive for possession. The Court of Appeal took 
the view that it would be right to approach the case as one of 
self-supply: 
"Although growing cannabis for one's own use 
was not necessarily such a serious matter as 
supplying drugs to others, the court agreed with 
what was said in R v Lawrence that those who did 
so were at risk of a prison sentence." 
It was held that there was nothing wrong in principle with the 
sentence of 18 months imprisonment but that the total for the 
two offences was too high and accordingly the sentence of six 
months was made concurrent. Perhaps there is one distinction 
to be made immediately and that is that self supply in 
Lawrence's case is said to attract where as in Brown's case it 
was said to be "a risk". 
The natural concomitant of self-supply is supply to others. 
Section 6 of the 1971 Act does not itself make a distinction 
between cultivation and cultivation with intent to supply 
another. It is submitted that such a distinction is certainly 
made in the judicial mind when sentencing. In R v Anderson (3) 
the appellant pleaded guilty to being in possession of cannabis 
resin and to cultivating cannabis. The police found 53 fairly 
well developed plants growing in his green house and 30 more 
growing in the open. Indoors they found a quantity of leaves 
being dried and several tins containing dried and crushed 
leaves. One eight inch high plant would produce about one 
pound of marketable leaf which, when dried and crushed, could 
be sold for £180 per pound. The appellant was sentened to 12 
months imprisonment on each count concurrent. The trial court 
had reached the conclusion that Anderson's purposes in growing 
cannabis was to supply it to others as well as himself. The 
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Court of Appeal observed that it was difficult to see how the 
trial court could have come to any other sensible conclusion. 
It had been submitted by counsel that the appellant had not been 
charged with possession with intent to supply others so that 
aggravation could not be considered. However the appellant 
court held that it was open to it: 
" to consider his purpose in growing such 
a large quantity, to infer that it was for the 
purpose of supplying it to the public, and to 
take that into account in fixing the sentence." (4) 
The Court clearly regarded cultivation with an element of supply 
as a more serious matter than cultivation for one's own use. 
In justifying the refusal of leave to appeal the Court appears 
to have hinted strongly at the line that Parliament might wish 
to take later: 
"Had there been an offence of growing cannabis 
with intent to supply and the prosecution had 
elected not to charge it the argument would have 
been strong for not punishing him as if he had 
been charged with the graver offence." 
But if the Court seemed to be clear in its view in Anderson's 
case then perhaps the contrary approach was adopted in 
R v Lawrence (5) where the appellant pleaded guilty to 
cultivating cannabis plants and possession of cannabis. A 
large number of cultivated cannabis plants were found growing 
in a wood and the appellant admitted that he had planted them 
and was looking after them. He was also found in possession 
of a number of packages of cannabis. He claimed that all the 
cannabis was for his own use and that he had no intention of 
selling it. The sentence was six months imprisonment, 
suspended, for the cultivation, with a fine of £200 and fines 
of £50 on each of the two counts of possession. The trial 
judge in passing sentence had observed that he" could not get 
out of his mind the strong suspicion that Lawrence was growing 
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cannabis so that some of it might get into other people's hands. 
It is relevant to explain that the appellant had pleaded not 
guil ty to possession of a controlled drug wi th intent to supply 
and that charge had been dropped in effect. The Court of Appeal 
considered that in all the circumstances the judge had not 
succeeded in banishing from his mind the allegation of 
possession with intent to supply, a matter which was not then 
relevant to sentence. It was held that the sentence of 
imprisonment, albeit suspended, was inappropriate, and the fine 
was excessive. The sentence of imprisonment would be quashed 
and the fine reduced to £100. The implications of this case are 
considered later in the light of the next case. 
In R v stearn (6) the appellant pleaded guilty to producing 
cannabis, possessing cannabis and supplying it. A total of 
44 cannabis plants had been found growing in his house, garden 
and green house. The appellant admitted selling cannabis among 
friends at about £20 per ounce. He had earned about £1500 from 
his first season's crop. He was sentenced to a total of three 
and a half years imprisonment. On appeal it was held that: 
"It is perfectly plain that an immediate 
sentence of imprisonment was necessary. We 
find it quite impossible to say that there 
is any ground which would justify us releasing 
him at this stage. The displeasure of society 
at the distribution of this type of drug on this 
scale must not go unmarked. On the other hand, 
we take into account the good character which he 
had in the past and, moreover and especially, the 
fact that he co-operated fully with the police and 
had the good grace to plead guilty at his trail. 
Those are matters that we find we can give effect 
to, by making some reduction in the length of 
sentence, while still preserving enough of it to 
show that society will not tolerate this kind of 
behaviour." (7) 
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The appeal was allowed to the extent that the sentence of 
three and a half years imprisonment was quashed and two 
years substituted. 
Before considering further the relevant sentencing policy, 
some remarks ought to be made about the law report for 
Stearn's appeal. Strictly, it seems that Stearn's main 
offence was that of producing cannabis rather than culti"vating 
it: Section 4 rather than Section 6 of the 1971 Act. This 
distinction is not immediately clear from the report, for that 
does not state the precise offence to which the appellant 
pleaded guilty. The rubric of the report does refer to 
"producing a controlled drug" but the head note refers to 
"cultivation of cannabis with a view to sale." The point 
made here is that the whole relevance of the section may be 
called into doubt. The origins of Section 6 of the 1971 Act 
is clearly Section 6 of the 1965 Act but why it should have 
been continued is uncertain. There may be a reasonable 
argument that Section 6 of the 1971 Act is otiose. From a 
sentencing perspective the higher maximum penalties for 
production must persuade prosecuting authorities to consider 
Section 4 charges first. 
There is a danger in trying to formulate a policy from so few 
cases. The smaller the number of cases the greater the part 
played overall by the facts and circumstances of the case and 
the personalities of the individuals involved. The reporting 
of a case in the law journals does not necessarily mean that 
it is representative of arrest trends, indeed it may well have 
been reported because it is not representative. But the cases 
cited indicate how the Bench come to distinguish factors not 
provided for in the statutory provision but of vital importance 
in apportioning culpability. Indeed the court in R v Lawrence 
referred to: 
~ 
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" the need to strengthen procedures for the 
determination of questions of fact going to 
sentence and to ensure that the form of the 
substantive criminal law is such that so far as 
possible the formal determination of guilt will 
resolve issues of fact which are critical to 
sentence." (8) 
(1 ) 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
(4 ) 
(5 ) 
(6) 
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Section 8: Occupiers etc of premises to be punishable for 
permitting certain activities to take place there. 
Section 8: 
"A person commits an offence if, being the 
occupier or concerned in .the management of 
any premises, he knowingly permits or suffers 
any of the following activities to take place 
on those premises, that is to say -
(a) producing or attempting to produce a 
cont~olled drug in contravention of Section 4(1) 
of this Act; 
(b) supplying or attempting to supply a controlled 
drug to another in contravention of Section 4(1) of 
this Act, or offering to supply a controlled drug 
to another in contravention of Section 4(1); 
(c) preparing opium for smoking; 
(d) smoking cannabis, cannabis resin or prepared 
opium." 
The earlier cases now considered precede the 1971 Act but they 
are still relevant: in R v Blake (1) the appellant was 
convicted of keeping a disorderly house and was sentenced to 
12 months imprisonment. It seems that he had been the manager 
of, . and had a financial interest in, a club which was 
frequented by young people who consumed (sic) drugs there, 
certain of these drugs having been purchased on those premises. 
The appellant had not actively encouraged the behaviour of his 
customers but he was aware of it and he had consulted the police 
about it. It was held, dismissing the appeal, that the 
appellant continued as manager well knowing what. was going on 
and the sentence was justified. The Court indicated that if 
the manager had played an active part, particularly in the 
sale ahd consumption of drugs then a much longer sentence would 
have been appropriate. Lord Parker C.J. was in the chair for 
Blake's appeal and also in R vOmer (2). There the appellant 
had been convicted of managing premises used for dealing in and 
knowingly cultivating and unlawfully possessing Indian hemp. 
~ ~ 
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Police officers in disguise had called at the appellants house 
and they had been offered drugs by him. It was held, dismissing 
the appeal, that as there was evidence of a substantial volume 
of business the sentence of four years imprisonment was 
justified. The distinction between these two cases, it is 
submitted, is the difference between acquiescing in unlawful 
activities and actually participating in them. Examples of 
other earlier cases are R v Andrews (3) where appeals against 
sentences of two years imprisonment were dismissed although the 
report of the case is perhaps too brief to be of any assistance. 
In R v Hopkins (4) the appellant was convicted of permitting a 
number of persons younger than himself to use his flat for 
smoking cannabis and he was sentenced to nine months 
imprisonment. On appeal against sentence it was held that 
permitting the use of premises for smoking cannabis was a 
serious matter and that the sentence was "well on the light 
side" and upheld. A sentence of nine months imprisonment for a 
similar offence was said not to be wrong in R v Jones (5) but 
it was varied to a probation order because of the poor mental 
health of the appellant. 
A more recent case is R v Dwyer (6) where the appellant was 
convicted of permitting premises to be used for smoking 
cannabis. Two American Air Force members were seen by police 
to go to Dwyer's house, spend some time there and then drive 
off. They were apprehended and found to possess substantial 
quantities of cannabis which they said they had bought from 
Dwyer and his wife although the latter two were acquitted of 
supplying cannabis. When the police went to the house they 
caught four persons smoking a reefer. They found £500 in 
English bank notes and $200 in American bank notes in the 
house. The appellant was sentenced to six months imprisonment 
suspended for two years and fined £200. On appeal it was held 
that in the circumstances, including the whole background 
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against which the offence was committed, imprisonment was not a 
proper sentence and that part of the sentence would be quashed. 
The fine would stand. The commentary of this case by Dr Thomas 
in the Criminal Law Review is noteworthy firstly for emphasising 
that the sentencer must accept the verdict of the jury as a 
basis for the sentence, whatever other suspicions he may have 
and secondly for the note that: 
"The sentencer was ... bound to deal with the 
appellant's on the basis that they tolerated 
the smoking of cannabis by their guests, for 
which a custodial sentence would rarely be 
appropriate. Accordingly, a suspended sentence 
was impermissible." (7) 
This case is considered later with the remaining case law. 
The appellant in R v Pusser (8) was convicted on a single charge 
of permitting premises to be used for smoking cannabis. The 
appellant was the licensee of a public house at which the police 
suspected that cannabis was smoked. Following a visit by police 
officers to the premises, when it was apparent that cannabis was 
being smoked, the appellant was warned not to permit cannabis 
smoking, and to call the police if he suspected that cannabis 
was being smoked. On a later occasion policemen carried out a 
search of the premises and found various amounts of cannabis in 
several forms, in different parts of the public bars on the 
premises. There was no evidence that the appellant had at any 
time personally smoked cannabis. A sentence of six months 
immediate imprisonment was passed. On appeal against sentence 
it was held that there was over whelming evidence that the 
appellant knew what was taking place, and made no attempt to 
stop it, despite being warned by the police. In dismissing 
the appeal Tudor Evans J. said: 
"It may well be that by permitting these activities 
to go on in the public house he was able to attract 
a large number of people to use it and so make a 
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larger profit. In our judgement, a sentence of 
immediate imprisonment was fully merited, and we 
do not come to the conclusion that the sentence 
passed was in any way excessive. This was a bad 
case and we think the sentence was fully justified." (9) 
The appellant in R v Spires (10) pleaded guilty to two charges 
of possessing cannabis, one of supplying cannabis and one of 
permitting cannabis to be smoked on his pre~ises. His house 
had been searched and about three grammes of cannabis and 
11 milligrammes of cannabis resin were found. He admitted that 
he had shared a reefer with two friends shortly before the 
police arrived. He was sentenced to nine months imprisonment 
on the charge of supplying cannabis, with concurrent terms on 
the other charges. On appeal the nine months imprisonment was 
reduced to three months imprisonment and suspended. It was 
held that as the prosecution had accepted his plea on the basis 
that he was not a trafficker in drugs, and he had no previous 
convictions for drug offences, an immediate sentence of 
imprisonment was not called for. The proper sentences on the 
charges of supplying cannabis and permitting the use of his 
premises for smoking cannabis would have been three months 
imprisonment, suspended, on each charge. The proper sentence 
on the charges of possessing cannabis would have been fines. 
As the appellant had been in custody, the sentence of nine 
months would be reduced to three months and suspended and the 
other sentences would be reduced to one day and suspended. 
Finally, in R v Hooper (11) the appellant pleaded guilty to 
permitting premises to be used for smoking cannabis resin and 
to possessing cannabis resin. Policemen had gone to the 
appellant's flat in the small hours of the morning, as a result 
of complaints about the noise at a party. The appellant held 
the door closed against the policemen when they first arrived 
but when they did gain access they found 6.74 grammes of 
cannabis under a carpet. The appellant admitted that he had 
allowed the flat to be used for smoking cannabis: he and two 
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friends had contributed £2 each and one of the friends had 
obtained some cannabis which they intended to smoke at the 
appellant's flat. The police arrived before they began to 
smoke it. The appellant was sentenced to three months 
detention. On appeal it was held that the Court was in no 
doubt that the sentencer was absolutely right to impose a 
custodial sentence on someone who allowed his premises to 
be used for the smoking of cannabis, whether or not he was a 
person of good character. Had it not been for the fact that 
the appellant had been on bail since being released from the 
sentence pending appeal, and had embarked on a trade in the 
interval, the Court would have returend him to complete his 
sentence. Although the penalty imposed could not be criticised, 
it would be quashed and a probation order of 12 months 
substituted. 
There are, it is submitted, a number of trends in the occupier 
offence. In the earlier cases sentences of immediate 
imprisonment were passes. An influential person was Lord 
Parker C.J. and his views were stated clearly in Yeandel v 
Fisher (12) which concerned a public house licensee and his 
wife. Both were convicted of being concerned in the management 
of premises, their public house, used for the purpose of 
smoking cannabis. At all material times the wife was in charge 
of the bar on none of the occasions when the offences were 
committed (presumably that means the smoking of cannabis) was 
Mr Yeandel seen there. Both were convicted and an appeal 
against conviction the offence was held to be an absolute one. 
Lord Parker said that: 
" this statute is dealing with the very 
important matter, particularly today, of 
dangerous drugs. I certainly take judicial 
notice of the fact that drugs are a great danger 
today and legislation has been tightening up 
the control of drugs in all aspects." (13) 
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It is submitted that this hard attitude to both conviction and 
sentence has been demonstrated in the earliest cases cited 
above, all of which involve the same Lord Chief Justice. The 
trend had changed by 1977 when Dwyer's case came to be 
considered and a far less stringent view of the offence was 
being taken. This was due in part to the newer offence in the 
1971 Act incorporating a mental element absent in the earlier 
absolute offence. But it may also have been that over the 
decade the appellate bench had come to realise the comparative 
seriousness of the offence. Finally, Dr Thomas' commentary 
on Dwyer's case that a custodial sentence for tolerating the 
smoking of cannabis on one's premises would rarely be 
appropriate seems to have been incorrect given the approach 
adopted by the court in the cases of Pusser, Spires and Hooper. 
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Section 9: Prohibition of certain activities etc. relating to 
opium 
Section 9: 
" it is an offence for a person -
(a) to smoke or otherwise use prepared opium; or 
(b) to frequent a place used for the purpose of 
opium smoking; or 
(c) to have in his possession -
(i) any pipes or other utensils made or adapted 
for use in .connection with the smoking of opium, 
being pipes or utensils which have been used by 
him or with his knowledge or permission in that 
connection or which he intends to use or permit 
others to use in that connection; or 
(ii) any utensils which have been used by him or 
with his knowledge and permission in connection 
with the preparation of opium for smoking." 
There appears to be no reported cases on this section. 
Section 9A: Prohibition of suppy etc. for articles of 
administering or preparing controlled drugs. 
Section 9A: 
"(1) A person who supplies or offers to supply 
any article which may be used or adapted to be 
used (whether by itself or in combination with 
another article or other articles) in the 
administration by any person of a controlled 
drug to himself, or another, believing that the 
article (or the article as adapted) is to be so 
used in the circumstances where the administration 
is unlawful, is guilty of an offence." 
"(3) A person who supplies or offers to supply any 
article which may be used to prepare a controlled 
drug for administration by any person to himself or 
another believing that the article is to be so used 
in circumstances where the administration is 
unlawful is guilty of an offence." 
There appears to be no reported cases on this section. (1) 
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Section 11: Power to direct special precautions of safe 
custody of controlled drugs to be taken at certain premises 
Section 11: 
"(1) ... the Secretary of State may be notice 
in writing served on the occupier of any premises 
on which controlled drugs are or are proposed to be 
kept give directions as to the taking of precautions 
or further precautions for the safe custody of any 
controlled drugs of a description specified in the 
notice which are kept on those premises. 
(2) It is an offence to contravene any directions 
given under subsection (1) above." 
There appears to be no reported cases on this section. 
Section 12 - Directions prohibiting prescribing, supply etc. 
of controlled drugs by practitioners etc. convicted of certain 
offences. 
Section 12: 
"(2) A direction under this subsection in 
respect of a person shall -
(a) if that person is a practitioner, be a 
direction prohibiting him from having in his 
possession, prescribing, administering, manufacturing, 
compounding and supplying and from authorising the 
administration and supply of such controlled drugs 
as may· be specified in the direction; 
(b) if that person is a pharmacist, be a direction 
prohibiting him from having in his possession, 
manufacturing, compounding and supplying and from 
supervising and controlling the manufacture, 
compounding and supply of such controlled drugs 
as may be specified in the direction. '.' 
"(6) It is an offence to contravene a direction given 
under subsection (2) above." 
There appears to be no reported cases on this section. 
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Section 13: Directions prohibiting prescribing supply etc. of 
controlled drugs by practitioners in other cases. 
Section 13: 
11(1) In the event of a contravention by a doctor 
of regulations made in pursuance of paragraph (h) 
or (i) of section 10(2) of this Act, or of the 
terms of a licence issued under regulations made 
in pursuance of the said paragraph (i), the Secretary 
of State may, subject to and in accordance with 
section 14 of this Act, give a direction in respect 
of the doctor concerned prohibiting him from 
prescribing, administering and supplying and from 
authorising the administration and supply of such 
controlled drugs as may be specified in the direction. 
(2) If the Secretary of State is of the oplnlon that 
a practitioner is or has after the coming into 
operation of this subsection been prescribing, 
administering or supplying or authorising the 
administration or supply of any controlled drug in 
an irresponsible manner, the Secretary of State may 
subject to and in accordance with section 14 or 15 of 
this Act, give a direction in respect of the practitioners 
concerned prohibiting him from prescribing, administering 
and suppling and from authorising the administration and 
supply of such controlled drugs as may be specified in 
the direction. 
(3) A contravention such as is mentioned in subsection (1) 
above does not as such constitute an offence, but it is 
an offence to contravene a direction given under 
subsection (1) or (2) above." 
There appears to be no reported cases on this section. 
Section 17: Power to obtain information from doctors, 
pharmacists etc. in certain circumstances. 
Section 17: 
11(3) A person commits an offence if without reasonbable 
excuse (proof of which shall lie on him) he fails to 
comply with any requirement to which he is subject by 
virtue of subsection (1) (of section 17). 
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(4) A person commits an offence of in purported 
compliance with a requirement imposed under this 
section he gives any information which he knows 
to be false in a material particular or recklessly 
gives any information which is so false." 
There appears to be no reported cases on this section. 
Section 18 - Miscellaneous offences. 
Section 18 
"(1) It is an offence for a person to contravene 
any regulations made under this Act other than 
regulations made in pursuance of section 10(2)(h) 
or (i). 
(2) It is an offence for a person to contravene a 
condition or other term of a licence issued under 
section 3 of this Act or of a licence or other 
authority issued under regulations made under this 
Act, not being a licence issued under regulations 
made in pursuance of Section 10(2)(i). 
(3) A person commits an offence if, in purported 
compliance with any obligation to give information 
to which he is subject under or by virtue of 
regulations made under this Act, he gives any 
information, which he knows to be false in a 
material particular or recklessly gives any information 
which is so false. 
(4) A person commits an offence if, for the purpose 
of obtaining, whether for himself or another, the 
issue or renewal of a licence or other authority 
under this Act or under any regulations made under this 
Act he -
(a) makes any statement or gives any information which 
he knows to be false in a material particular or 
(b) produces or otherwise makes use of any book, record 
or other document which to his knowledge contains any 
statement or information which he knows to be false in 
a material particular." 
There appears to be no reported cases on this section. 
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Section 19: Attempts etc. to commit offences. 
This section now has different applications to the different 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom: 
Scotland and Northern Ireland 
"It is an offence for a person to attempt to commit an offence 
under any other provisions of this Act or to incite or attempt 
to incite another to commit such an offence." 
This is the original section as provided for by the 1971 Act. 
England and Wales 
"It is an offence for a person .•. to incite another to commit 
such an offence." 
This amended offence was provided for by section 10 of the 
schedule to the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. 
A simple analysis of the original section 19 reveals three 
separate offences within the terms of the provision: viz; 
(1) attempt to commit an offence; (2) incite another to commit 
an offence; (3) attempt to incite another to commit an offence. 
However, the reports reveal only one case for a contravention of 
Section 19 and that relates to the first of the three 
alternatives. In R v Foo (1) the appellant pleaded guilty to 
attempting to possess herion. In appears that the heroin had 
been left under a carpet in a house where Foo lived. The drug 
was found by another resident and Foo attempted to recover it, 
he said, for a third party. The appellant's appeal against a 
sentence of four years imprisonment was upheld and that sentence 
was varied to two years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal did 
not interfere with the trial judge's recommendation that Foo be 
deported (2). In punishing individuals such as Foo for 
attempting to commit crimes the law is punishing them for 
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something they did not complete, for an unfulfilled intention. 
The justification for this is stated by Sheriff Gordon in two 
ways: firstly, someone who intends to do an unlawful act but 
does not succed is just as wicked as another who has the same 
intention but does succeed. But it may be that as the external 
harm is less with the former than with the latter then the 
punishment may be less. Secondly, an attempt at a crime reveals 
in law someone who may well later attempt the same unlawful act 
unless punished (3). As for punishment, Sheriff Gordon says 
that: 
" a person guilty of attempt is usually 
thought of as guilty of a lesser offence than 
a person guilty of the completed crime, and so 
liable only to a lesser penalty." (4) 
In the circumstances it would seem that the policy adopted is 
essentially that attempts will carry lesser penalties than 
completed offences but such a proposition cannot be tested fully 
with so few relevant cases. 
(1) 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
e (4) 
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Section 20: Assisting in or inducing commission outside United 
Kingdom of offence punishable under a corresponding law. 
Section 20: 
"A Person commits an offence if in the United Kingdom 
he assists in or induces the commission in any place 
outside the United Kingdom of an offence·punishable 
under the provisions of a corresponding law in force 
in that place." 
The international aspect of the drug problem is emphasised 
strongly by this provision. In R v Faulkner (1) the appellants 
has gone to Pakistan with the intention of becoming involved in 
a "hashish" run. They were approached by an American who asked 
them to take drugs in their luggage to Denmark for which they 
would be paid £1000 each on their arrival. They subsequently 
carried out a second "run" to Copenhagen and were apprehended 
when returning through customs at Heathrow Airport. They were 
found to be carrying cannabis which they had imported for their 
own use having paid for it in Copenhagen. The appeal point 
taken by the appellants was that although the maximum sentence 
for breaches of Section 20 of the 1971 Act was then 14 years 
imprisonment, the maximum in Denmark was only six years. It was 
submitted on these facts that lesser sentences could therefore 
have been awarded. In the view of the appeal court the Danish 
maximum penalty would be no more than a useful guide. In 
dismissing the appeals it was held that the maximum sentence 
under corresponding law of the country into which the drugs are 
imported is an irrelevant consideration. Where cases of planned 
international drug trafficking are brought before the sentencing 
court on the scale which existed have then there must be severe 
sentences for breaches of the 1971 Act. The sentences of four 
years were not therefore excessive. 
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Dr Thomas discribed (2) section 20 in his commentary on the case 
as a very unusual offence in that its existence depends entirely 
on the law of some place outside the United Kingdom. He argues 
that this gives some support to the argument advanced for the 
appellants in Faulkner's case. As liability depends on the 
existence of the foreign law, it was arguable that the gravity 
of the offence should also be regulated by the foreign law. 
Counsel seems to be seeking in such an argument to be trying to 
restrict the powers of the courts, powers that had as maxima 
been imposed by Parliament. Further, Parliament must be 
presumed to have realised and understood the implications of 
passing such an offence so that any change ought essentially to 
be for Parliament itself. 
In R v Derrick (3) the appellant was convicted in the United 
Kingdom of assisting the commission outside this country of an 
offence punishable in another jurisdiction. Derrick was 
concerned with two others in the smuggling of cannabis from 
North Africa into Spain. The matter came to light when one of 
the two others was stopped in Spain with a motor car in which 
was concealed 49 kilogrammes of cannabis resin. Derrick had 
bought the car in England and arranged for the petrol tank 
and boot to be altered for the purpose of concealing drugs. 
He also took part in buying airline tickets that were needed, 
and he went to Spain and North Africa. He had previous 
convictions but none for drug offences. He was sentenced to 
six years imprisonment. On appeal, it was submitted that the 
sentence was above the normal range for importing cannabis, and 
that the evidence did not show that he was the .leader of the 
enterprise so as to justify a higher sentence. The Court said 
that it was difficult to determine the exact part played by 
Derrick but clearly he was an active and important participant 
in the offence. After anxious consideration it had come to the 
conclusion that the sentence was unoriginally higher than his 
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established part merited. The sentence was reduced to five 
years. Perhaps the value of Derrick's case is threefold: 
firstly, the case is a good example of how section 20 works 
in practice to prohibit conduct that contributes to the success 
of an international criminal operation: secondly, as an 
illustration of the difficulty faced by the Court in major 
operations of apportioning blame, and especially when not all of 
the active participants are caught: thirdly, although section 20 
is little used in practice it is or could be a powerful 
provision carrying heavy maximum penalties. 
& 
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Section 23: Power to Search and Obtain Evidence 
Section 23: 
"(4) A person commits an offence if he -
(a) intentionally obstructs a person in exercise 
of his powers under this section; or 
(b) conceals from a person acting in the exercise 
of his power under subsection (1) above any such 
books, documents, stocks or drugs as mentioned in 
that subsection; or 
(c) without reasonable excuse (proof of which shall 
lie on him) fails to produce any books or documents 
as are so mentioned where their production is 
demanded by a person in the exercise of his power 
under that section." 
There appears to be no reported cases on this section. 
2.129 
A. 
2.130 
-166-
Section 27: Forfeiture 
The law of forfeiture of controlled drugs has changed 
dramatically within the last seven or so years. The whole topic 
of forfeiture has become a political problem involving many 
issues and a great deal of consensus on all sides. Some what 
surprisingly then the three jurisdictions have developed this 
aspect of the law of controlled drugs at varying speeds. For 
that reason the jurisdictions are considered separately. 
Section 27(1): 
"Subject to subsection (2) below, the Court by 
or before which a person is convicted of an offence 
under this Act may order anything shown to the 
satisfaction of the court to relate to the offence, 
to be forfeited and either destroyed or dealt with 
in such other manner as the court may order." 
Law before 1985 
The nature of the order 
It is certain that a Court by or before which a person is 
convicted has a power of forfeiture, but what is the nature of 
that order? The matter was considered in R v Menochal (1) where 
the appellant pleaded guilty to being knowingly concerned in the 
fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of 
controlled drugs contrary to section 3(1) of the 1971 Act. The 
appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment on 
31st January 1977 but nearly three and a half months later on 
9th May 1977 the same judge purpoted to make an order under 
section 27(1) of the 1971 Act, or alternatively section 43 of 
the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, for the forfeiture of 
£4371 in cash found in the appellant's handbag at the time of 
her arrest. The appellant appealed against the order on the 
ground that the order was: 
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" a sentence or other order made by the Crown 
Court when dealing with an offender." 
within section 11(2) of the Courts Act 1971, and it had not been 
made within the time limits prescribed by the last-named 
provision. 
The greater part of the judgement of Menochal's case in the 
Court of Arpeal and the speeches in the House of Lords are 
irrelevant to Scots Law. Judicial activity in both the courts 
mentioned was directed at reconciling two provisions in 
different statutes, neither of which apply to Scotland (2), in 
the light of historical reasons for the English judiciary having 
a power to alter or add to a sentence of the court (3). However, 
what is of concern to Scots law is the decision of the House of 
Lords that forfeiture orders, including an order made under 
section 27(1) of the 1971 Act, was a sentence in the nature of a 
penalty (4). As Lord Salmon held: 
"All prison and other sentences against a convicted 
person, including money penalties and forfeiture of 
money in relatio~ to an offence, have two purposes: 
(i) to punish the offender and (ii) to support the 
public good by discouraging the offender and other 
potential criminals from committing such an act in 
the future." (5) 
As the statutory provisions giving rise to this dictum do not 
apply to Scotland it cannot be said to be binding but it is 
highly persuasive in explaining the nature of an order of 
forfeiture. 
It is perhaps not out of place here to restate the general power 
of forfeiture in Scots law. The present authorities for the 
general power of forfeiture are contained in the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 which provides by section 223 for 
convictions on Indictment that: 
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"(1) Where a person is convicted of an offence and 
the court which passes sentence is satisfied that any 
property which was in his possession, or under his 
control at the time of his apprehension -
(a) has been used for the purpose of commiting, or 
facilitating the commission of any offence; or 
(b) was intended by him to be used for that purpose, 
that property is liable to forfeiture, and any 
property forfeited under this section shall be 
disposed of as the court may direct. 
(2) Any reference in this section of facilitating 
the commission of an offence shall include a 
reference to the taking of any steps after it has 
been committed for the purposes of disposing of any 
property to which it relates or of avoiding 
apprehension or detection." 
Where a person is now convicted of an offence by a court of 
summary jurisdiction the same provisions are applied by 
section 436 of the 1975 Act (6). 
An offence under the 1971 Act 
Section 27 of the 1971 Act allows the power of forfeiture where 
a person is convicted of an offence under that Act. In 
R v Cuthbertson (7) the appellants had produced and supplied an 
illegal drug on a large scale as a result of which they made 
enormous profits. Two of the appellants transferred a 
substantial part of their share of the profits to bank accounts 
in France and Switzerland. They were convicted of conspiracy 
with other persons to contravene section 4 of the 1971 Act. 
Following their conviction and sentence, the trial judge 
ordered the forfeiture, under section 27(1), of the appellants' 
assets which had been traced as representing the proceeds of 
their criminal activities. Appeals were taken against the 
forfeiture orders arguing that the power of forfeiture contained 
in section 27(1) only applied where a person was convicted of an 
offence under the 1971 Act, and not to a conviction for con-
spiracy to commit an offence under that Act, and only extended 
to anything shown 'to relate to' an offence under that Act. 
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The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and the matter was 
taken to the House of Lords. There, in his speech, Lord Diplock 
held that: 
"This is a pure question of construction of section 27 
read in the context of the Act of which it forms a 
part. The question should not be approached with any 
preconception that Parliament must have intended the 
section to be used as a means of stripping professional 
drug traffickers, such as the appellants, of the whole 
of their ill-gotten gains, however laudable such a 
consummation might appear to be. Parliament's intention 
must be ascertained from the actual words which 
Parliament itself approved as expressing its intention 
when it passed the Act in the terms in which it reached 
the statute book." (8) 
And later: 
"The words of the section speak for themselves, 
clearly, without resort to extraneous aids." (9) 
But, Lord Diplock also held that it was "with considerable 
regret" (10) that he found himself "compelled" to allow the 
consolidated appeals, and Lord Edmund-Davies was similarly 
"forced to the most reluctant conclusion" (11) that the appeals 
were to be allowed. 
The essence of the decision of the House of Lords was that 
section 27(1) of the 1971 Act provided a power of forfeiture in 
relation to an accused who had been convicted of an offence 
"under this Act." It was clear from the whole structure of the 
Act that for an offence to come within that description it had 
to be an offence, whether substantive or inchoate, which had 
been expressly created by the 1971 Act, itself. As conspiracy 
to commit an offence under the 1971 Act was not an offence 
expressly created by the 1971 Act, it followed that there had 
been no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the appellant's 
assests under section 27(1). This was so whether conspiracy 
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was charged at common law or, in England and Wales, as a 
statutory conspiracy following the coming into the force of 
section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 on 1st December 1977. 
In setting on this narrower construction Lord Diplock held 
further that: 
"The fact that the section is a penal provision 
is in itself a reason for hesitating before 
ascribing to phrases used in it a meaning broader 
than they would ordinarily bear; and in the instant 
case, the whole structure of the Act in my opinion 
points conclusively in the opposite direction." (12) 
~., 
The decision of the House of Lords, that there had been no 
jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the appellants' assets under 
section 27(1), was widely commented on when it became known and, 
indeed, it was criticised in the House of Lords (13). One 
academic commentator was moved to say that the result was 
"extra-ordinary, not to say incredible" (14) and went on to say 
that: 
"Conspiracy to commit a crime is in effect the 
same as doing the crime itself, the moral culpability 
may be as bad if not worse, there can be no reasons 
for any difference or limitation in the way the 
offenders are punished, including forfeiture." (15) 
But does the decision of R v Cuthbertson apply in Scotland? 
It is certain that in the application of section 27(1) of the 
1971 Act the court is bound to have regard to the fact that the 
offence of which the accused has been convicted is an offence 
under that Act. But the general power of forfeiture under 
sections 223 and 436 of the Criminal Proceudre (Scotland) Act 
1975 extends to property used or intended to be used for the 
commission of any offence, and not merely the offence of which 
a person is convicted (16). Certainly, it has been suggested 
(17) that where the powers provided under a particular statute 
are different from the general powers provided by the 1975 Act, 
2.137 
2.138 
-171-
the court should use the powers contained in the statute under 
which the person is charged (18). But the essence of 
Cuthbertson's case was that the appellants' were not charged 
under the 1971 Act and, it is submitted, that had the crime been 
committed in Scotland, the terms of the power in the 1975 Act 
would have been applicable. 
Anything 
'Anything' is defined in Collins Dictionary of the English 
Language is "any object" or "a thing of any kind". But, the 
question arises, does "anything" in section 27(1) mean 
"anything" in fact? In R v Beard (19) money was found in the 
accused's flat and it was clearly part of the proceeds of the 
sale of controlled drugs. Caulfield J. held: 
"I have no doubt that the word "anything" which 
is a very general description of personal 
property, includes money." (20) 
Accordinly, the money involved, £3978, was ordered to be 
forfeited. 
It has been shown, on the authority of R v Cuthbertson, that the 
power of forfeiture under section 27(1) of the 1971 Act may only 
be exercised where the accused has been convicted of an offence 
expressly created by the 1971 Act itself. But another major 
point arising from the same case concerned the things that might 
be forfeited. Cuthbertson and other accused had transferred a 
substantial part of their shares in the enormous profit arising 
from. their criminal activity to various banks in France and 
Switzerland. The total value of their assets that had been 
traced as representing their proceeds was some £750,000 and at 
the conclusion of the trial the presiding judge had ordered 
these to be forfeited. This course of action had been upheld by 
the Court of Appeal. However, before the House of Lords, 
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Lord Diplock in the principal speech said that the trial judge 
and the Court of Appeal appeared to have been influenced by the 
argument of Crown Counsel that the Parliamentary purpose to 
which effect was intended to be given by section 27(1) was to 
str~ drug traffickers of the whole of their profits of their 
crime whatever might be the way in which they had invested these 
profits. Lord Diplock held that even where a connection can be 
made between the specific thing sought to be forfeited and the 
substantial offence to which it related, it could not be 
suggested that section 27(1) authorised the court "to follow the 
assets", that is, to forfeit whatever those funds ultimately 
manifested themselves in. It was held further that: 
"No machinery whatever is provided by the section 
for effecting the assignment of choses in action and 
realising the charges on real and personal property 
which 'follow the assets' in this kind of way would 
entail. It is practical considerations of this kind 
which, in my view, lend weight to the conclusion based 
on the ordinary meaning of the language of the sections. 
They make it clear that, in the case of the sole offender, 
orders of forfeiture under section 27 can never be 
intended by Parliament to serve as a means of stripping 
the drug traffickers of the total profits of their 
unlawful enterprises: and the difficulties of using 
the section for this purpose are but multiplied when 
offenders are joint, assets in such a case would have 
to be followed down multiple trails ... " (21) 
Scots lawyers may. for choses in action, real and personal 
property read in general terms, incorporeals, heritables and 
moveables, respectively (22). 
The remaining judges agreed, but Lord Scarman went further and 
was more specific~ 
" (2) 'anything' in the context of section 27(1) 
is any tangible thing; (3) section 27 is concerned 
not with restilution, compensation or the redness of 
illegal enrichment but with forfeiture. Counsel for 
the appellants put it correctly, though strangely, 
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when he suggested that forfeiture was limited to 
"the accoutrements of crime", by which I took him 
to mean, in workaday English, the tools, instruments 
or other physical means used to commit the crime." (23) 
Indeed it was further held that things which were tangible at 
the time of the arrest could be the subject of a forfeiture 
order. (24) 
Relate to the offence 
Section 27(1) of the 1971 Act allows forfeitre of anything shown 
to the satisfaction of the court to relate to the offence. In a 
number of cases Courts have had occasion to consider the 
purported links between crimes and things. In R v Morgan (25) 
the appellant pleaded guilty to two charges of possessing a 
controlled drug with intent to supply. The Court of first 
instance ordered the forfeiture of a pair of cylinder scales 
and £393 in cash found in the appellant's possession when he was 
arrested. On appeal against sentence the Court of Appeal held 
that the £393 was no doubt part of the appellant's working 
capital for trading in drugs, but did not appear to justify an 
order made under section 27(1). The order was held to have been 
made without jurisdiction and was quashed. It would seem from 
the report that the prospective clients of the appellant had 
made off at the approach of the police and that the appellant 
had not supplied the controlled drug although on his plea that 
had been his intention. Accordinly, the sum of £393 did not 
relate to the offences that were preferred against the appellant 
or that he pleaded guilty to. (26) 
In R v Ribeyre (27) the Court of Appeal again held that where a 
person was convicted to having controlled drugs in his 
possession with intent to supply, an order under section 27(1) 
forfeiting cash proceeds had been made without jurisdiction as 
the words of section 27(1) " ... relating strictly to the offence 
of which the person was convicted." The appellant would 
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not necessarily have required his "working capital" for the act 
of selling drugs, or so the court held, and the money was 
accordingly not "anything shown to be related to the offence." 
In R v Khan (28) the appellant Khan was sentenced to a total 
of ten years imprisonment on conviction on three charges of 
possession of cannabis resin and heroin with intent to supply 
and on pleas of guilty to four charges of supplying and 
possession of heroin. In addition he was ordered to pay a fine 
of £10,000 and by section 27(1) of the 1971 Act, an order was 
made for forfeiture of a motor car used in the offences of 
supplying. The judge also made an order under section 43 of the 
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 for forfeiture of a house in 
St Albans in the name of Khan and under his control when used by 
him for the sale of one pound of heroin. On appeal the sentence 
of imprisonment was reduced to seven years and the fine of 
£10,000 and the forfeiture order on the car were upheld. The 
forfeiture order on the house was set aside as the judge had no 
jurisdiction on the point (29). The reasoning was that at 
appeal Crown counsel conceded that section 43 of the 1973 Act 
did not apply to real property. While section 43(1) used the 
word 'property' without qualification, nevertheless section 
43(4) of the 1973 Act applied the Police (Property) Act 1877 
and there 'property' was referred to as that in the possession 
of the police thus confirming that the provision was concerned 
with personal property and not real property. All this is of 
course irrelevant to Scots law as none of the authorities cited 
above apply here. 
Further in Khan's case the Court of Appeal observed that in 
R v Beard, considered earlier, Caulfield J. had held that a 
house was not included in the word "anything" in section 27(1). 
In R v Cuthbertson Lord Diplock said the following of section 
27 (1) : 
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"I would apply a purposive construction to the 
section considered as a whole. What does it set 
out to do? Its evident purpose is to enable 
things to be forfeited so that they may be 
destroyed or dealt with in some other manner as 
the court thinks fit. The words are apt and, as 
it seems to be me, are only apt to deal with 
things that are tangible, things of which physical 
possession can be taken by a person authorised to 
to do so by the court and which are capable bf 
being physically destroyed by that person or disposed 
of by him in some other way. To ascribe to that 
section anymore extended ambit would involve putting 
a strained construction on the actual language that 
is used, and so far from there being any grounds 
for doing so, it seems to me that if it were attempted 
to extend the subject - matter of orders of forfeiture 
to choses in action or other intangibles, this would 
lead to difficulties and uncertainties in application 
which it can hardly be supposed that Parliament 
intended to create." (30) 
So far as Scotland is concerned, as section 223 of the 1975 Act 
provides a general power of forfeiture in relation to 'any 
property which was in the accused's possession, or under his 
control at the time of his apprehension,' then, under the latter 
limits, forfeiture of a house in certain factual circumstances 
may be acceptable to the Scots courts (31). Similarly, the 
statutory power of forfeiture under summary procedure is 
supplemented with a statutory power to grant warrant for a 
search for forfeited articles by section 437. 
In Donnelly v H M Advocate (32) the appellant was originally 
charged on Indictment with one offence of possessing diamorphine. 
and two offences of possessing cannabis resin, all with intent 
to supply. He pleaded guilty to one of the cannabis charges, 
and he was acquitted on two other charges. He was sentenced to 
eighteen months imprisonment, and £1047 found hidden in his 
house was ordered to be forfeited. He appealed against sentence 
on the ground that the order of forfeiture was incompetent. On 
appeal, counsel for the appellant argued that the forfeiture of 
& ~ 
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the money was incompetent. It was said that the forfeiture 
could not be justified, under reference to a number of cases in 
England. These cases are not referred to in the judgement of 
the court. Counsel also argued that forfeiture could not be 
justified under Section 223(1) of the 1975 Act. In reply, the 
Crown conceded that if the order depended on the justification 
given by section 27(1) of the 1971 Act it could not be 
supported. The Court agreed with that concession. No reasons 
were given by the Court but it was said that: 
"Section 27(1) could not protect this order if 
that is all that we have to look at in determining 
the competency of the forfeiture." (33) 
But the Crown argued that the order of forfeiture was competent 
under section 223(1) and under both subheading (a) and (b) or 
either of them. The Court was of the opinion that the order 
was competent under section 223(1)(b): 
"In the circumstances of this case the judge was 
entitled to be satisfied that the money found 
concealed in the flat in association with the 
paraphernalia of trafficking, and, indeed, the 
cannabis resin, .was intended to be used by the 
appellant for the purpose of committing an offence 
and, for that matter, an offence under the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971. The intention was there to be 
seen and it arises as a reasonable inference from 
the material which was before the trial judge." (34) 
The appeal was dismissed. 
Donnelly's case is of importance for several reasons: first, 
it is an authority that makes clear that the powers under 
section 27(1) of the 1971 Act and under section 223(1) of the 
1975 Act are not mutually exclusive and that by implication 
both powers might be applied in justifying forfeiture of 
different articles in the same case. Second, the broad terms 
of section 223(1) are such that 'working capital' can be 
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forfeited in Scotland in circumstances where that has been held 
unjustified in England. Indeed, in his commentary on Donnelly's 
case Sheriff Gordon observes that: 
"The 1975 Act is wider since it applies to 'any 
offence', and not just to the offence charged. 
The money here could be forfeited under the Misuse 
of Drugs Act only if it was the proceeds of the 
supply to which the accused pleaded guilty. It 
might have been forfeited under the 1975 Act for 
that reason, as having been used by buyers to 
facilitate the commission of offences, or as was 
the view of the court, as working capital, and 
therefore money which it could be inferred was 
intended to be used by the accused to commit 
further offences." (35) 
Third, the two sections with which we are now concerned are a 
good example of the pragmatic and expedient nature of Scots 
criminal law and procedure. 
It would be interesting to know what the Scots courts would 
make of R v Chresaphi (36) where the only ground of appeal 
against sentence concerned a forfeiture order under section 
27(1) of the 1971 Act. Chresaphi was convicted of being 
concerned in the supply of a controlled drug, heroin. During 
the investigation of the case the police found in a locked 
cupboard in the appellant's bedroom a large sum of money in 
£100 bundles. The total was £3520. The appellant was living 
with a lady at the time and she told the police that the money 
had been obtained in the drugs business by the appellant. At 
this trial the appellant gave evidence and he denied that the 
money was from drugs. He said the money was from his work and 
it was kept out of the sight of the tax man. He also said that 
the money had come from his legitimate business. On appeal 
Caulfield J. held that the evidence of what the woman had said 
was not evidence which was admissable on the issue as to 
whatever or not the Court was satisfied that this money which 
A 
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was found in this bedroom was related to the offence which was 
the charge on which Chresaphi was being tried, namely supplying 
heroin (37). Crown counsel conceded on appeal that there was 
no evidence that the money discovered and ordered in part to be 
forfeited did relate (a) to the drug trade or (b) to the charge 
before the court. On that ground the forfeiture order was 
quashed (38). 
A similar scenario arose in R v Llewelyn (39) where the 
appellant pleaded guilty to possessing cannabis with intent to 
supply, and two counts of possession of cannabis and 
amphetamines. Policemen executing a search warrant at the 
appellant's house found two polythene bags, one containing one 
ounce of cannabis resin and the other containing five pieces 
of cannabis and a quantity of amphetamine. Some £400 in 
cash was found during the search in the appellant's wife's 
handbag. He was sentenced to a total of nine month's 
imprisonment and the £400 was ordered to be forfeited under 
section 27(1). The appeal was only on the forfeiture order. 
It was decided by the appellate court, on the authority of the 
cases of Morgan and Ribeyre, that: 
"Although it was established that the £400 
represented the appellant's working capital, it 
did not relate to the cannabis in his possession 
on the day of the search: the appellant would not 
require his working capital for the purpose of 
selling the cannabis in his possession on that day, 
and it was impossible to see how the money related 
to the cannabis which he had in his possession with 
intent to supply. The Court was satisfied that the 
trial judge's findings of fact (that the appellant 
was dealing commercially) were fully justified but 
that did not mean that the Court was able to make the 
forfeiture order. The words of the statute were clear 
and must be strictly followed. The forfeiture order 
must be quashed. (40)" 
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It is interesting that in Dr Thomas' commentary on this case he 
suggests that the appellant could have been fined a sum 
equivalent to the money found during the search. But, he 
cautions, the sentencer must avoid the trap (41) of justifying 
the fine by reference to earlier offences which have not been 
proved or admitted. To do so offenders against the principl~ 
that an offender should not be sentenced for offences which 
have not been brought home to him. He continues: 
"The sentencer must make it clear that he is 
imposing the fine solely for the offence for which 
the offender is before the court, and not for the 
purpose of removing the profits of earlier 
unproved offences." (42) 
This of course contrasts with Donnelly's case where the court 
held the money in his possession to be in effect for the purpose 
of committing future offences. However, the foregoing cases all 
represent the practical results of Parliament's modest attempt 
to strengthen the power of the courts in dealing with drug 
offenders. It will be shown that what happened in 1985 
represents a wholly different effort. 
However, most recently in R v Churcher (43) the appellant 
pleaded guilty to various charges on three Indictments. The 
charges included supplying controlled drugs and possession of a 
controlled drug with intent to supply. The appellant admitted 
dealing in amphetamine sulphate and cannabis. He was sentenced 
to a total of two years imprisonment and forfeiture orders were 
made in respect of two sums of money; £610 and £577, which were 
found in his possession at the time of his apprehension for 
offences in two of the Indictments. The appellant claimed that 
one sum of money was a loan from his mother, and that the other 
had been withdrawn from a building society. The sentencer made 
the forfeiture orders without allowing the appellant to call 
evidence to show that the two sums of money were not related to 
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the offences in terms of section 27(1). On appeal it was held 
that the power to order forfeiture was valuable in drug offences 
and should be used when it was appropriate to do so: however, 
proper investigation had not been made to ensure that the 
provisions of the statute were fulfilled. The Court was 
concerned that the appellant had not had a proper opportunity to 
establish that the Court should not be satisfied that the money 
related to the offence. While the sentences of imprisonment 
were held to be wholly appropriate, the forfeiture orders were 
quashed. Lord Justice Woolf held that: 
"The Court is anxious to make clear that the power 
to order forfeiture is valuable in drug offences and 
should be exercised where it is appropriate to do so. 
Regretably this is another case on which, no doubt 
because of the pressure to which Crown Courts are 
now frequently subject, the proper investigations 
were not made so as to ensure that the courts can 
make a forfeiture order. It would be preferable that 
a little more time were taken to inquire into these 
matters to ensure that the provisions of the statute 
are fulfilled. If that were to be done it would not 
be necessary for this Court to interfere with regard 
to otherwise desirable forfeiture orders." (44) 
In deciding this, the Court made it clear that it was not 
deciding the matter of forfeiture, only ensuring that the 
appellant had not had an opportunity of calling evidence in 
support of his contention that the money was not related to 
drugs offences. 
Section 27(2) provides: 
"This court shall not order anything to be 
forfeited under this section, where a person 
claiming to be the owner of or otherwise interested 
in it applies to be heard by the court, unless an 
opportunity has been given to him to show cause why 
the order should not be made." 
I~ ~ 
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The power in subsection (1) is sU9ject to that in subsection 
(2). It is interesting to note that the power in subsection (1) 
allows forfeiture, destructive or other expendient dealing 
although subsection (2) appears to relate only to forfeiture. 
There may be circumstances in which the distinction is material. 
For the mo~ent one point that may be worth considering further 
is that the applicant by subsection (2) must be: 
" a person claiming to be the owner or 
otherwise interested in ... " 
.the thing sought to be forfeited. It may well be said that such 
an applicant is not before the court as an accused person. The 
section does not appear to prevent the court making an order for 
forfeiture of property belonging to a person who has not been 
convicted of the offence in question (45). The final words of 
subsection (2) suggest that the onus is on the applicant 
throughout, although this cannot be said to be a legal burden, 
rather simply a persuasive one. 
In R v Beard (46) Caulfield J. held: 
"My powers under section 27(1) are virtually 
unrestricted. I can order the destruction of the 
property, or I can order that it should be dealt 
with in such a manner as the court may order. 
Obviously, I must adopt a judicial not a 
whimsical approach as regards the words' "in 
such other manner as the court may order." (47) 
It has been shown, it is submitted, that the judicial power is 
far from 'virtually unrestricted' and that the bench have set 
limits on that power. Reported cases are generally few in 
number but it must, surely, be accepted that, as Lord 
Wilberforce has said, section 27 is: 
" an important and necessary section .for. 
the suppression of the traffic in drugs." (48) 
B. 
2.150 
2.151 
-182-
1985 and later 
(i) Scotland 
The public pressure and political debate that preceded the 
changes in law in 1985 cannot really be divided amongst the 
jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. The essential reason for 
the distinction made here is that Parliament responded in 
different ways and at varying speeds in each of the two larger 
jurisdictions. There was a variety of sources of pressure 
of the border; for example the chairman of the Scottish Police 
Federation told that body's annual conference in April 1984 
that: 
" only pathetic attempts had been made so far 
to tackle the growing abuse in Scotland. The cost 
of stronger action would be cheap at the price when 
related to the human misery the problem caused." 
In reply Mr Michael Ancram, the Under Secretary of State for 
Scotland, assured the policemen that: 
" the Government shared their deep concern 
and revulsion at a growing evil, from which no 
section of society appeared to be immune." (49) 
The response of the legislature became apparent in the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provision)(Scotland) Act 1985. The nature 
of the provision is perhaps not strictly speaking a forfeiture 
but it is still convenient to consider the matter here. 
Section 39 of the 1985 Act inserted a new section into the 1975 
Act namely section 193B. This section applied only to solemn 
procedure and to a person who is convicted of an offence to 
which the section applies (50) and who is sentenced in respect 
of that offence to a period of imprisonment or detention. In 
these circumstances it was provided that: 
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II the Court shall, unless it is satisfied that 
for any reason it would be inappropriate to do so, 
also impose a fine." 
Subsection (2) provides that in determining the amount of a fine 
imposed: 
" the Court shall have regard to any profits 
likely to have been made by the offender from the 
crime in respect of which he had been convicted." 
In his annotations on the 1985 Act Professor JM Thomson of the 
University of Strathclyde makes two points about this sub-
section: 
"First, it is only the profits likely to have 
been made by the particular offender from the crime 
which is relevant, not, for example the profits 
which a co-accused is likely to obtain by committing 
it: often the offender may only receive drugs for his 
part in the offence. Secondly, it is only the likely 
profits of that particular crime which are relevant. 
Thus, it would appear that profits from previous drug-
trafficking - even if known - are excluded. There will 
also be difficulty in assessing what profits were 
"likely" to have been made from the crime." (51) 
By section 193B(5) it is provided that where the fine has not 
been paid any period of imprisonment or detention imposed for 
non-payment of the fine is to be served consecutively upon the 
initial sentence, unless the initial sentence is one of life 
imprisonment or detention for life. 
(ii) England and Wales 
The modest development in Scotland of fining offenders for 
likely profits will be contrasted sharply with changes south of 
the border. But, as a preliminary, it is worth remembering that 
the international aspect of drug-related matters must always be 
kept in mind. The jurisprudence of drug abuse has always been 
developed by domestic legislation and international agreements. 
The almost universal move to tackle the assets of the drug 
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offender have been well documented (52) and in some countries 
very extensive (53). In recent years controlled drugs in all 
their aspects have received very extensive press attention. The 
adverse reactions to the decision in Cuthbertson's case was thus 
amplified and the subject of comment. Of all the participants 
in the criminal justice system the police were perhaps the most 
vocal. The Association of Chief Police Officers held a three 
day conference in, April 1983 and the main point to arise was 
the concern expressed about the profits to be made from drugs. 
The Association sought a change in the law to enable the courts 
to tackle the "Mr Bigs" of the drug trade (54). Thereafter in a 
debate on the policing of London the Home Secretary made plain 
(5&) the Government's intention to take action to prevent 
professional drug dealers from profiting from their crimes. 
Further examples, for that is all that can be put forward here, 
of the concern felt appeared at regular intervals. The Council 
of Eurpoe, through the "Pompidou Group", convened a meeting in 
September 1984 at which it was decided to consider new moves to 
trace and confiscate the financial assets of drug traffickers 
(56). At the end of the same year the Head of H M Customs and 
Excise Investigations Division made a retirement speech that was 
widely quoted. He observed that he saw the confiscation of 
smug~lers assets as the biggest possible deterrent (57). The 
Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary said at a conference 
that, in his view, the major drug traffickers had a considerable 
advantage over most law enforcement agencies in terms of human, 
financial and other resources. He too called for wider powers 
(58) . 
There is perhaps scope for a study of the politics of the reform 
of the law of controlled drugs. In the absence of such a work 
two matters must be considered in detail here as of particular 
relevance to recent legislation. The first matter was the 
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publication in June 1984 of the report of a committee chaired by 
Mr Justice Hodgson. Although the committee was given a remit by 
The Howard Committee on Penal Reform and the subsequent study 
met those terms, the title of the book, The Profits of Crime and 
their Recovery, does not reflect the wider contents. The result 
of the committee's inquiries was a number of recommendations 
which deal with making good the loss suffered by the victim and 
depriving offenders of the profit of their crimes. These 
recommendations are to be found in three groups: the first 
concerns compensation, .that is to say making good a victim's 
loss. The second set concerns the deprivation of ill-gotten 
gains from crime. The Committee's principal proposal was that 
courts should be given new powers to order confiscation of the 
proceeds of an offence of which the accused has been convicted. 
The confiscation order, it was advised, should be limited to the 
Crown Court and should seek to deprive the drugs offender of the 
net profit of the offence. In particular it was recommended 
that wholesale suppliers of Class A or B drugs should have the 
burden of proving that assets acquired after the date of the 
first proved offence were obtained legitimatley. The Committee 
advised the retention of the existing and separate power of 
forfeiture under section 43 of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
Act 1973 but extending it to any property belonging to the 
accused which had been lawfully seized (59). The third set of 
recommendations concerned the practical matter of bringing the 
accused's assets under control of the court. The main proposal 
of the Committee was that a High Court judge should have the 
power to make an order freezing assets of an accused person 
prior to his trial. These interim measures were an attempt to 
prevent an individual disposing of his assets of profits on 
arrest in order to avoid being deprived of them subsequently on 
conviction. 
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The Report is important for English law in that the Committee 
has, in the words of Mr Martin Wasik, 
" striven to deal with an area of law which 
is at present not only very untidy, with related 
provisions in numerous different statutes, but 
which is also beset by fundamental difficulties 
of principle arising from the incorporation of 
compensation, restitution and forfeiture within 
the more traditionally penal objectives of the 
sentencing system." (60) 
The thoroughness and clarity of the document is a distinguishing 
feature as is the historical introduction. It is regretable 
that Scots law has been ignored generally (61). Certainly the 
law here might not be much further advanced than in England but, 
it is submitted, there was some scope for considering such 
provisions as we have, particularly as, in Chapter 4, the 
Committee found time to compare the law in various jurisdictions 
abroad. The conclusion must be that the Hodgson Report is of as 
little importance in Scotland as it is of great importance in 
England. Mr Wasik concludes that the Report is "full of 
challenging ideas which merit wide discussions" (62). 
The second matter of relevance to be considered prior to the 
recent legislation is the text of a speech by Lord Lane. In 
July 1985 Lord Lane, as Lord Chief Justice, addressed the Lord 
Mayor of London's dinner for judges. In a speech covering 
several topics his Lordship urged Parliament to introduce laws 
enabling drug traffickers to be stripped of their profits and to 
put pressure on the drug producing countries to cut production. 
His lordship said that: 
"There seems to be few signs of urgency. 
How many more years will go by, how many more 
children and young persons will have to die 
degrading deaths, before action is taken? One 
would have thought that there would be few things 
more important f"or Parliament to get on with, and 
few things less contentious." (63) 
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A mere three weeks after this speech the Government indicated 
that in the autumn of 1985 a package of "Draconian legislative 
measures" would be introduced (64). It is difficult at present 
to assess the precise effect of Lord Lane's public intervention 
but it seems unlikely that the nature and extent to the 
observations would have been over looked. 
It is in this context that the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 
1986 can be considered. The Act, which received Royal Assent 
on 8th July 1986, provides new powers foi tracing and freezing 
the proceeds of drug trafficking and for a confiscation order to 
be imposed on a person convicted of a drug trafficking offence . 
It also provides increased maximum periods of imprisonment in 
default where the amount of the confiscation order is not paid 
in full, and creates new offences of assisting another person to 
retain the proceeds of drug trafficking and disclosing 
information likely to prejudice a drug trafficking 
investigation. Perhaps this is not the best place to consider 
the whole Act but it is relevant to highlight the aspects of the 
new provisions that may affect sentencing policy. 
The first aspect of the Act is the provision by Parliament of an 
indication of what constitutes "drug trafficking." This phrase 
has been used very widely as we have seen for a variety of 
purposes from a general description of an accused's activities 
to a term of abuse. Section 26(1) of the 1986 Act provides 
that "drug trafficking" means: 
" doing or being concerned in any of the following, 
whether in England and Wales or elsewhere -
(a) producing or supplying a controlled drug where 
the production or supply contravenes section 4(1) 
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 or a corresponding 
law; 
(b) transporting or storing a controlled drug where 
possession of the drug contravenes section 5(1) of 
that Act or a corresponding law; 
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(c) importing or exporting a controlled drug where 
the importation or exportation is prohibited by 
section 3(1) of that Act or a corresponding law; 
(d) entering into or being otherwise concerned 
in an arrangement whereby -
(i) the retention or control by or on behalf of 
another of the proceeds of drug trafficking by him 
is facilitated, or 
(ii) the proceeds of drug trafficking by another 
are used to secure that funds are placed at his 
disposal or are used for his benefit to acquire 
property by way of investment." 
Perhaps the first impression of the definition is that 
Parliament has extended the meaning of the term beyond the 
inclusion of merely offences from the 1971 Act. But a statutory 
definition is also given for the term "drug trafficking offence" 
which means any of the following: 
"(a) an offence under section 4(2) or (3) or 5(3) 
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (production, supply 
and possession for supply of controlled drugs); 
(b) an offence under -
(i) section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise 
Management Act 1979 (improper importation); or 
(ii) section 68(2) of that Act (exportation); or 
(iii) section 170 of that Act (fraudulent evasion) 
in connection with a prohibition or restriction on 
importation or exportation having effect by virtue 
of section 3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971; 
(c) an offence under section 15 of this Act 
(assisting another to retain the benefit of drug 
trafficking) ; 
(d) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Law 
Act 1977 of conspiracy to commit any of the offences 
in paragraph (a) to (c) above; 
(e) an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts 
Act 1981 of attempting to commit any of those offences; 
(f) an offence of inciting another to commit any of 
those offences, whether under section 19 of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971, or at common law; and 
(g) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the 
commission of any of those offences." 
The second aspect of the 1986 Act considered here is the various 
orders created under the Act. It must be true to say that these 
provisions are, if not new to law, of a wholly different 
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character to anything that has gone before given the powers 
granted to the court and the complexity of the whole matter. 
There are now three different types of orders available in 
English law: 
(i) Confiscation Order 
Where a person appears before the Crown Court to be sentenced in 
respect of one or more drug trafficking offences the court may 
make a confiscation order: section l(i). Before making such an 
order the court shall first determine whether that person has 
"benefitted from drug trafficking": section 1(2). A person who 
has at anytime received any payment or other reward in 
connection with drug trafficking carried on by him or another 
has benefitted from drug trafficking: section 1(3). The amount 
to be recovered under the confiscation order shall be the amount 
the Crown Court assesses to be the value of drug trafficking: 
section 3(1). The court shall then order the defendant to pay 
that amount or order that amount to be taken account of before 
making any other order by way of sentence: section 1(5). 
(ii) Restraint Order 
If at any time after proceedings have been instituted in England 
and Wales against the defendant for a drug trafficking offence 
but before they have been concluded, the High Court is satisfied 
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant has 
benefitted from drug trafficking, the court may by order 
prohibit any person from dealing with any property available in 
respect of the defendant: section 6(1). 
(iii) Charging Order 
If, at any time after proceedings have been instituted in 
England and Wales against the defendant for a drug trafficking 
offence but before they have been concluded, the High Court is 
satisfied that there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
2.160 
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defendant has benefitted from drug trafficking, the court may 
make a charging order on property available in respect of the 
defendant for securing the payment to the Crown of any amount 
which is recoverable in the defendant's case under a 
confiscation order or which, if a confiscation order were made 
in the proceedings, might be recoverable in his case under the 
order: section 7(1). 
The remainder of the Act provides for various ancillary and 
supporting powers. Perhaps the most significant for sentencing 
purposes is that in section 5 of the 1986 Act. There, certain 
procedures are established for enforcing the payment of fines. 
Where the Crown Court orders a defendant to pay any amount under 
a confiscation order then the order shall have effect as if that 
amount were a fine imposed on the defendant by the Court. 
Further, substantial periods of imprisonment in default of 
payment are established: section 5(1)(b). As an indication of 
Parliaments determination it is provided additionally that any 
period of imprisonment in default of payment shall run 
consecutively to any period of imprisonment also passed as part 
of the same sentence: section 5(2). 
(1) 
(2 ) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5 ) 
• (6) 
(9 ) 
(10) 
(11 ) 
(12) 
(13) 
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CHAPTER 3 SPECIALTIES 
3.1 In describing the legal model of the drug trade the relevant 
case law has been analysed in terms of the statutory offences. 
But it is clear that there are amongst the cases a number of 
particular themes which cut across the whole variety of such 
statutory offences. These themes or categories are considered 
now under the headings of conspiracy, couriers, addicts and 
deportation. There are amongst these categories various 
important idications of sentencing policy. 
3.2 A. Conspiracy 
Inchoate offences, of which conspiracy is one, are committed 
when some step is taken to put a criminal intention into 
effect. Whereas the crime in view is not completed, the step 
taken is nevertheless sufficiently serious for it to merit 
punishment. It is worth mentioning, at this early point, that 
in Scotland conspiracy is still a common law crime (1), but in 
England and Wales it has been superceded by statutory 
provisions (2). The importance of this point, it is submitted, 
lies in the powers of the court in sentencing: in Scotland 
conspiracy as a common law crime is not subject to any maximum 
punishment provided by statute. In England conspiracy is now 
subject in all cases to the same maximum term of punishment as 
the consummated offence (3). For the latter reason it would 
seem from a reading of the judgements that the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) that many of the appellants are treated, 
which is to say sentenced, as if they had committed the 
consummated offence. Much of the dicta therefore does not 
necessarily apply specifically to the crime of conspiracy. 
However, as the appellants have been convicted of conspiracy 
these judgements must be considered here. 
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3.3 The earliest case in which an indication of sentencing policy is 
laid down preceded the 1971 Act but only by about 18 months. In 
R v Ardalan (4) the appellant and a number of others had been 
charged on Indictment with a conspiracy to commit an offence 
contrary to the then customs legislation. This involved a 
conspiracy to obtain 10 kilogrammes of cannabis which had been 
imported illegally. After conviction, Ardalan was sentenced to 
three years imprisonment and the others similarly convicted were 
sent to prison for various periods. All appeals against 
conviction were refused and in the course of considering the 
appeals against sentence Lord Roskill L.J. said that: 
"It is plain, and this has been said in this 
court and elsewhere before, that for those who 
indulge in these drug conspiracies where there 
are large profits at stake, exemplary deterrent 
sentences are necessary. Amongst those of whom 
it is essential for the courts to strike in some 
effort to stop this trade are those who arrange the 
illegal importation into this country of drugs of 
this kind in defiance of the prohibition on their 
importaion. It is the man at the centre whom the 
court should be especially concerned to aim 
punishment both to punish him and to warn others 
that those who indulge in similar conspiracies are 
likely to receive similar or perhaps even longer 
sentences." (5) 
and later it was added that: 
"In the view of this court it is almost 
inevitable that those who take part in 
conspiracies of this kind, great or small, 
receive custodial sentences and the fact that 
an immediate custodial sentence was imposed 
cannot be criticised in principle." (6) 
3.4 The next case to be considered reflects precisely the policy 
settled in the first observation from Ardalan's case. R v Kemp 
(7) arose out of various concurrent activities which amounted to 
a number of conspiracies relating to the manufacture and 
production of lysergide, known as LSD. The conspiracies covered 
~a 
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a period of about seven years, and it was claimed that the 
appellants were responsible for the production of almost all the 
LSD seized in the United Kingdom in the years immediately before 
1979, together with a significant proportion of that seized in 
Holland. Kemp was a highly qualified chemist (8) and his main 
co-appellant Bott was a medically qualified woman (9). None of 
the appellants had relevant previous convictions. The complexity 
of the issues at appeal and the parts in the venture played by 
each of the appellants is perhaps indicated by the fact that the 
hearing in the appeal court lasted four days. The court had to 
hear submissions ranging over five Indictments. The applications 
for leave to appeal against sentence concerned in essence the 
imposition of 13 years imprisonment on Kemp and Todd as the 
manufacturers and sentences ranging from three to 11 years 
imprisonment on the various distributors. In the event this 
important case came to be reported for the statements on the 
sentencing policy of the courts in relation to Class A drug 
offences. Lord Roskill in giving judgement observed that the 
Court had been greatly assisted by counsel who had put before it 
"every conceivable argument" in support of the general submission 
that the sentences were too high (10). In discussing the parts 
played by the ringleaders in the matter the Court said that they: 
" were concerned quite deliberately, knowing full 
well what ,they were doing, in the manufacture and 
production of this vast quantity of LSD. But they 
of course needed channels of distribution for it was 
not much use having this vast quantity unless channels 
of distribution existed through which •.. it could be 
moved around this country and out into Europe and 
indeed even in Australia, so that the full consequences 
of the evil in which these people were engaging might 
reach the far corners of the earth." (11) 
3.5 In sentencing the appellants the trial judge had applied the 
statutory provision relating to conspiracy charges (12) and he 
regarded 14 years as the maximum sentence which was open to him 
to pass in the case of the ringleaders, that being the then 
..... - .. 
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statutory maximum for the relevant substantive offences by the 
time the most serious part of this conspiracy had taken place. 
The appeal court had to consider two matters on sentencing: 
firstly, the trial judge's ceiling sentence and, secondly, the 
individuals sentences which the trail judge imposed on each of 
those involved in "this appalling story of crime." Before 
turning to consider these two matters there were certain general 
views:-
"We have often said in this Court that this Court will 
not, where a trial judge over a long period of time and 
taking all the care that Park J. took, allocates degrees 
of responsibility as he sees it, whether after trail or 
pleas of guilty - interfere with the trial judge's 
assessment, unless he can clearly be shown either to 
have overlooked some fundamental fact or in some 
respect to have gone wrong in principle. A trial judge 
hearing the evidence, seeing the accused, hearing the 
mitigation of counsel, watching the course of the 
trial, is in an infinitely better position than this 
Court, with all its experience, can possibly be in 
dealing with such a matter. Of course from time to 
time questions of disparity of sentence do arise and 
when they do, this Court has to deal with them as best 
it can, without the advantages which the trial judge 
possesses. But where in a case of this kind disparity 
is alleged by most of the applicants, and the trial 
judge has taken the pains that Park J. took, the 
burden upon you who seek to disturb the sentences 
arrived at with such care is indeed formidable and no 
counsel has shrunk from that fact." (13) 
3.6 In dealing with the question of the trial judge's ceiling 
sentence, the appeal court had to consider the evidence led by 
one of the appellants. That evidence was from a doctor of 
medicine and it was to the general effect that LSD was less 
dangerous than heroin in that it was not addictive, that it did 
not lead to violence and that its effects were less devastating 
to the individual than heroin. The doctor was of that view based 
on his own researches and also of the view that LSD ought not, if 
the decision rested with him, to be a Class A drug. Counsel 
argued that where a trial judge is face with a case involving a 
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controlled drug, he might require evidence to assist him as to 
the propensities of that particular drug. In so doing, the trial 
judge ought to have had the benefit of such evidence and graded 
LSD cases such as the present appeals below heroin in gravity 
(14). The appeal court rejected that argument stating explicitly 
that it is no part of the duty of a trial judge nor of that Court 
to grade the categories of Class A drugs into sub-categories. 
While the trial judge and that Court may be assumed to have 
certain knowledge as to drugs the prosecution and the defence, in 
appropriate cases, would be ready to assist with any additional 
information or evidence if required. Regretably the Court did 
not continue the point to state what knowledge the trial judge 
and the Court may be assumed to have on controlled drugs. It was 
said later: 
"We are therefore concerned - whatever the relative 
dangers of heroin or LSD, it is no part of our duty 
to rule on them and we have not the slightest intention 
of being drawn into such a controversy - and the 
learned judge was concerned, with a conspiracy on an 
enormous scale to manufacture, produce and distribute 
LSD, a category A drug." (15) 
It was on that basis that the Court rejected the argument that 
the ceiling of 14 years taken by the trial judge was wrong in 
principle. But the sting in the tail was the threat from the 
Court that: 
"If crimes of drug abuse with LSD or heroin 
cannot be stopped by sentences such as the 
learned judge found necessary to impose in 
these cases, then something else has got to be 
done to stop it, and the only remaining weapon 
in the hands of the courts, reluctant as any 
court is to pass very long sentences, will be 
consecutive sentences." (16) 
'.,:. 
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3.7 The second matter for the appeal court was the individual 
sentences imposed on each appellant and the failure, or so it 
was said, of the trial judge to give sufficient weight to the 
mitigation. The Court acknowledged that the effect of heavy 
sentences on families, wives, girlfriends and children was 
"highly tragic." But so far as each of the appellants was 
concerned it was stated that: 
3.8 
"Without Kemp none of this would ever have taken 
place, because it was his skills and techniques 
which found a way of manufacturing ever purer LSD 
from these very simply obtained basic chemicals. 
If people choose to offend on this scale against 
the laws of society, then society through the 
courts can only respond by ensuring that over a 
long period of years the talents with which nature 
endowed them are not allowed to be abused to the 
peril of so many." (17) 
The Court made the same views known about the appellant Todd. 
The trial judge had dealt with those who manufactured and 
produced the drug at the top of the scale and then graded those 
who were responsible for distribution further down. This 
arrangement was upheld on appeal. As for Bott, the Court held 
that there was little or no mitigation as she had assisted in the 
distribution of the drugs: 
"She took part in this conspiracy, she did it with 
her eyes open and society must ensure that those 
people who indulge in this sort of crime are not 
free again to indulge in it and once again to abuse 
their personal freedom for a long time, however much 
they may now seek to persuade this court that if they 
were now free their lesson would have been learned." (18) 
More particularly the gravamen of the submission on behalf of 
the remaining appellants was that the trial judge had got the 
apportionment of blame wrong. The appeal Court belittled this 
submission. While it could be shown that one appellant had 
fewer tablets in his possession than another or another could 
3.9 
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be shown to have made a lesser profit the Court held that: 
" the sentences in these cases do not have 
to be assessed on a percentage basis by reference 
to who had what, who distributed what, who gained 
what. Some no doubt gained more than others. What 
the learned judge had to do was to apportion the 
blame, the degree of responsibility, as he saw it, 
and we see nothing wrong whatever with the sentences 
which he passed ... " 
The Court concluded that: 
"In the result therefore, giving these cases the 
most anxious considerations that we can, fully 
realising the implication for the families of these 
men of upholding these very long sentences, we 
think the learned judge would have been failing in 
his duty if he did not impose sentences on the 
scale which he did, in this by far the worst drug 
conspiracy case that has yet fallen to be dealt 
with in our courts, by ensuring that the willing 
participants, whether involved for some false 
motives of idealism or purely for greed, should 
receive sentences which reflected the gravity of the 
offences of which they were guilty." (19) 
Accordingly the applications for leave to appeal against 
sentences were refused. 
The week after Kemp's case was heard in the Court of Appeal the 
same forum, but with a different combination of judges, had to 
consider the appeals in R v Frish (20). There the appellants 
had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to contravene section 4 of the 
1971 Act by offering to supply a Class A drug, namely heroin, to 
another. Each was sentenced to nine years imprisonment. It was 
accepted by the prosecution that there was no evidence of other 
involvement in the drug trade by the appellants and that the 
transaction for which they came before the court was their only 
transgression. The facts were that Sen, the second appellant, 
had obtained 491 grammes of heroin and then enlisted Frish's 
assistance in selling it. Frish contacted a potential buyer who 
3.10 
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turned out to be a police officer. Lord Lawton L.J. laid down 
policy: 
"What, then, is the proper sentence? This court is 
familiar with the tragedies which arise from this 
heinous trade of trafficking in heroin; and the 
policy of this court, as of courts all through the 
civilised world, is to do all it can by the sentences 
it imposes to stamp it out. When professional drug 
pedlars of heroin are convicted they must expect very 
severe sentences indeed. When beginners in this 
terrible trade are caught they must expect severe 
sentences. 
The question is whether the sentences passed in this 
case were appropriate to beginners in the trade. We 
have come to the conclusion that they were met, they 
were too severe for mere beginners, as the prosecution 
through the police officers accepted that they were. 
We cannot draw any distinction between them. Mrs Sen 
had the heroin and Frish was willing to distribute it. 
In these circumstances they should have the same 
sentences." (21) 
The Court allowed the appeals in so far as the periods of 
imprisonment for each appellant was reduced to seven years. 
The broad nature of the conspiracy charge is indicated in the 
following charges. In R v Saleem (22) the appellant was 
convicted of conspiracy to import, and conspiracy to export, 
morphine tablets. The tablets were imported from Pakistan and it 
was intended to export them to Denmark. Saleem was sentenced to 
seven years imprisonment. At the trial and on appeal, it was 
said that he had made little or no profit of the affair. The 
Court said that the matter was exceedingly serious, some twelve 
thousand tablets being involved. London was being made a centre 
for the traffic and the Court did not want the country to become 
a clearing house for drugs or to be known by other countries as 
being a temporary warehouse for drugs. Such drug offences 
required long sentences in the hope that the trade in drugs would 
thereby be stopped. However in all the circumstances, the 
3.11 
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sentence would be reduced to five years, bringing it in line 
with the sentences passed on the accomplices. But to mark the 
Court's disbelief of the claims that Saleem had made no profit, 
there would be a fine of £2000 with one year's imprisonment 
consecutive in default of payment. 
The case of R v Carrington (23) is a very notable drugs 
conspiracy case not least for the occupation of the appellant: 
he was a detective sergeant in the Drugs Squad of the 
Metropolitan Police. He was convicted of conspiracy to 
contravene the provisions of the 1971 Act and two charges of 
supplying a controlled drug. The activities of the squad in 
1976 led to the seizure of 11~ hundred weight of cannabis. That 
drug was taken to a police store prior to destruction. Some of 
it was removed from a van in which it had been put for conveyance 
to the destruction point. Over a period of six months or so, 
Carrington supplied 950 pounds of one variety of cannabis and a 
further quantity of another variety and he received £6000 which 
was later recovered from him. He was sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment. On appeal it was submitted that the sentence did 
not sufficiently take into account that another man i~volved in 
the matter as a result of giving a false account of events 
(including saying that Carrington blackmailed him into taking 
part and that he received very little of the proceeds of the sale 
of the cannabis) was discharged conditionally, that Carrington 
was subordinate to senior officers against whom there was 
insufficient evidence to support a committal for trial, that the 
offences were stale and that he had tried to help with police 
investigations. The Court held that the disparity with the other 
man could not be taken into account in the circumstances and that 
allowance was made for the fact that he was the tool of his 
I superiors. The appeal court accepted that Carrington had been 
under strain for a long period and that he had given assistance 
d& ~ 
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but, nevertheless, it went on to say that: 
" one is bound to observe, if it needs 
observation, that this type of offence committed 
by this type of man, a sergeant in the Drug 
Squad of the Metropolitan Police, strikes at 
the very foundation of justice and that may be 
a cliche, but it is a necessary cliche, in these 
circumstances. These types of offences undermine 
the whole administration of the criminal law. One 
does not have to attend very many trials in this 
part of the country to realise what the effect 
of this sort of behaviour by a police officer 
means so far as the administration of justice is 
concerned, what it means so far as deliberations 
of juries are concerned. It cannot be too strongly 
emphasised that these offences are as grave as 
any can be so far as justice is concerned and in 
these circumstances, though it grieves us in 
many ways to have to do it, we are bound to say 
that there is nothing wrong in the length of 
this sentence." (24) 
There may well be a reasonable argument for saying that 
Carrington's case would be more apposite for a study of 
sentencing and breach of trust. Perhaps the importance of the 
case for this study is as an illustration of the insidious nature 
of the drug trade. Further, it is a good example of an 
exemplary sentence in the circumstances. Saleem also received a 
heavy sentence by way, clearly, of warning others. A common 
factor of the cases is profit and the involvement of others not 
before the court. The Court stated explicitly that it did not 
believe that Saleem did not make a profit and the recovery of 
£6000 in cash from Carrington appears to have been an influencing 
factor in his appeal. 
In R v Ross (25) the appellant had conspired to supply cocaine to 
two policemen who were pretending to be customers. Seventy-eight 
grammes of cocaine was obtained by one of the conspiracters for 
the purpose of the transaction. The appellant was sentenced to 
six years imprisonment: the co-defendant who obtained the cocaine 
,& 
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and thereby played a greater part in the conspiracy received 
three years imprisonment. The judgemen~ of the Court of Appeal 
is interesting for the almost unique description by the trial 
judge of the way in which he arrived at sentences. That judge 
had said that the first thing that he had to do was decide what 
the correct sentence was for Ross's part in the conspiracy to 
deal in cocaine of this quantity. The ~vidence was that it was 
in an uncut state, that it had been bought for £3000 on credit 
and that it would be sold for £7000. He came to the conclusion 
that an appropriate sentence would be seven years imprisonment, 
and that allowing for Ross's plea of guilty and mitigation the 
sentence ought to be six years which was what was imposed. The 
issues of sentencing policy not necessarily concerned with 
controlled drugs but raised by this case was twofold: first 
the discount allowed for a plea of guilty which need not be 
considered further here (26) and second the recognition given 
by the Courts of the assistance given by accused persons to the 
police. Ross alleged that he was aggrieved because his 
co-conspirator had been sentenced to a lesser period of 
imprisonment after a document had been handed up to the trial 
judge. The contents of this document was not known to Ross but 
it was known to the Court of Appeal who dealt with the point and 
said that: 
"It is well-established that those who give 
information to the police get a very substantial 
discount on their sentences. It is one of the 
facts of life that in dangerous crimes such as 
distribution of drugs, which is done in secrecy, 
and in which very large sums of money are involved, 
there is no way in which the law can be enforced 
without the help of information. No more need be 
said about that." (27) 
Thereafter the Court referred to the co-defendant receiving the 
substantially discounted sentence as being in a "special 
category." This is an unambiguous statement of policy by the 
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English appeal court and it is intended to encourage accused 
persons to assist the police not for purposes of altruism but 
for very positive rewards. As Ross appears not to have assisted 
the police he did not fall into that category. However, 
according to the appeal court, the plea of guilty by Ross did put 
him into another category and the Court held that the discount 
of one year for that much had been too little. The discount 
ought to have been two years. Furthermore, as the initial 
sentence of seven years was thought to be too high, a more 
realistic sentence was six years. The appeal by Ross was allowed 
to the extent of quashing the sentence of six years and 
substituting a sentence of four years. Similarly in 
R v McCullough (28) the appellant had pleaded guilty to a 
conspiracy to supply a controlled drug namely LSD. He was 
arrested in possession of sufficient LSD to make 8000 
doses, and admitted being concerned in a scheme to import 
and sell LSD with an estimated value of £42,000. He was 
sentenced to six years and on appeal it was held that a sentence 
of eight years imprisonment would not have been out of place for 
an operation on this scale. Further, the court held that the 
trial judge had given sufficient credit for the appellant's 
unfortunate personal circumstances, his plea of guilty and the 
help that he had given the police; in short 
"That the learned judge made a reduction of 
two years was a sufficient indication to the 
appellant and others that frankness does pay 
even in these circumstances." (29) 
The remaining reported cases concerning conspiracy are more 
important for the drugs issues raised than any other issue. 
In R v Suermond~ (30) the appellant pleaded guilty to 
conspiring to import 4 kilogrammes of cocaine in two separate 
consignments, and being concerned in the importation of a 
further consignment of 5.9 kilogrammes of cocaine. He had 
been concerned in the purchase of cocaine in Peru and its 
importation with a view to sale in the United Kingdom. The 
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total estimated street value of the three consignments was 
about £1,400,000. He appealed against a sentence of 10 years 
imprisonment. The judgement of the Court set out the extra-
ordinary facts of the conspiracy involving Suermondt as the 
ringleader and detailed the points made in submission by his 
counsel at appeal. Of interest now was one particular point, 
namely that the trial judge had failed to give sufficient 
weight to the clear distinction in the appellant's mind between 
the seriousness of importing cocaine as he was doing and the 
seriousness of importing a dangerous drug like heroin. In 
fairness, the matter had been raised before the trial judge and 
that had led him to adjourning for further evidence about the 
dangerous qualities of cocaine. In view of that evidence and a 
further report that had been put before the Court of Appeal, the 
latter Court held that: 
"It is clear ... that on any showing cocaine is 
both addictive and dangerous and is a socially 
harmful drug. It may well be that it is less 
dangerous and less socially harmful than heroin 
but it seems to this Court that there is little 
profit in comparing its importation with the 
importation of heroin because if the appellant 
had been caught importing heroin on the scale 
of this importation of cocaine the sentence would 
have been very much higher and in the region of 
14 to 15 years. 
It may well be that because of the higher price 
of cocaine its socially harmful effects are less 
obvious than the socially harmful effects of other 
drugs, but (counsel for the appellant) eventually 
submitted to us that cocaine should be considered 
on a par with amphetamines in its dangerous qualities 
and we are content to deal with the matter on that 
basis." (31) 
In concluding the judgement and dismissing the appeal the Court 
laid down that: 
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" this is a case where the overwhelming 
consideration to be borne in mind by the 
sentencer is one of deterrence. Here the 
appellant admitted taking three sUbstantial 
consignments of a dangerous and addictive drug 
and, to use a cliche, took part in a game in 
which he was playing for high stakes, high 
profits on the one hand, if he avoided detection, 
a heavy sentence on the other, if he was caught. 
In those circumstances, any persons considerations 
of the appellant must be outweighed by the 
deterrent considerations." (32) 
Exemplary sentences were also passed in R v Prevost (33) where 
14 years imprisonment was given to a man said to be the leader 
of an international gang of cocain smugglers, and in R v Miller 
(34). In the latter case the appellant was a man aged 43 with 
a severe criminal record for offences of dishonesty and drugs. 
He had been released from prison in 1981 and three months 
later he was engaged in the current offence of conspiracy. On 
arrest he was searched by the police and he was found to be 
carrying £2000 which he had offered to pay for a supply of 
heroin. He was sentenced to an extended term of 10 years and 
on appeal it was held that in view of the gravity of the 
offenc~ and his previous convictions for drug offences the 
sentence imposed was entirely appropriate. In R v Andaloussi 
(35) a 30 year old Morrocan became involved with 24 other 
individuals in the illegal importation of drugs into the United 
Kingdom. Over a period of four years at least 88~ kilogrammes 
of cocaine valued at £2,250,000 were smuggled. The grounds 
of appeal was disparity between his sentence and those of two of 
his confederates. It was held that the appellant was a 
principle in a serious long lasting conspiracy to import an 
addictive drug and he could therefore have no complaint against 
his sentence. 
Finally R v Mansoor (36) is of interest for the detailed 
consideration of the appellant's place in the venture. The 
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appellant was convicted of a charge of conspiracy to contravene 
the 1971 Act and of possession of heroin with intent to supply it 
to another. He was sentenced to nine years imprisonment on each 
charge, concurrently. It seems to have been accepted all round 
that Mansoor was merely one member of a large team of people who 
were involved. At the relevant time he was found in possession 
of 321 grammes of heroin. In passing sentence the trial judge 
made it clear that he did not regard the appellant as being in 
the front rank of this conspiracy. He placed him "in about the 
second or possibly the third rank" (37) and he stressed Mansoor's 
role in providing a place to conceal the drug, in conducting 
negotiations and in indicating that other deals would follow 
although this was the first. On appeal, counsel for the 
appellant submitted that his client had been "further away from 
the original importer" than the trial judge had inferred from 
the evidence. There was nothing, according to the submission, 
to connect Mansoor with the importation and, it was emphasised, 
he was "a middle man very low down the line and not the 
financier." It was conceded that he was deeply involved (38). 
The appeal court held that a heavy sentence here was not wrong 
in principle but on the facts that passed was excessive. The 
sentence of nine years was quashed and sentences of seven years 
imprisonment on each charge was substituted, the sentences to 
run concurrently. 
(1) 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
(4) 
(5 ) 
(6) 
(7) 
(9 ) 
(10) 
(ll ) 
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B. Couriers 
The crucial importance of the prohibition on the importation of 
controlled drugs has been underlined earlier in this work. The 
various attempts to circumvent the prohibition may, perhaps 
generously, be described as tests of human ingenuity. One of the 
least subtle of these attempts is simply to have an individual 
transport the controlled drug through the point of entry. The 
small size of many controlled drugs tends to ease the problems 
associated with such attempts and also to provide an incentive. 
This part of this work is about the individuals who transport 
personally the controlled drugs and who therefore act as 
couriers. This particular trade has caused considerable judicial 
comment and some anguish at hard decisions that have had to be 
taken. 
In R v Ayoub (1) the appellant had been convicted on two charges 
of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the 
restriction on the importation of cannabis and sentenced to six 
years imprisonment on each charge concurrent. On appeal it was 
said that as the evidence had shown that the appellant had a 
quantity of cannabis worth retail about £30,000 to £50,000 (2); 
that her house appeared to be a major distribution centre; that 
in letters found in her possession she appeared to express 
pleasure at evading the authorities on previous occasions and 
that she knew a considerable amount about the material law and 
penalties; that she was to be regarded as a professional 
trafficker and to be sentenced accordingly. The defence 
submission that her enforced separation from her young children 
would be disasterous for them was rejected in that as she had 
had the children with her at the time of her apprehension. She 
had used them to evade the likelihood of being stopped. Lane J., 
as he then was, said that: 
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"That type of behaviour does not endear the 
mother to someone who is looking for mitigating 
circumstances." (3) 
Further, the offence was such that the appellant must go to 
prison for a considerable time and children, being what they are, 
will get over the "first wrench of deprivation." The Court held 
that this sort of offence must inevitably be visited with a harsh 
sentence to punish the appellant and to discourage others. 
Accordingly, application for leave to appeal against sentence was 
dismissed. This aspect of discouraging others is common to most 
courier cases and the appeal court is frequently presented with 
cases in which the personal problems of the appellants are 
extreme ones. 
Indeed couriers appear generally to be selected by their 
paymasters precisely for their problems. In R v Mehagian and 
Fenwick (4) the appellants were convicted to being knowingly 
concerned in the fraudulent evasion of a prohibition on the 
importation of drugs. Both appellants were American girls who 
had gone to Syria and taken work as dancers in a night club. 
Both became pregnant and moved to Lebanon. Mehagian was anxious 
to consult an English doctor but she had no money for the air 
fare to England. Money was given to her in return for taking 
twelve suitcases, containing 512 pounds of cannabis to England. 
Fenwick accompanied Mehagian. On conviction each was sentence 
to two years imprisonment. Subsequently, Mehagian's child was 
born with a heart condition. Fenwick's child died. The 
families of both girls were willing to take them back and look 
after them. On appeal against sentence Lord Lawton L.J., held: 
"It would have been easy for this Court to have 
taken a sentimental view. It would have been 
easy to say that the British public will benefit 
from the fact that the appellant Mehagian will 
leave the country and never come back, but the 
Court has to do its duty, and has to do its duty 
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not only to the young of this country. It has 
to do its duty to the young allover the world. 
One thing which must not happen is that the 
unscrupulous villans who put these drugs into 
circulation should think that if they get hold 
of young people to bring drugs into England then 
they are going to have drugs brought into a country 
where the law is prepared to take a sentimental 
view. The Court has had to steel itself in this 
case to the fact that what has happened here was 
what happens in so many cases. These narcotic 
peddlars are always on the look out for young 
persons who will be willing to act as carriers. 
They change their tactics according to the views 
of the Courts which have dealt with the carriers. 
If they have reason to think that the Courts will 
be lenient with a woman who has a number of 
children, then they will find such a woman to 
act as carrier. If they think that the Courts 
will be lenient with students, then students are 
used as carriers. No doubt these villans in the 
Lebanon thought that two pregnant girls would 
excite the sympathy of the Court and the girls 
would not be running quite the same risks as 
others might who were apprehended as carriers. 
In those circumstances this Cour~ feels obliged 
to uphold these sentences. It does so reluctantly 
but it does so in what it conceives to be its 
duty." (5) 
It is impossible to know whether Lebanese drug barons in fact 
took notice of what English judges had to say on these matters 
or whether they simply sought to vary the type of people acting 
as couriers. The aim of the latter would be to avoid the 
authorities associating the carriage of drugs with any particular 
group. Further, the types of people in fact selected would be 
more susceptable to inducements or threats. The importance of 
the judicial observations in Mehangian's case lies in the view 
of these matters by the judges and, in particular, how their 
subjective assessment of accused persons was being 'tested' by 
the drug barons. The remaining relevant cases follow this narrow 
theme but the judicial views expressed are of interest. 
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In R v Taylor (6) the three appellants each pleaded guilty to 
fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of 
heroin. They had each been concerned in a world wide operation 
to transport heroin from the Far East through London Airport to 
America. One of the appellants had been stopped at the airport 
in possession of 516.5 grammes of heroin strapped to her legs. 
The appellants were all young women in their twenties, of 
previous good character and citizens of the United States. They 
were each subject to various personal or financial difficulties, 
and they had co-operated with the authorities after their arrest. 
Each appellant had been sentenced to five years imprisonment. In 
the Court of Appeal Philips J. noted that: 
"The value of the heroin was £1.5 million, 
perhaps £8 million in the United States of 
America." 
and further that: 
"Each of (the appellants) was sentenced to 
five years imprisonment. A man named Laws, 
who was described as a fieldorganiser, was 
sentenced to nine years imprisonment. A man 
named Beutes, who was one of the financiers, 
was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment." 
and finally that: 
"(the appellants) were all young women of 
good records, but in difficulties of one 
sort or another. This is very pertinent 
to the matter in hand, because they are the 
sort of persons likely to be recruited as 
carriers for a number of reasons: (1) they 
look like tourists or holiday makers (2) being 
financially straightened, they were likely to 
go fairly easily for easy money, albeit they 
originally did not know what was involved and 
got involved to such an extent that they could 
not withdraw." (7) 
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It was on all those grounds that the Court dismissed the 
appeals and held that personal circumstances such as those of 
the appellants could be only of relatively minor importance. 
Similarly in R v Anderson (8) the appellant, a woman of good 
character and the mother of young children, pleaded guilty to 
being concerned in the importation of cannabis. She was caught 
coming through customs with a holdall containing 7.88 kilogrammes 
of cannabis said to have a street value of £9000. She was 
sentenced to three years imprisonment and ordered to forfeit 
£500. The Court reaffirmed the relevant principle when Michael 
David J. held, in dismissing the appeal, that: 
" when sentencing this appellant the learned 
trial judge said, "one of the terrible features 
of this evil trade is that those who organise it 
very often choose people in difficult circumstances 
to act as couriers and your case is no exception 
to that pattern." 
We agree, and would add that one of tQe reasons 
for so doing is that the evil persons who profit 
most by this trade are able to say to such 
couriers: "Well, of course, if you are caught, 
because of your circumstances you will be dealt 
with leniently." 
This Court has said in many cases - and we 
repeat - that people who act as couriers in 
this class of trade must expect substantial 
immediate sentences of imprisonment. The 
sentence imposed in this case is well within 
the tariff for cases of this sort. Indeed, 
it is rarely, if ever, that a sentence would 
be reduced by this Court to less than three 
years imprisonment in such a case ... It is 
quite impossible for this Court to say that 
this sentence was either wrong in principle 
or manifestly excessive, and accordingly, this 
Court has no hesitation in upholding it." (9) 
e-"· . ., .-.'-;"":.. . ."'. 
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Again in R v_Taylor (10) the trial judge had said that the 
" ... message must be writ large and clear for 
all to see, that those convicted of importing 
this drug into this country, whether for 
distribution here or as a staging-point, await 
substantial sentences of imprisonment." (11) 
The 'staging-point' mitigation had in effect been disposed of by 
Lord Lawton in Mehagian's case when he made it clear that the 
Court owed a duty to the young allover the world but the matter 
was raised subsequently as we have seen and unsuccessfully so. 
Equally in R v Mbelu (12) the appellant was found to be in 
possession of 3.47 kilogrammes of cannabis and he was convicted 
of importing that substance. Mbelu was then a passenger in 
transit from Nigeria to the United States and it was accepted 
that he intended to remain in the United Kingdom, between planes, 
for only about one hour. He was sentenced to 18 months 
imprisonment. On appeal against sentence, Drake J. said that: 
"What is urged on this Court as grounds for 
reducing the sentence was his good character up 
to the present time; that he was merely in 
transit through the country on the way to the 
United States and, finally, the hardship which 
results from the length of this sentence to 
himself and his family. Unfortunatley, the 
fact is that many, many of those who engage in 
smuggling drugs are people of previous good 
character. As to the argument that the Court 
should treat this matter more leniently because 
the drugs were not destined ultimately for this 
country but were destined for the United States, 
that is not an argument which impresses this Court. 
It is not really a very attractive argument to say 
that this man can be sentenced very lightly because 
he was going to supply people or import the goods, 
if not to supply them at all, to people in a 
friendly country, but not this one. As to the 
hardship which may result to himself and his 
family, that again is really a matter that all 
to familiarly flows from criminals convictions." (13) 
3.22 
-220-
The case to be considered now is perhaps the best known of the 
courier cases, or it ought to be as it has been reported in at 
least five different journals. In R v Hamouda (14) the 
appellant, an Arab woman of 27 years, was illiterate and spoke 
very little English. She pleaded guilty to fraudulently 
importing 10.8 kilogrammes of cannabis resin. She had arrived 
at Heathrow Airport on a flight from Egypt, and was found to be 
carrying slabs of cannabis resin in the false bottoms of two 
holdalls. The cannabis resin had an estimated street value of 
£20,000. The appellant claimed that she had agreed to carry the 
cannabis resin for a man in Cairo, and would hand it over to 
someone in London. She was to receive £1000 which she needed 
to pay for an operation on her child who had a heart complaint. 
She was sentenced to two years imprisonment. In dismissing the 
appeal, Lord Lawton said: 
"It is a very sad case. But even sadder is 
the current abuse of drugs in the United Kingdom. 
From case after case coming before it this Court 
is aware that around the world, and in particular 
in the Middle ~ast, are those who are doing all they 
can to get controlled drugs brought unlawfully into 
this country. Those who plan drug smuggling 
operations seldom themselves bring in the drugs; 
they employ couriers to do so. It is also the 
experience of this Court that they are always 
looking for couriers who, if they are caught, can 
tell a story which may affect their sentences. All 
kinds of couriers have been before the Court. The 
fashion in them changes depending on the attitude of 
the Court. A few years ago the courier was very often 
a student, and we were told that his life would be 
ruined by a sentence of imprisonment. The court found 
itself unable to accept that as mitigation. As a 
result students were not chosen as couriers. Then 
pregnant women were sent here as couriers, being told 
that not very much would happen to them by way of 
sentence. The Court decided that even pregnant 
woman would have to be dealt with in accordance with 
the full rigour of the law. Now we find this young 
married woman with a sick child acting as a courier. 
The same situation will probably happen if the 
court takes a lenient view in her case. Couriers 
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will be told that not very much will happen to 
them, in the unlikely event of their being caught, 
if they are ignorant of the English language and 
have a yeung child. 
The menace of the illegal importation of controlled 
drugs is so great that the court has reluctantly 
had to take the view that those who engage in this 
traffic must expect severe custodial sentences. It 
is obvious from the facts of this case that the 
attitude of the learned judge that he had in mind 
all the points which were urged upon him and which 
have been urged upon us, and that he mitigated the 
severity of the penalty by imposing at the lower end 
of the bracket normally passed in this kind of case. 
It is with regret that in the circumstances we 
are unable to treat this case as an exception .. " (15) 
The echoes of Lord Lawton's earlier judgement in Mehagian's case 
are clear in Hamorda and by 1982 his Lordship clearly regarded 
the organisers of the drug trade as still probing the 
sensibilities of the judiciary with emotional cases. But 
whether or not these organisers actually care about what happens 
to their couriers is an open question. The main focus attention 
is most likely to be the drugs in question. 
In 1983 The Times carried a number of reports of a trial at 
Maidstone Crown Court and these newspaper reports are most 
instructive. In R v Redding (16) about 30 individuals were 
either covicted of or pleaded guilty to a total in excess of 
21 charges of fraudulently evading the prohibition on the 
importation of cannabis. They had committed the offences over a 
period of about three years and it was said that: 
"The gang ... devised a way to get accomplices into 
the immigration area ... known as "smotherers" their 
job was to "mind" through customs couriers who had 
large quantities of cannabis hidden in suitcases. 
They would create a diversion if officers looked 
likely to stop and search their colleagues. Frail, 
elderly women were used as couriers .. " (17) 
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Most of the press attention focused on one such old lady, 
Margaret Redding then aged 69 years. She had been chosen, it 
was said, because of her age and her apparently innocent looks! 
There are a good many other examples of couriers cases which fit 
in the general pattern outlined, for example inR v Parada (18) 
the appellants were both Bolivian women who could not speak 
English. They pleaded guilty to being concerned in the 
importation of cocaine hydrochloride. The substance was said to 
have a total street value of £Yz million. One woman was arrested 
at the airport, the other at a London hotel, after apparently 
delivering the consignment to a companion. It appeared that the 
amount offered to the women was vastly more than they could 
expect to earn in normal employment. Each was sentenced to six 
years imprisonment. On appeal it was held that deterrent 
sentences would be passed in the hope of making it too expensive 
for people to act as couriers. Heavy as the impact of the 
sentence was on the appellants, the Court could not say that it 
was wrong in principle or unduly long. 
The issue for July 1983 of the Bulletin of the Judicial Studies 
Board carried an interesting and relevant article concerning 
drug couriers. The writer was Judge Hilliard who discussed 
certain problems associated with drug importers and bail 
provisions; in particular an attempt was made to try to discover 
why warrants were "issued so often for alleged drug offenders 
who had failed to appear for trial. The bail problem is 
irrelevant here but the judge said that: 
"Many of the defendants are birds of passage, 
or tourists with no real ties with this country 
They have no assets. They may not speak English, 
and they almost certainly have no home to go to 
here. They may have been forbidden to work in this 
country as a condition of entry so that they 
cannot lawfully maintain themselves ... " 
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And later: 
"It must be borne in mind that this sort of 
crime is a highly organised business. No one 
can dispose of £10,000 of drugs swiftly, 
secretly and successfully unless there is 
already in existence a well organised disposal 
system, which is seldom detected. The organisers 
recruit couriers from those with the best 
mitigation potential in the event of capture. 
They study the sentences and appeals from them 
with some care. This is evident because if any 
particular mitigation strikes a responsive cord 
with the judiciary e.g. elderly smugglers, or 
mothers of children with holes in their hearts, 
such successful mitigation is thereafter 
followed by a number of further couriers with 
similar mitigation potential, who have been 
deliberately recruited." 
Authorities for the judges' propositions are those cited 
earlier. An interesting point from the article is that the 
answer to the problem of absconding defendants is a large cash 
deposit on the basis that this would 'impose great financial 
strain on the illict organisation behind them, if couriers do 
not attend their trials'! Clearly the English judiciary see 
couriers as merely the foot soldiers of the army of drug 
traffickers. None of the judges seems to have considered that 
the carrying of drugs may well have been spread round as diverse 
a group of people as possible to lessen the chance of detection, 
with little regard to the ultimate fate of the couriers. 
Finally, in R v Darby (19) the appellant pleaded guilty to being 
concerned in evading the prohibition on the importation of 
cocaine. He had been detected at an airport carrying 2 .. 95 
kilogrammes in various packets which were strapped to his back 
and his shins. The report narrates that the cocaine was in fact 
cocaine hydrochloride of 80 per cent purity. The drug was valued 
at £472,000. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and he 
was refused leave to appeal against sentence. The Court of 
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Appeal held that the sentence fell within the limits suggested 
for large scale importation of Class A drugs in R v Aramah. The 
sentence was correct. The Court seemed again to have the measure 
of the nature of the individuals with whom they were dealing for 
Leonard J. said that 
" the applicant is a man who, to all intents 
and purposes, is of previous good character. We 
would only add that, of course, the normal 
situation in cases of this kind is that people 
who carry drugs - whether simply as couriers 
working for other people or, as would appear to 
be so in this case, as independent contractors 
or purchasers on credit - are generally people 
of good character because they are less likely 
to be suspect." 
and later: 
"What seems to this Court to be important is 
the actual value and the considerable quantity 
of the drug which was imposed." (20) 
The Court, with increased experienced of the drug trade, has 
clearly distinguished between couriers as agents for undisclosed 
principals and couriers working on their own account. Such is 
the objectivity achieved by the Court of Appeal in England that 
no longer are long sentences for importation upheld for couriers 
with good mitigation in judgements heavy in apologetic or 
sympathetic tones. Rather the precise occupation within the 
drugs trade is established and then, it is submitted, the 
appropriate sentence follows. 
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C. Addicts 
Introduction 
Aldous Huxley was a persuasive and committed advocate of the 
use of controlled drugs and in particular of mescaline. In his 
book Doors of Perception he said: 
"That humanity at large will ever be able 
to dispense with Artificial Paradise seems 
very unlikely. Most men and most women lead 
lives at worst so painful, at best so 
monotonous, poor and limited that the urges 
to escape, the longing to transcend themselves 
if only for a few moments, is and has always 
been one of the appetites of the soul. Art 
and religion, carnivals and saturnalia, 
dancing and listening to oratory - all these 
have served, in H G Wells' phrase, as Doors 
in the Wall. And for private, for everyday 
use there have always been chemical 
intoxicants." (1) 
It is submitted that the reasons for addiction are in law 
irrelevant. The fact is that it exists and some consideration 
must be given to the definitions of drug addiction in its 
present context. In English law a "drug addict" meant: 
" a person who, by reason of the habitual 
taking or using, other than upon medical advice, 
of any controlled drug within the meaning of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 -
(a) is at times dangerous to himself or to 
others, or incapable of managing himself, or 
his affairs; or 
(b) so conducts himself that it would not be 
reasonable to expect a spouse of ordinary 
sensibilities to continue to cohabit with 
him." (2) 
The spouse, while the section was in force, could apply to a 
Magistrates Court for a matrimorial order to be made under the 
provisions of the 1960 Act, on the ground that their spouse was a 
"drug addict" as defined above. Futher, and more recently, The 
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Misuse of Drugs (Notification of and Supply to Addicts) 
Regulations 1973 (3) contain provisions prohibiting doctors, 
except under licence from the Secretary of State or in certain 
cases for treatment, from supplying or prescribing cocaine or 
diamorphine to persons they consider or suspect to be addicted to 
certain controlled drugs. For the purpose of these Regulations 
it is provided, by Regulation 2(2) that: 
" a person shall be regarded as being addicted 
to a drug if, and only if, he has as a result of 
repeated administration become so dependent upon 
the drug that he has an overpowering desire for 
the administration to be continued." 
These Regulations concern only controlled drugs specified in its 
Schedule and an examination of that Schedule reveals a very much 
smaller number of substances and products than is to be found in 
the Schedules to the principal Act. It is worth noting, it is 
submitted, that accused persons who describe themselves or are 
described in the reported cases as "registered drug addicts" mean 
no more than that their doctors have informed the Chief Medical 
Officer of their status which mayor may not, on the wording of 
the regulation, be a matter of fact. Further, there does not in 
the case law appear to have been any occasion on which the two 
definitions stated above have had to be considered or reconciled. 
The brevity of these definitions contrasts with the 1950 
definition from an expert committee of the World Health 
Orginisation: 
"Drug addiction is a state of periodic or chronic 
intoxication detrimental to the individual and to 
society, produced by the repeated consumption of a 
drug (natural or synthetic). Its characteristicics 
include (1) an overpowering desire or need (compulsion) 
to continue taking the drug and to obtain it by any 
means; (2) a tendency to increase the dose; (3) a psychic 
(psychological) and sometimes, a physical dependence on 
the effects of the drug." (4) 
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Edwin Schur in his important study of drug addiction contrasts 
addiction with the mere habit forming consumption of substances 
such as tobacco. Genuine addiction, he argues, implies 
tolerance and physical dependence whereas a psychological 
habituation is not truly addictive. The "causes" of this 
addiction need not concern us here but the features of it do. 
Schur described, as a continuing feature of the American drug 
problem, the spreading of the drug habit by addicts themselves. 
His analysis continues: 
"Some addicts may encourage friends to take up 
drugs. More typically the addict engages in 
actual drug peddling - usually to finance his 
own habit. There maybe less obvious factors 
also motivating the addict to introduce others 
to drugs. The more addicts there are, the larger 
the overall illicit traffic is likely to be, and 
this would operate to the drug-seeker's advantage; 
similarly addicts may rely on each other for help 
in cases of temporary shortage. Futhermore, there 
maybe a social-psychological need to feel a sense of 
group belongingess, which can be established only 
with fellow addicts." (5) 
Elements of most of these points will become apparent in the 
following study of the case law. Before proceeding in that 
direction some brief reference ought to be made to Thomas 
De Quincy whose life and works form the basis of so much early 
work on drug addiction. De Quincey had been introduced to opium 
by a friend who had recommedned it as a means of relieving 
rheumatic pains. In his subsequent addiction to opium, he was 
to describe it as "the abyss of divine enjoyment", "the secret of 
happiness" and "a panacea for all human woes." Rather than 
consider directly the writings of De Quincey, it might be of 
interest to turn to Grevel Lindop's recent biography. Lindop 
seeks to synthesize the great amount of material on his subject 
since the publication in 1936 of two separate biographies. In a 
most interesting book the author pro,duces a comprehensive 
literary and historical study of De Quincey and in the epilogue 
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Lindop argues: 
"Almost every aspect of the theory of addiction is 
highly controversial, so our conclusions must be 
tentative, but it seems clear that De Quincey's 
addiction was not a matter of chance. Contrary to 
his own assertion, he must have known a certain 
amount about opium before he first tried it in 
1804, and he found it at a time when he was very 
vulnerable to its temptations. Perhaps the main 
factor in his continued use of the drug was a 
reluctance to face up to unpleasant situations. 
Opium helped him to forget or evade painful 
obvigations, and dulled the awareness that by 
doing so he was laying up trouble for the future." (6) 
This introduction has been, of necessity, superficial for the 
nature, causes and consequences of drug addiction are clearly 
complex elements within a difficult subject. But, notwithstanding 
these aspects, the case law reveals a pattern of judicial 
attitudes to drug addicts, attitudes that are markedly difficult 
from those apparent when considering others participating in the 
drugs business. 
Case Law 
There might well have been a note of exasperation in the voice of 
Lord Parker C.J. when he said, in R v Glasse (7) that: 
"These hard drug cases, or indeed any drug cases, 
are extremely difficult to know how to deal with." 
Some aspects of the difficulties facing the Bench were apparrent 
in a slightly earlier case that the same Lord Chief Justice had 
been required to deal with. In R v Fraser (8) the applicant had 
been found to be in possession of 24 heroin tableti. He had 
pleaded guilty to possessing these illegally and he had been 
sentenced to six months imprisonment and ordered to pay £200 
towards the costs of the prosecution. Fraser applied for leave 
to appeal against sentence. By the time the Court of Appeal came 
to consider the application Fraser had taken treatment "of an 
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extremely disagreeable kind" but he had the "courage to go 
through with it" and the court accepted that he was by then no 
longer an addict. Lord Parker's difficulties perhaps started 
with being faced at all by someone such as Fraser: 
"He is a man of twenty-nine of extremely good 
family, his father a merchant banker, educated 
at a famous public school, having served with 
two renowned regiments." 
But, it was held, this did not entitle the applicant to special· 
treatment by reasons of these privileges. If anything, those 
privileges raised greater responsibilities and would tempt the 
court to give more rather than less by way of sentence to him 
than to a person who was deemed then man in the street. The 
Court made it clear, however, that: 
" a man in the position of the applicant 
is not sentenced because he is an addict; 
everyone is extremely sorry for him. What 
he is being sentenced for is commencing the 
taking of the drug." 
Later in the judgement some of the reasons for that compassion 
are explained: 
" anybody who takes heroin puts himself body 
and soul into the hands of the supplier or the 
supply. Such persons have no moral resistance to 
any pressures that may be brought to bear on them." (9) 
Notwithstanding the applicants successful efforts to rid himself 
of his addiction, the Court held that the public interest must be 
considered and not merely his own interests. In the absence of 
any special circumstances the Court was not satisfied that the 
sentence could be faulted in anyway in principle and the 
application was refused. 
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The importance for American criminal jurisprudence of Robinson v 
California (10) is that in that case the Supreme Court held it to 
be unconstitutional for a Californian statute to make it a 
misdemeanour to be addicted "to the use of narcotics." Dr Harvey 
Teff has argued that to label in this way the addict as a 
criminal and punish him for his addiction is rather like singling 
out one section of the community and making it subject to strict 
liability. This was not to say that compulsory measures for 
addicts are in all circumstances necessarily unacceptable, but 
merely that an exclusively punitive approach was even more 
negative in their case than for conventional criminal categories 
(11). Thus, in sociological terms, drug addiction in American 
law was seen as a status rather than an act. Lord Parker in 
Fraser's case sought to make it clear that the applicant was not 
being sentenced for his addiction although technically it was his 
unlawful possession"that constituted the offence rather than the 
fact that he had started taking heroin. In the recent Scots case 
of H M Advocate v Ramsay (12) the appellant had pleaded guilty to 
possession of small quantities of heroin on two occasions. The 
trial judge, saying that he treated the case as a serious case of 
drug addiction, imposed a sentence of four years. On appeal 
against sentence the Lord Justice General (Emslie) observed: 
"Well, of course, drug addiction is not a crime and 
it looks as if the learned judge in proceeding to 
sentence has exceeded the bounds of what would be 
an appropriate sentence for possession and possession 
alone. From the information we have, this registered 
drug addict was consuming about one gram of heroin a 
day. Accordingly, ... what he was found to possess 
was little more than a day's supply of the drug which 
he appeared to need to feed his addiction. In addition 
to taking drugs, of course, we have heard that he 
consumed about two bottles of vodka a day. The daily 
cost must have been immense and it is not perfectly 
clear where the money came from ... " (13) 
In the circumstances the sentence was reduced from four years 
imprisonment to two years imprisonment. The question arising is 
~ ~ 
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whether it is reasonable to infer that the Court is applying a 
subjective test? It may be, for example, that another person in 
similar circumstances has developed a tolerance level of two 
grammes of heroin a day. While possession of this quantity is 
double that of Ramsay it is stall only that required to feed a 
daily habit. In short, much of the details are relative and vary 
with the individual concerend. 
3.31 The decision in Ramsay's case raises two interesting points. The 
first point is that the Court limits somewhat less than obliquely 
at the cost to the individual of his habit of consuming heroin 
and vodka on the daily scale indicated. Bakalar and Grinspoon 
have commented that: 
"Many addicts, maybe most of them, have made a 
mess of their lives. They are socially isolated, 
neglect their health, and have no job or family; 
they pass the time committing burglaries, selling 
drugs on the street, waiting for a connection and 
nodding off. Eventually, if they survive long 
enough, they are likely to end up in prison, civil 
confinement, a detoxification clinic, or a methadone 
maintenance programme. Addicts who do not lead that 
kind of life often have enough fortitude and social 
support either to sustain the addiction on their own 
or to give it up on their own, untreated." (14) 
An addict who trades in controlled drugs may do so in one of at 
least two ways: he may either deal in the substances as a means 
of livelihood on a large scale, in which case it maybe argued 
that his addiction is incidental, or he may deal in the substance 
on a small scale, mainly to pay for his habit. In relation to 
the former of these two possible alternatives R v Doherty (15) is 
relevant: the appellant was sentenced to four years imprisonment 
for possessing cannabis. The report is superficial but it 
appears that the Court of Criminal Appeal had evidence that he 
was trafficking in the drug which was being sent to him by 
relatives in Nigeria. Accordingly, the Court appears to have 
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regarded it as a special consideration that: 
" he was not merely an addict, but traded the 
drug which was a very serious matter from the point 
of view of public health and morals." 
In R v Bond (16) the appellant had become a drug addict and the 
Court said that: 
"Since taking drugs his personality had changed. 
He has become aggressive, he is anti-authoritarian 
and his only hope is co-operation in treatment 
not only to get him off the drugs but to get rid 
of the craving for the drugs." (17) 
But while the Court below and the appeal court had given detailed 
consideration to the appellant's problems and conditions they 
were: 
" not considering solely the question of 
curse but of punishment. This man was a pedlar -
it has been suggested a technical pedlar, but he 
did go to Worthing Assembly Hall selling such 
tablets that he did not need and using the proceeds 
to buy or obtain more." (18) 
The facts of the case tended to show that the appellant had made 
a considerable percentage profit from his sale of methedrine and 
benzedrine tablets. The Court declined to interfere with the 
sentence of three years imprisonment and the appeal was 
dismissed. 
But if an attempt has been made to distinguish large scale 
dealings by an addict from small scale dealings then it maybe 
that such a distinction is regarded on occasions as being without 
merit: in R v France (19) the appellant received a total of four 
years imprisonment. He was found to be in possession of 
5 grammes of heroin with a street value of £600 - 700, glucose 
for use as a dilutant, sets of scales and a list of customers. 
In mitigation it was claimed that he had dealt with drugs for the 
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short period of three weeks to finance his own addiction. On 
appeal, it was held that this type of addiction was: 
" likely to perpetrate itself as the 
activities entered into to satisfy one 
addict's needs would in turn cause the 
misery and probable death of others." 
Accordingly, as the sentence was in no way excessive the appeal 
was dismissed. Further, on the authority of McWilliams v 
H M Advocate (20) it would appear to be the case that the 
dealings by an addict referred to earlier need not necessarily 
involve financial gain. The appellant had pleaded guilty to 
supplying heroin to another addict and he explained that this 
had been done because his friend was suffering so severely from 
withdrawal symptoms that he felt he had to help. The appellant 
had shared his own supply with his friend. The appellant was 
unrepresented at his appeal hearing and the· judgement of the 
Lord Justice General (Emslie) records that the appellant had 
told the court that: 
" at the time of the offence of supply he 
was physically and mentally unstable, and that 
his ambition is to keep clear of drugs and to 
help those who have become addicts and who have 
had their lives ruined by the taking of drugs. 
He mentioned one or two other matters, like the 
consequences of his imprisonment, namely, the 
loss of his house and the contents thereof, and 
his inability to pay outstanding debts to the 
council and to the Gas Board. As he put it, 
rather graphically at the end, three years for 
sharing his own fix with a friend must be an 
excessive sentence." (21) 
The Court considered these aspects, as had the trial judge, and 
held that while the sentence was severe it was not excessive and 
refused the appeal. 
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The second point arising from Ramsay's case is the element of 
compulsion. The philosophical aspect is that the overwhelming 
demand or requirement to continue the use of the controlled drug 
or to increase the use of it renders that person less "free" to 
decide his own actions. The need to satisfy the craving for the 
particular drug affects adversely the mind of the addict. Indeed 
that craving might be so great or immediate as to cause an addict 
to commit a number of other serious crimes to obtain the drug or 
money to purchase the drug. In R v Bath (22) the accused pleaded 
guilty to burglary, forgery, obtaining property (drugs) on a 
forged document and unlawful possession of drugs. In mitigation 
the accused said that he was under the influence of drugs at the 
time of the burglary and at the time of the forgery his 
prescription from the drug clinic he attended had been cut and 
he would do anything to avoid getting bad withdrawal symptoms. 
He was sentenced to terms of three and two years imprisonment 
concurrent. The accused had previous convictions and the Court 
appeared to take note of his failure to benefit from treatment 
at the clinic. On appeal the sentences were upheld, the Court 
saying that when drug addiction takes an individual to the 
lengths of breaking into chemist shops and forging prescriptions 
a serious aspect was introduced which "justifies and requires a 
punitive element" in the sentence. Such an element was also 
apparent, and was tempered, in R v Larcher (23) where a sentence 
of eight years imprisonment was held to be excessive for a series 
of burglaries of doctor's premises and chemist's shops by a drug 
addict who had not previously served a sentence of imprisonment. 
The appellant admitted a series of such crimes and to obtaining 
drugs by such means. The sentence was reduced to five years. 
Ormrod L.J. held that these were very serious offences and he 
commented that: 
"The social inquiry report is a typical 
report of the drug scene. There is a great 
deal of false optimism about an otherwise 
~ ~ 
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totally hopeless way of life. The appellant 
is not working and he is never likely to do any 
work as far as one can see." (24) 
Perhaps the mose vivid example of the difficulties that drug 
addicts get themselves into as a result of their addiction is 
R v Gould (25). Gould and a number of other men pleaded guilty 
variously to charges of robbery, possessing imitation firearms 
and other offences. The robberies were for the most part 
committed in shops or similar premises, where assistants were 
threatened with imitation firearms or a knife, and cash or goods 
varying in total value from £160 to £7,900 were stolen. The 
appellants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying in 
total from seven years to 10 years. It was held that on the 
basis of the existing guidelines (26) the sentences imposed were 
proper and the appeals were dismissed. Counsel for the 
appellants had, however, pointed out a number of matters for the 
Courts consideration. More particularly, the appellants had been 
used by a man called Williams who was described (27) as "the 
prime activator of these offences" and he had escaped the 
clutches of justice. It was said that Williams was a "purveyor 
of heroin" and, according to Lord Lane C.J., that: 
" by dint of persuading people like these appellants 
to take drugs, and then withdrawing the supply of drugs 
from them, he put them into a state of mind where they 
felt obliged to carry out these offe~ces. 
It is put forward that since what was done was to get 
money for drugs to which they had become habituated, in 
order to stop withdrawal symptoms, this in some way was 
mitigation of the gravity of the offence. It is not. 
Whether one calls addiction to heroin, or other drugs, a 
a disease or not, it must be made perfectly plain that it 
is not an excuse of any sort for committing crime that the 
proceeds of the crime are going to be used in order to 
supply the offender with drugs to stop the onset of 
withdrawal symptoms." (28) 
In short, the fact of drug addiction in an accused was to be 
regarded by the Courts in England as no mitigation. 
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Dr Thomas' analysis (29) of the primary decision with which the 
sentencer is faced is perhaps a most apposite decision in dealing 
with the drug addict. Does the sentencer impose in the name of 
general deterrence a sentence intended to reflect the offender's 
culpability or should an attempt to made, as an alternative, to 
influence the future behaviour of the addict? The English courts 
appear generally to have considered individualized measures as 
being suitable for addicts from a point and although the aims 
might have been constant the means have varied. An initial 
statement of principle maybe found in R v Ford (30) where the 
appellant pleaded guilty to housebreaking and larceny and he was 
sentenced to 27 months imprisonment. There was a co-accused. 
Goods to the value of £100 were taken of which about £60 were 
recovered. Ford had a few previous convictions for dishonesty 
but a large number for drunkeness and he was said to be a chronic 
alcoholic. The long sentence was given so that Ford could 
receive continuous treatment. On appeal, Sacns L.J. held that 
the appropriate sentence for the offences would be 12 months. 
This was on the basis that Ford seemed not to try to help 
himself. It was held further that: 
"This Court only desires to add one further thing. 
In relation to offences of dishonestly sentences of 
imprisonment - except when there is an element of 
protection of the public involved - are normally 
intended to be the correct sentence for the particular 
crime, and not to include a curative element. This 
Court wishes to make it clear that what it is now 
saying has nothing to do with special cases such as 
those of possessing dangerous drugs or cases where 
the protection of the public is involved "(31) 
An attempt of a controlled drugs special case was R v Glasse (32) 
where the appellant was a drug addict who would not co-operate 
with treatment in open conditions. The Court held that a 
comparatively long custodial sentence, that is to say five years 
imprisonment, was appropriate since it provided the "best hope of 
a cure'. In R v Gaines (33) the Court passed a sentence of five 
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years imprisonment on a drug addict as being 
" the right course ... with an eye to a 
possible early release date." 
The rationale was said to be that the discretion about releasing 
the appellant was left to the authorities to exercise once they 
thought it right to do so. This appeal was heard on 18 March 1970 
and therefore concerned the controlled drug legislation prior to 
the 1971 Act. The next relevant decision is R v Grimes (34) 
which was heard on 14 November 1974 and it appears to mark a 
change in judicial attitude over the intervening period. Grimes 
had been sentenced to three years imprisonment for a variety of 
offences relating to controlled drugs. In sentencing him the 
trail judge had made it clear. that he was sentencing him not by 
reference to what the proper sentence was for the offences as 
such but what the judge thought the proper period of 
incarceration should be to enable the authorities to treat Grimes 
for his drug addiction. It was relevant that by committing these 
offences Grimes was in breach of an existing probation order. 
On appeal, Roskin L.J. said: 
"If his drug addiction can be treated in prison 
so much the better, but it is not right to pass 
a longer sentence because such a longer sentence 
might enable the drug addiction to be treated 
merely because a shorter sentence might not produce 
that report. Indeed, there is no reason in this 
case to think a shorter sentence would not equally 
enable the drug addiction to be treated in so far 
as it can be treated." (35) 
The Court reduced the sentence in effect to 18 months 
imprisonment. It felt that this course was open to them because, 
on the basis of the reports before them, the appellant had 
responded well to treatment in prison and he would be offered 
assistance on release by the probation service on a voluntary 
basis if he sought it. 
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Any doubt that it improper necessarily to impose a sentence of 
imprisonment disproportionate to the offence to allow the 
offender to benefit from the treatment while in prison was 
removed, it is submitted, in R v Roote (36). The appellant, a 
woman aged 26 years, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of 
morphine, forgery of a prescription and demanding drugs by means 
of a forged prescription. Sentence was deferred and the 
appellant was subsequently arrested when she failed to appear, 
having taken an overdose of drugs. There was a medical report 
to the effect that the appellant had a very tenuous hold on life 
and a long sentence would probably save her life. On appeal, it 
was held that a substantial term of imprisonment was appropriate 
for the offences but having regard to the appellant's past 
history and in all the circumstances the sentence would be 
reduced to a total of three years imprisonment. The judgement of 
the court was given by Drake J. who noted that: 
" she had not the strength of mind to give 
up drugs of her own free will and it is clear to 
this Court that what the judge was in fact doing 
was passing a longer sentence than he would 
otherwise have considered appropriate, the 
additional term of imprisonment being passed 
for the benefit of this appellant and not in 
any way by way of punishment." (37) 
and the Court then stated succinctly the principle to be applied 
then: 
"This Court is firmly of the view that, save in 
exceptional circumstances, the court should not 
pass a sentence of imprisonment outside the 
range appropriate for the offence and for the 
particular offender on the grounds that the 
additional term of imprisonment will be of 
benefit to the offender in society in helping 
overcome some addiction such as an addiction to 
alcohol or drugs." (38) 
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The Court has reserved to itself the possibility of there still 
being exceptional circumstances which would justify a lengthy 
period of imprisonment. Dr Thomas observed in his commentary on 
Roote's case that: 
"The assertion of the principle of proportionality 
in the present case, given the facts, is particularly 
strong and the implication is that the exceptional 
circumstances to which the court refers as justifying 
the importation of a disproportionate sentence would 
be exceptional indeed," (39) 
Again, in R v Bassett (40) the appellant pleaded guilty to 
various charges on four Indictments of burglarly, obtaining by 
deception and possessing a controlled drug. He had committed a 
series of offences of dishonesty in order to obtain money to buy 
heroin, to which he was addicted. He was sentenced to a total of 
five years imprisonment, the trial judge observing that the only 
hope for the appellant was a considerable period in custody. On 
appeal, the Court held that curing an offender of drug addiction 
was an improper reason for passing a long sentence of 
imprisonment. Lord Lane C.J. said that: 
"It seems that the applicant (for leave to appeal) 
had a happy and settled life until he became 
addicted to heroin after the suicide of his brother. 
He managed to stay away from trouble for some 
considerable time, so far as his honesty was concerned 
prior to these offences. The learned judge who 
sentenced him accepted that the heroin addiction was 
largely responsible for the offences which he had 
committed. It is the usual pattern of the addict 
having to find very large sums of money to keep 
himself in heroin and being unable to obtain such 
large sums of money except by means of crime. It 
is an all too familiar picture in this court." (41) 
The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge had said on 
sentencing that keeping the applicant in prison would keep him 
away from drugs. The Court continued: 
3.39 
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"With respect to the experienced learned judge, 
that is an improper reason for passing a long 
sentence of imprisonment. A long sentence of 
imprisonment will not cure drug addiction. It 
will perhaps cure the physical addiction but 
it will almost certainly not cure any psychological 
addiction." (42) 
In the circumstances the appeal was allowed to the extent that 
the sentence of five years was' reduced to three years 
imprisonment. 
The remaining reported cases involving drug addicts serve, it is 
submitted, as good illustrations of the difficulties faced by the 
Courts. In R v Heather (43) the appellant admitted a robbery at 
a chemist's shop in which an assistant was threatened with a 
knife and drugs were demanded from the pharmacist. There were 
also guilty pleas to lesser charges involving controlled drugs. 
The appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment for the 
robbery and to 12 months imprisonment concurrent on the other 
charges. On appeal it was held that the five years imprisonment 
was not considered to be wrong in principle. However, in giving 
judgement for the court, Lord Roskill L.J. held 
"This, like other cases of its kind, raises a 
very difficult drug offence sentening policy, 
concerning a young man who is in danger of 
becoming a hopeless and incurable drug addict." (44) 
Heather had applied for leave to appeal, and the single judge had 
on the information before him, refused leave to appeal and the 
appellant had renewed his application. He had been in custody 
prior to his trial and some thirteen months had passed between 
the original sentence being passed and the matter of the appeal 
coming before the appeal court. By the date of the latter 
hearing additional reports had been obtained and these showed 
that the appellant seemed to be responding to his circumstances 
in a favourable way although he lacked the strength of character 
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to wean himself from the drugs. It was then said that: 
"The problem faced by the Court is that this 
was a grave offence of a kind for which a 
sentence of five years was well justified, 
and normally to reduce it would be wrong. 
There was nothing wrong in principle with 
the sentence. We fully accept that deterrent 
sentences are required in cases of this kind. 
But this young man has been in prison for 
some time and there are clear signs that he 
is beginning to benefit from the discipline 
there." (45) 
Accordingly, the Court "not without a great deal of hesitation" 
gave the appellant one more chance and placed him on probation 
for three years. 
In H M Advocate v Gaitens (46) the panel was convicted of 
possessing heroin and cannabis and possessing them with intent to 
supply. The street value of these drugs was said to be about 
£3000. In mitigation, Counsel had submitted that the panel had 
been on probation at the time of the offences and a medical 
report showed that he had been involved with drugs since he was 
16 years old, graduating from cannabis to heroin (47). However 
at the time of the trial Gaitens maintained that he had overcome 
the drugs habit. Lord Ross, the Lord Justice Clerk, was reported 
as saying that offences of this kind spread misery to other 
people. If repeated warnings by the Court about severe sentences 
were ignored then the consequences must be accepted. Gaitens was 
sentenced to seven years imprisonment. It is submitted that it 
would be reasonable to infer from these circumstances that no 
leniency was shown for the panel's drug addiction (48). 
Perhaps the best place to start a summary is to return to the 
beginning: in the fundamental case in Northern Ireland of 
R v McCay (49) the Court of Criminal ·Appeal enunciated eleven 
principles governing sentencing policy for drug offences. In the 
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course of the appeal, Lord Lowry C.J. said that: 
"We observe first that the learned county court 
judge made the correct general approach by 
condemming the practice of taking drugs otherwise 
than on a doctor's orders. This practice is a 
crime. The fact that the offender is usually 
the main sufferer distinguishes it from most 
other crimes, but cannot obscure the social 
evil which results. One may feel sympathy with 
the plight of an addict while maintaining a 
necessarily severe attitude in the interests 
of those who may be tempted to do likewise and 
indeed in the interests of the accused. The 
present cases do not exemplify physical or 
psychological addiction, but this fact removes 
one circumstance which is likely to promote a 
lenient approach. 
There are, as in almost every criminal field, 
cases among drug-takers, and even suppliers 
- though they are both exceptional - in which 
great leniency may be justified, and a judge 
with the duty of sentencing will be vigilant, 
in the interests of the community as well as 
the accused, to recognise them." (50) 
This clearly anticipated the run of English cases enunciating the 
same principles. The concern about drug addiction was thus 
expressed at the highest level and continues to be so now. For 
example on, 7th Dece.mber 1983 Lord Boothby put the following 
question in the House of Lords: he sought 
"To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they 
are taking to combat the rising level of drug 
addiction in the country, particularly among 
young people." (51) 
Lord Elton, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the 
Home Office replied that the Government. was taking steps to 
prevent the illegal importation and supply of controlled drugs 
within the United Kingdom by improved enforcement action by 
H M Customs and Excise and the police. They were seeking to 
reduce supplies at source by increasing the Government's 
•• Wif;J 
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contribution to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control 
and by offering additional aid for law enforcement activities in 
Pakistan. The Government indicated that they were making a 
further £6 million available over the next three years for new 
initiatives in the treatment and rehabilitation services for drug 
misusers. In addition it was said that ways were being looked at 
of dissuading young people in particular from misusing drugs. In 
passing it may be said that Lord Boothby's concern was not 
entirely objective as he made clear when he concluded his 
remarks: 
" may I ask the noble Lord whether he 
realises that the number of drug pushers in 
this country is getting frightening. I do not 
know what steps can be taken, such as more 
police, but the numbers of pushers is increasing. 
A new lot have landed just close to where I live 
and I sometimes go down to look at them - not 
to purchase, but to watch their activities." (52) 
There was no suggestion in the Government's answer of a change in 
law so far as drug addicts were concerned: the inference that is 
to be drawn, it is submitted, being that such addicts were being 
dealt with adequately. In 1984 there were 5,415 registered drug 
addicts in the United Kindgom. More than half of this total were 
under 25 years of age and 4,900 (91 per cent) were addicted to 
I 
heroin (53). The question to be considered now is this: to what 
extent, if at all, does the fact of drug addiction affect an 
accused person before the courts having been charged with drug or 
other offences? 
The first point to be made is that the status of registered drug 
addicts appears to be inconsequential in law. Such a status may 
be put forward by way of mitigation but that confers no rights 
or immunities. Indeed the nature and terms of the relevant 
legislation (that a doctor must consider or suspect addiction to 
only certain of the controlled drugs) impose a duty on a doctor 
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rather than on the addict. The only benefit for the addict seems 
to be the implication that by registering his addiction he is 
co-operating with someone who might generally be described as 
being in authority. The second point to be made is that the 
Courts do not know what to do or how to deal adequately with drug 
addicts. This state of affairs arises partly from the lack of 
specific statutory powers to deal with drug addiction and partly 
from the difficulties that addiction causes to the legal concepts 
involving responsibility. Sheriff Gordon has said that: 
" the phenomenon of addiction presents 
awkward problems from whatever side the question 
is approached. The addict is by definition unable 
to control his craving, and so might be said not to 
be responsible for anything he does as a result of the 
craving, or of the effects of any drug for which he 
craves. Nor will punishment cure his addiction. 
But his condition may be the result of his own 
earlier actings, so that he can be said to have 
made himself an addict. His addiction was at one 
stage a habit, and it may be said that persons are 
responsible for their habits." (54) 
or more generally: 
"Addiction is the type of case for those situations 
in which a.man voluntarily puts himself into a 
condition in which he is incapable of free action, 
and then does something criminal." (55) 
It is submitted that given the large number of drug addicts - a 
number that grows relentlessly - it is essential that the 
jurisprudential aspects of the problem are clarified and settled. 
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C. Deportation 
The international aspect to controlled drugs has resulted in a 
number of relevant authorities on deportation. This point is 
considered further as deportation is an element of a sentence 
passed on a convicted person. It may also be that a 
recommendation for deportation is a severe punishment to that 
person. The law in broad terms on deportation is contained in 
the Immigration Act 1971. By section 3(6) of that Act a person 
of 17 years or over at the time of his conviction, who is not a 
British citizen maybe recommended for deportation where he is 
convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment. Further, 
by section 5 the Secretary of State has a discretion whether or 
not to make a deportation order on the basis of such a 
recommendation. Thus, deportation is essentially an 
administrative decision for the executive. The Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971 has in itself no power or authority in addition to or in 
place of the powers within the Immigration Act 1971. 
In R v Nazari (1) the Court of Appeal in fact considered four 
cases together in order to review the principles governing the 
power to recommend offenders for deportation, and to lay down 
guidelines - as opposed to rigid rules - for the assistance of 
courts below. These guidelines were such that Courts should 
keep them in mind when considering whether to recommend 
deportation. The essence of the guidelines was that the Court 
before whom an accused person appeared for sentence must 
consider whether the accused's continued presence in the United 
Kingdom is to its detriment. Offenders who have committed 
serious crimes or who have long criminal records are suitable 
for recommendation, but a minor offence such as shoplifting by a 
visitor would not normally merit a recommendation, unless it was 
part of a series of offences committed on different occasions or 
carried out as part of a planned raid by members of a gang. The 
appellant Nazari was a young man of Iranian citizenship and he 
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had pleaded guilty to fraudulently importing 1.95 kilogrammes of 
opium. The prosecution accepted that opium in the form in which 
it was imported could not be converted into heroin. He was 
sentenced to four years imprisonment and recommended for 
deportation. It was claimed that if he was deported his studies 
would be interrupted, he would be unable to marry his English 
girlfriend, and he would face the possibility of being sentenced 
to death in Iran. The sentence of imprisonment was not in issue 
but it was upheld in effect when Lord Lawton L.J. said that: 
"There is no application for leave to appeal 
against the sentence of four years imprisonment, 
which is in line with the kind of sentences which 
are passed upon those who try to smuggle dangerous 
drugs into the United Kingdom." (2) 
The Court applied the guidelines indicated and found Nazari's 
continuing presence to be detrimental to the United Kingdom and 
upheld the recommendation for deportation. 
In R v Rossi (3) the appellant had pleaded guilty to possessing 
cannabis. In October 1979 he was stopped by policemen who were 
keeping watch on a public house known to be a haunt of drug 
addicts and suppliers. Rossi said that he had been to the public 
house to try to obtain heroin but he had not been successful. 
His house was searched and there was found 2.7 grammes of herbal 
cannabis. He was aged 19 years at that time, a native of Italy 
and he had come to the United. Kingdom in 1978. He had three 
previous conviction, two for possessing and one for theft. He 
had been fined on each occasion. He was sentenced to one month's 
imprisonment and recommended for deportaion. It was submitted on 
appeal that having regard to his age and record, the fact that 
the cannabis was for his own use and that he had kept out of 
further trouble since 1979 the recommendation ought not to have 
been made. The Court held that the principle it had to consider 
was what threat Rossi would be to society if he was allowed to 
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remain here. The matter was on the border line but it had come 
to the conclusion that the interests of society did not require 
him to be deported and that the recommendation should be quashed. 
However, if he committed any further offence it was likely that a 
different view would be taken. 
It is clear that the Court draws an inference of future behaviour 
from the circumstances of the offence then before it: in both 
cases cited the trial courts and the appeal court have expressed 
a view on recommendation for deportation. However, in 
R v Omisore (4) the court did not state an opinion one way or 
the other. The appellant was a 32 year old Nigerian whose wife 
and two children were living in Nigeria. Up to the age of 30 he 
had been a student living in England. Omisore was detained by 
customs men at London Airport when he called to collect a crate. 
On examination it was found that the crate had a false 
compartment which contained 4 kilogrammes of cannabis. He said 
that he was collecting it for a friend and that he thought it 
contained palm oil. There were no previous convictions. He was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment and recommended for 
deportation. On appeal it was submitted that the sentences 
passed were out of line with the usual run of sentences in such 
cases and that the sentence was affecting his health because of 
worries about his family and his inability to eat the food 
provided. The Court of Appeal held that in the circumstances the 
sentence would be varied to three years imprisonment. The report 
cited adds the courts judgement that: 
"The deportation order was a matter for the 
Home Secretary and not one for the Court of 
Appeal." 
It seems strange that the court could not even say that such an 
order was not wrong in principle for the choice of words above 
suggests, it is submitted, that the appeal court has no locus to 
-~. . . ~ 
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consider the matter. Contrasted with the foregoing case in 
R v Patel (5) where the appellant was a married man aged 42 years 
with eight children. He had been born in India and he had first 
come to the United Kingdom in 1972, possibly as a visitor, and 
remained there. His family arrived in 1978. In April 1980 he 
went back to India, he was refused leave of re-entry on his 
return in May 1980 and he was served with a detention order. 
Since that date he had remained in the United Kingdom under a 
temporary admission order. On re-entry in May 1980 he was found 
to be carrying a suitcase in which was concealed 14~ pounds of 
cannabis resin with a street value of £7500. Patel had been 
sentenced to three years imprisonment and recommended for 
deportation. On appeal, it was held that although the appellant 
was a carrier he had pleaded guilty and he was a man of previous 
good character, therefore the period of imprisonment would be 
reduced to two years. Further, the appeal court held that the 
court was entitled to consider the effect that deportation would 
have on innocent persons not before the court, the object being 
not to break up families or impose hardship on them. In the 
circumstances the recommendation of deportation would be set 
aside. Perhaps the best conclusion from these cases is in 
essence that each case turns on its own merits and that there is 
at present no overt policy! 
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PART FOUR 
POWERS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 4 
A. Sentencing Powers 
4.1 The 1971 Act is identical to many criminal statutes in that 
the judges are given by Parliament a very wide discretion in 
the matter of sentence with the only inhibiting factor being 
the statutory maxima. The aim of this part of the work is to 
consider generally these maxima as they are now and in the 1971 
Act. To assist, the Appendix to this chapter reproduces at 
Table A the whole of schedule 4 to the 1971 Act as that schedule 
was when it was brought into force at first. Futher, Table B 
reproduces the same schedule as at 31st December 1986. In the 
12 or so years between these two dates there have been 
considerable amendments and how the changes were brought about is 
a reasonable consideration in this work. 
4.2 Three principal Acts have included provisions relating to 
controlled drugs and to penalties: 
(a) Criminal Law Act 1977 
This Act was of great importance to criminal law and procedure. 
Section 28 of the 1977 Act concerned the penalties on summary 
conviction for drug offences. More particularly Section 28(8) 
amended the penalties for certain offences referred to in 
schedule 5 of the Act and those included offences under the 
Customs and Excise Act 1952, which was then in force, and the 
1971 Act itself. The main alteration was the reduction from 
six months to three months imprisonment as the maximum term 
of imprisonment on summary conviction. Perhaps of almost equal 
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importance was the introduction of a standard maximum fine of 
£1000 on summary conviction. That sum was "the prescribed sum" 
but it could be such other sum as is for the time being 
substituted in that definition in section 28(7) of the 1977 Act 
by section 61(1) of the same Act. The section was derived from 
recommendations in the James Report (1). 
(b) Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 
Section 26 of the 1971 Act made particular provisions for the 
increase of penalties for certain offences under the then 
existing Customs and Excise Act 1952. With the repeal of the 
latter and the re-enactment of many of the provisions in the 
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, section 26 of the 1971 
Act was repealed: see section 177(3) and Schedule 6 of the 1979 
Act. Schedule 1 of the 1979 Act enacted particular variations of 
maximum penalties for existing offences; that is to say, 
sections 50(5), 68(4) and 170(4) of the 1979 Act. 
(c) Controlled Drug (Penalties) Act 1985 
This is a very short Act of only three sections. The Act 
provides by section 1(1) that for the conviction of offences 
under the 1971 Act of the production, supply and possession with 
intent to supply a Class A drug, the maximum sentence was no 
longer to be 14 years but instead life imprisonment. By 
section 1(2) of this Act convictions involving Class A drugs on 
Indictment under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 made 
the accused liable to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or a 
financial penalty of any amount or both. For Class B drugs the 
penalty was a maximum of 14 years imprisonment or a financial 
penalty of any amount or both. 
4.3 This is not the place to discuss the politics of the Bill 
although it is fair to say that a reading of Hansard indicates 
a great deal of unanimity on all sides for the aims of the 
4.4 
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legislation. The sponsor of the Bill, Mr Keith Raffan M.P., said 
at the Third Reading that: 
"The Bill is not directed at addicts who 
pathetically push hard drugs to finance 
their habits. It is directed at the big 
boys - the Mafia-style drug dealers and 
godfathers - of drug trafficking who are 
not addicts themselves but who are out to 
exploit addicts for financial gain." (2) 
The Government minister involved, Mr David Mellow M.P., 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, took 
a keen interest in the whole subject and in the same debate he 
said: 
"In erecting barriers against drugs, it is 
essential to have a framework of law and 
penalties which enable sentences of 
imprisonment to be visited on drug dealers 
which are commensurate with the gravity of 
the offence and enable a warning to be sent 
to those who might become involved that the 
courts will not overlook such behaviour and 
that it will be visited with severe sentences 
of imprisonment." (3) 
If there was ever any doubt as to the seriousness with which the 
authorities viewed involvement at the upper end or higher levels 
of the durgs trade then this Act must have removed that doubt. 
(d) Criminal Justice Act 1982 
This Act is of importance in sentencing matters, not so much for 
altering the 1971 Act, but rather for the nature and extent of 
the legislative involvement in parole. The relevant part of the 
Act is section 32: 
"(1) The Secretary of State may order that persons 
of any class specified in the order who are serving 
a sentence of imprisonment, other than -
(a) imprisonment for life; or 
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(b) imprisonment to which they were sentenced -
(i) for an excluded offence; 
(ii) for attempting to commit such an offence; 
(iii) for conspiring to commit such an offence; 
(iv) for aiding or abetting, counselling, 
procuring or inciting the commission of 
such an offence, 
shall be released from prison at such time earlier 
(but not more than six months earlier) than they 
would otherwise be so released as maybe fixed by 
the order; but the Secretary of State shall not 
make an order under this section unless he is 
satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order 
to make the best use of the places available for 
detention. 
(2) In this section "excluded offence" means -
(b) an offence under an enactment specified in 
Part II of that Schedule; 
(c) an offence specified in Part III of that 
Schedule." 
Thereafter the Act contains the following -
"Part II: Offences Mentioned in Section 32(2)(b) 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c38) 
18. Section 4 (production or supply of a controlled drug) 
19. Section 5(3) (possession of a controlled drug with 
intent to supply it to another). 
20. Section 20 (assisting in, or inducing the commission 
outside the United Kingdom of, an offence relating to 
drugs punishable under a corresponding law, as defined 
in section 36(1).) 
Part III: Offences Mentioned in Section 32(2)(c) 
Offences under sections 50(2) and (3), 68(2) and 170 
of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 in 
connection with a prohibition or restriction on 
importation or exportation of a controlled drug 
which has effect by virtue of section 3 of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971." 
Section 32 of the 1982 Act came into force on 28 October 1982 by 
virtue of section 80(1) of that Act. 
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4.5 The origins of this particular legislation lie in the acute 
shortage of prison accommodation and the response of the 
Government to what it perceived as demands for "a stricter 
policy" towards "real criminals". Controlled drugs were 
covered by this legislation but perhaps the essence of the matter 
is the involvement and the power of the executive in criminal 
justice. Accordingly, the problem is not discussed further here 
but it should be noted that the change in parole policy did not 
go unchallenged. In R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex parte Findlay and Others (4), a bank robber and 
others, including a drug trafficker, appealed to the Court of 
Appeal from a refusal by the Divisional Court to grant them 
judicial review of the policy statement. It was held, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson L.J. dissenting, that there was no ground for 
granting judicial review of the policy statement made by a 
Government prior to legislation (5). 
B. Prior Writings 
4.6 In the review of the existing literature on sentencing at the 
start of this work, one writer was omitted deliberately so that 
further and more detailed consideration could be paid in the 
light of the case law. In 1979 Lord Devlin published his book 
The Judge (6) which consisted of a collection of essays and 
lectures. The importance of the work lies not only in the 
value of what was said but that it had been said by so senior 
a judge, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in the House of Lords. 
In total the book is a study of different aspects of the 
English Judge. The second chapter is the most relevant here 
and in broad terms it begins by asking whether judges should be 
penologists and answers that they should not. Lord Devlin seeks 
to establish a line whereby justice and penology maybe divided 
practically, each at work within its own province, instead of 
being assimilated. 
1£",'7!i!l 
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"To make a judge a penologist would be to 
make him an expert in a subject other than 
law." (7) 
The second part of the chapter concerns the limitations of a 
working paper on sentencing. The conclusion reached is that it 
is a most unsuitable instrument of planning for institutional 
change, which is what would be meant by the training of judges 
in penology as the working paper recommended. A more considered 
analysis of these views follows. 
The Judge as Sentencer I 
The first part of the paper was in fact Lord Devlin's address to 
the Howard League for Penal Reform in September 1975. The 
general theme of that address was that judges were concerned with 
justice and penologists with crimes. Further, the amount of an 
offender's debt to society should like any other debt be 
quantified as the amount owed and not as the amount which the 
creditor would like to spend on improving the debtor's moral 
character (8). Lord Devlin attacked the superficial attraction 
of dovetailing the penologist into the judge. A lawyer, he 
argued, is not by nature a social worker because their aptitudes 
are different. The lawyer's working hypothesis is that all men 
are reasonable, but this is not appropriate for a social worker. 
He observes that: 
"Penology falls between two ancient disciplines. 
There is the discipline of medicine, where the 
sin is not to cure where you can, and there is 
the discipline of law, where the sin is to cure 
the man against his will." (9) 
But the power to sentence an offender lies with the courts and 
therefore with lawyers and Lord Devlin warns that: 
"The sentence must not be longer than is justified 
by the gravity of the crime and must not fall below 
the least that retribution demands." (10) 
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In addition to these objects Lord Devlin, secondly, champions the 
judge as the non-expert and emphasises his value as such. He 
asserts that the jury is still the "indispensable instrument" of 
the criminal trial, in which the judge still plays no more than 
his traditional part. The change in the judge's role is due to 
the encroachment of penology. The origins of this in England is 
said to be the first set of Prison Rules in 1899. These laid 
down that the object of imprisonment should be the reform of the 
prisoner as well as deterrence. This statutory action imposed 
upon the judge the task of making the punishment fit the criminal 
as well as the crime. Since then alternatives to imprisonment 
devised by penologists have multiplied. 
However, Lord Devlin still sees the English judge as the "juryman 
writ large." The implications of this is that of promoting open 
justice and that the judge is more than just a specialist. 
Further, everything that goes into the judge's mind on fact is 
seen to go in by way of evidence and during its passage it is 
subject to counsel's comment. Partial training by way of 
judicial training is therefore rejected as it would result only 
in a 'half-baked' expert. If the judge is to be trained he 
should be fully trained. He will then be an expert who holds 
views of his own. Consequently, his decisions will cease to 
reflect the attitude of the ordinary man applying an intelligent 
mind to technical questions and the judge will become a product 
of a technique. Lord Devlin observes also that now that the 
reform of the criminal has increased in importance as an 
objective and that imprisonment has come to be considered as a 
form of treatment as well as punishment, the adequacy of the 
"instant sentence" is becoming more apparent. As treatment 
continues to play a larger part in the determination of the 
period of incarceration so the judge's control is diminished. 
The prisoner's future is more a matter for administration 
decision than judicial action. It is this point that Lord Devlin 
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founds on for his assertion that judges would not make good 
penologists. 
4.9 The Judge as Sentencer II 
The second part of the paper was an assessment by Lord Devlin of 
a consultative paper by a Home Office Working Party issued in 
August 1976. The main feature of the Paper was a proposal for 
judicial training, although disapproving notice was taken of 
Lord Devlin's views outlined above. This training was in theory 
to last a year but financial constraints produced a suggestion of 
a shorter course of one month. Lord Devlin's ascorbic view was 
that the Working Party did not seem to have taken the views of 
those who would be appointed to attend this training. Further, 
the Party had concerned itself only with the mechanics of a 
change, the virtues of which had been taken for granted (11). 
His sustained criticism included an overtly political assessment 
of the Paper when he wrote that: 
"I must say at the outset that the show piece 
of the new scheme, the month's incarceration, 
strikes me, even on the assumption that judges 
should be penologically minded, as a dazzing 
manifestation of the unacceptable face of 
socialism, that is, an excessive zeal for 
setting up at public expense institutions for 
regimenting people into doing things which any 
sensible person does for his own benefit, at his 
own expense, and in his own way." (12) 
He concludes by asserting, almost jubilantly it seems, his 
complete ignorance of most of the subjects, contained in the 
proposed syllabus course, when he was first appointed to the 
bench in 1948. Indeed he says: 
"When sentencing I did not feel handicapped by 
my ignorance of penal theory and criminology; I 
have not from my slight subsequent acquaitance 
with them discovered to what use I could have 
put them." (13) 
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His Lordship's general test when sentencing an individual was to 
ask himself what the minimum sentence was that would do. He, 
like all judges in his view, was a person of independent and 
mature mind, determined to do justice. Accordingly, the judge 
did not need to know the "recondities of case law" but he ought 
to know the general principles and "above all" he should know the 
tariff. 
This superficial analysis of Lord Devlin's views is an important 
aspect in seeking to establish a legal model of the drug trade as 
a means of assessing sentencing policy. It is the judicial 
approach that is now being considered rather than the minutae of 
the decisions. Lord Devlin's views stated explicitly are in 
broad terms very similar to what might have been inferred from 
the case law of sentenced drug offenders. It is submitted that 
this whole approach manifests itself in various ways: firstly, 
there is minimal reference in the judgements to the technical 
aspects of controlled drugs. It maybe that each individual 
controlled drug has different propensities in similar conditions 
but this and other distinctions are never followed. The cases 
repeat regularly the distinction between "hard" and "soft" drugs 
without explaining the reasons for the difference or stating 
authoritatively into which category all the drugs fall. Lord 
Devlin champions the value of the English judge as a non-expert, 
speaking for the ordinary man, and that is reflected, it is 
submitted, in the reasoning stated. Secondly, not only is 
technical evidence not relied on in judgements but it is, on 
Lord Devlin's proposition, positively discouraged. He considers 
the judiciary to have what might be termed a generalised faculty 
of analysis applicable to all criminal cases irrespective of the 
subject matter. This is evident in his description of judges as 
being 'independent and of mature mind'. In relation to 
controlled drugs it will be shown later that the judges really do 
view the whole of the drugs trade as simply a vast commercial 
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enterprise and while occasionally police evidence is called as to 
the nature and extent of that trade there seems a reluctance to 
state authoritatively what precisely the various trades are in 
the business. Judges rely on some assistance from the 1971 Act 
but supplement that with their own views of the parts played. 
Similarly, with the street values of drugs there is a reluctance 
to examine or establish technical means of assessing that value. 
Thirdly, that judges exist to do justice in an objective manner 
is most apparent in the sentencing of drug addicts. There, 
notwithstanding the expression of concern, the judges still 
proceed to pass sentences of lengthy periods of incarceration on 
addicts whose criminal responsibility ought in many circumstances 
to be a matter more for medical treatment. Finally, an important 
aspect of judgements in controlled drugs cases is the homily, a 
stage at which Lord Devlin would say that the judge expresses 
simply the views of the ordinary man. Homilies appears to be 
variations on constant themes of, for example, "Mr Bigs" in the 
background and the "harrowing plight" of drug addicts with the 
"death and misery" brought about by drugs. Mr Steven White has 
studied the use of the homily in courts (14). His article in 
the Criminal Law Review is the end product of research into the 
use of homilies by judges and magistrates when sentencing 
offenders. The value of the article lies in considering the 
sentiments that the homilies are used to express. His view is 
that whether or not condemnation was made explicit, although 
generally it was, those imposing sentences managed by the manner 
in which they pronounced sentence to create the impression that 
sentencing was a fairly hostile process (15). It is submitted 
that many of the cases cited earlier show a marked judicial 
hostility to the drugs trade and to virtually all those involved 
in it. Surprisingly also, there have been a few examples of such 
hostility and condemnation by academic writers and commentators, 
as will be shown, in circumstances where one would have 
anticipated with introspection and reflection that a more 
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detached view would have prevailed. 
Review of articles 
Just as there is said to be nothing new under the sun so there 
have been earlier academic studies of sentencing policy and 
controlled drugs. These studies must be reviewed now to see if 
their conclusions can assist here. Three particular writers have 
produced amongst them five relevant articles and these articles 
are considered now for simplicities sake in chronological order: 
(1) Alec Samuels 
(a) 1968 (16) 
The learned author describes the sentencing of drug offenders as 
then being a comparatively new task for the courts but there had 
been sufficient cases to permit a review of the policy of the 
courts. In twelve pages Mr Samuel sets out all of the reported 
cases in English law and a considerable number of the unreported 
cases for which the transcript reference number is cited. His 
conclusion is that the proper sentencing principles to be applied 
by the courts cannot be said to have been then widely and clearly 
disseminated and understood. If that was so then it seems 
reasonable to infer that Mr Samuel's article would have had a 
considerable impact. His systematic exposition would have 
assisted the bench and practitioners in a field that they had 
little experience of. Indeed it maybe that one judicial 
attitude adverted t.o on several occasions in this study has its 
foundations in this article: Mr Samuel's first proposition was 
that drugs may be "broadly classified into hard and soft." While 
this is supported by inference in an extensive bibliography 
cited there is no explanation or justification for the 
distinction. Moreover, the author saw certain principles 
emerging and he summarised these (17) by saying that the relevant 
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factors to be taken into account in sentencing were: 
(i) whether the drugs were hard or soft; 
(ii) whether the accused was peddling or 
trafficking for commercial gain; 
(iii) whether the accused was running a 
club, or merely having a party with friends 
at his own home; 
(iv) the need to protect young people; 
(v) and (vi) the age and previous convictions 
of the accused; 
(vii) the extent of the accused's addiction 
or dependence; 
Factors (iv), (v), and (vi) are not peculiar to the drugs trade 
and indeed they are of relevance in any sentence passed by a 
Court. Of the remaining factors, (iii) appears now to be fairly 
less important than it did in 1968. It seems that the English 
courts at this time were most concerned at the supposed role 
played by clubs and their proprietors in making conditions 
amenable to the drug trade. Exemplary sentences have been noted 
earlier as having been handed down to occupiers of premises who 
permitted various drug activities to take place there. Factor (i) 
has to some extent been superceded by the emphasis given by the 
Courts to the Class into which the drug falls rather than by a 
mere measurement of 'hard' or 'soft'. Factor (vii) is wrongly 
stated by the author as being the "extent" of addiction. It is 
submitted that such a status was and still is important and that 
its extent cannot really be assessed. But it is clear the beyond 
anything else the existence of a commercial motive is the single 
most important aspect of any drug case. Factor (ii) therefore is 
still highly relevant but what difference the author saw in 1968 
between "peddling" and "trafficking" is unclear. 
, . 
. . 
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(b) 1977 (18) 
This article is less substantial than that of 1968 and, if it 
does anything of value, it covers reported sentencing appeals 
over the period between 1968 and 1977. The article starts with a 
fairly broad, emotive and sweeping statement that: 
"Drug abuse is a most serious social evil. 
People, mostly' young people, deliberately 
slowly destroy themselves. The only cause 
for a little negative relief in contemplating 
the drug scene is that the problem appears not 
to have grown, or to be growing, as fast as 
was gloomily predicted a few years ago." (19) 
No authority is cited for any of these propositions which are by 
no means self-evident. And later: 
"What happens to drug addicts? Many become 
debilitated, infected, diseased, exhausted 
and die, often of an overdose after several 
years addiction. Some come off because of 
exhaustion, having seen a friend die, having 
found something of a passive desire to come 
off ... " (20) 
Perhaps the single most important criticism of the article is 
that Mr Samuel's attempts too much in too short a space. Lord 
Devlin has maintained that an attitude of demarcation is 
essential, with lawyers being concerned with the law and with 
justice and penologists with punishment. Mr Samuel's, it is 
submitted, has approached the subject on too wide a front and in 
the result fails adequately to deal with anyone of the matters he 
raises. 
(b) 1979 (21) 
This article on close examination appears to be almost identical 
to that of 1977 with the addition of a few new cases. In these 
circumstances what has been said of the earlier article applies 
equally, it is submitted, to the latter. 
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(2) Desmond Marrinan (22) 
This article is in essence an analysis of the two important 
sentencing cases from Northern Ireland considered earlier in this 
work, namely McCay's case and that of Magee. Mr Marrinan's 
exposition is set in the context of the policy as it then was in 
England and as it could be inferred from the case law. Some 
consideration is also given to the relevant statistics of the 
United Kingdom dealing with drug abuse. There is then little to 
be gained from a rehersal of the cases. There are two 
conclusions which are worth restating: first, in condisering 
R v McCay the learned author concludes that the principles which 
emerge from this case are broadly in line with the policy of the 
English courts with the proviso that the English courts had no 
sought to draw such a marked distinction between LSD and cannabis 
(23). The Court in Northern Ireland was certainly correct in 
drawing such a distinction because LSD is classified as a 
Class 'A' drug whereas cannabis is a Class 'C' drug. But, it is 
difficult to think of an English authority that does not draw 
such a distinction and anyway Mr Marrinan does not cite a case in 
support of his proposition. The second conclusion is that the 
principles set out in R v McCay are clear and broadly in line 
with the English position although the Irish Courts seem to 
prefer a harder line towards the first offender involved with 
possession of cannabis and similar drugs but not concerned with 
the supplying of drugs for gain. Both Courts have rightly 
advocated and imposed very severe deterrent sentences on pushers. 
That too is unobjectionable but then the Court of Northern 
Ireland have a far closer affinity with the English courts given 
the supremacy even in criminal matters of the House of Lords. 
Mr Marrinan's final question as to whether the use of the 
deterrent sentences for users would have the desired effect can 
be answered in the negative. 
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(3) Stephen Woolman (24) 
This article, published in July 1985, is the most recent and the 
author purports to point to some causes for concern in the 
practice of the Scottish Courts in sentencing drug offenders. 
In the opening line of the article the author adverts to the 
serious problem of "hard" drugs but does not specify which he 
means or why they should be so described. Nevertheless the 
author's aim is to try to obtain "an idea" of current sentencing 
practices and to this end he examined those cases reported in the 
law reports together with all the cases reported by The Scotsman 
in the first four months of 1985. It is then conceded 
immediately that this is an unrepresentative sample with an undue 
bias towards the more serious cases. He does not seem to concede 
that the reports he examines are concerned in all probability 
with east central Scotland in general and Edinburgh in 
particular. Nor does he explain how in these continued 
circumstances a meaningful result can be gleaned. This 
superficial study is based on the briefest of details of cases in 
two separate groups namely offences involving cannabis and 
offences involving heroin. It is emphasised at the end of the 
article that no conclusions can be drawn as the survey is 
unrepresentative. The first comment then is that cannabis is 
often treated in a very similar fashion to heroin at least for 
offences greater than simple possession. It is difficult to see, 
with respect, what case or cases that this proposition is founded 
on and even if there is some sort of authority within the article 
the admission that the survey is unrepresentative weakens the 
whole matter. The second point by the author that guidelines 
ought to be given cannot be faulted and indeed ought to be 
encouraged. There is no need for the Scots judiciary to accept 
simply the authority of R v Aramah but there is a need for some 
clear statement of policy other than a bald statement of the 
requirement for exemplary sentences. This is a most important 
point being put forward by Mr Woolman but the remainder of his 
~ 
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article is disappointing. 
Review of books and reports 
(1) The Australians 
As a matter of comparative jurisprudence some consideration is 
given now to important Australian reports that may indicate one 
possible future trend. In their substantial study of Australian 
drug offenders (25) Iran Potas and John Walker report on the 
degree of sentencing disparity in the Australian courts in 
dealing with drug offenders, especially in relation to the 
importation, supply and possession of heroin. The aim of the 
researchers is to identify those factors which the courts regard 
as crucial in determining sentence length. The study is 
concerned with those individuals who have been sentenced 
following a conviction of an offence under section 233B(1) of 
the Customs Act 1901 (Commonwealth). This section divides into 
seven sub-sections each one of which constituting a different 
offence and the whole section being cast in the broadest of 
terms. It would seem that each sub-section amounts to what is an 
offence contained in a separate section under the 1971 Act. The 
authors consider a total of 253 judgements of trial court level 
where drug offenders were convicted under section 233B and had 
been imprisoned. From a study of these cases a total of 60 
factors relevant to sentence were drawn up and these indicate 
the matters taken into account. Table C in the Appendix to this 
Chapter reproduces the list of these factors. Perhaps a first 
observation that might be made is that this list in itself would 
provide a suitable model for analysing the relevant case law. 
The value of the report for present purposes is that as the 
factors on the list are only those which have been expressly 
adverted to or clearly implied in the course of the courts' 
deliberations on sentence then a picture of Australian judicial 
attitudes can be inferred. This is all the clearer for the 
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researchers evaluation, set out at Table D, of the aggravating 
and mitigating factors which are referred to by the judges in 
the transcripts of at least ten cases. 
This superficial treatment of the report is necessary in the 
present circumstances and it does not do justice to the work of 
authors (26). Perhaps what is most noteable is their conclusion 
that: 
"This study has shown that it is possible to 
develop sentencing models with the aid of the 
computer that can not only mathematically 
describe, but also prescribe, sentences with 
a remarkable degree of accuracy. All that is 
required is certain specific items of information. 
The fact that the cases analyzed fit so neatly 
into logical and intuitively sound models 
suggest that sentencing disparity, in so far as 
it applies to Federal drug offenders who have 
been sentenced to terms of imprisonment is not 
such a serious problem as has been imagined." (27) 
In his discussion of this report, Mr Wasik has concluded in 
essence that a computer can assist the mechanical process of 
collecting and evaluating sentencing cases but ultimately it is 
the researcher who decides certain crucial factors, such as how 
close a fit to the actual sentences imposed by the court is 
acceptable as confirming their model as an accurate one (28). 
In short, while the computer-aided research can produce a 
"check-list" of essential factors in any sphere of sentencing, 
this really only confirms what is already judicial practice: the 
study describes, it cannot prescribe. Indeed, Mr Wasik himself 
raises an important point that perhaps indicates the future of 
sentencing: 
"If we decide, in the end, that we need 
sentencing guidance to reduce disparity 
but otherwise to reflect existing practice, 
the Court of Appeal could further develop 
its guidelines judgements, or we could 
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implement legislative guidelines to the same 
job at a single stroke. Logically, though, 
there are questions which need to be settled 
first. If we are going to have guidelines, 
who should draw them up - the Judges, 
Parliament, or an independent commission? 
And should they embody existing sentencing 
practice, or should their production give an 
opportunity to re-think the principles of 
sentencing?" (29) 
(2) Bruce MacFarlane 
In his very extensive and thorough examination of the Canadian 
Law of controlled drugs, Bruce MacFarlane concludes with a study 
of the principles of sentencing drug offenders (30). As his book 
was published in 1979 and the preface is dated 20 January of that 
year, the author was presumably stating the law as at that date. 
The first and perhaps major principle that Mr MacFarlane states 
is supported by seven authorities dated between 1969 and 1977: 
"Where an accused has been convicted of either 
trafficking or possession for the purpose of 
trafficking, the courts have consistently ruled 
that deterrence and the protection of the public 
are the paramount considerations and that, in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances", a period 
of incarceration should generally be imposed." (31) 
Immediately thereafter the learned author cites further authority 
for the proposition that courts have tended to suggest that 
"exceptional circumstances", if they exist at all, should flow 
from the offence and not the offender. Further, the Canadian 
courts have concluded also that in trafficking cases specific 
variables tend to either aggravate or mitigate the position of 
the accused: 
"Accordingly, while no definite rule can be 
promulgated in relation to the length of 
sentence which should be imposed in a given 
case, the courts do tend to rely upon the 
existence of specific facts as materially 
affecting the length of the appropriate 
sentence." (32) 
,<iii. 
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Mr MacFarlane lists the factors which tend to affect the 
sentence imposed for trafficking and possession for the purpose 
of trafficking:-
" 1. Quantity of the Drug. 
2. Element of Commercialism. 
3. Presence of Weapons or Arms. 
4. Where Accused was Addict at Time of Offence. 
5. Effect of an Undercover Agent's Actions. 
6. Nature of Drug. 
7. Age and Character of Purchaser. 
8. Trafficking in a "substance". 
9. "Mode" of Trafficking. 
10. Where Accused is an Informant." 
Mr MacFarlane cites an impressive number of authorities in 
support of each of these factors and the net effect is to produce 
a distinct legal model of sentencing drug offencers in Canada. 
But the study proceeds further with a statistical analysis of 
sentencing ranges. The reason for this is said to be that drug 
offences, unlike many other criminal activities tend to attract 
the full spectrum of sentences prescribed by Parliament. The 
analysis is of the statistics gathered by the Health and Welfare 
departments. Regretably this analysis cannot be pursued here but 
it is interesting that Mr MacFarlane expresses a hope that he 
assists the bench and counsel when they are required to undertake 
the 
" rather difficult and delicate task of 
sentencing a drug offender." (33) 
(3) Richard Lord 
The publication of Mr Lord's textbook on controlled drugs was a 
notable advance for this aspect of criminal law. The merits of 
the book have been set out earlier in this work. Part of the 
importance of the book lies undoubtedly in the unique chapter on 
the sentencing of drug offenders. Textbooks on individual areas 
of criminal law had been published before 1984, of course, but 
Mr Lord is perhaps the first author to do this and include a 
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chapter on sentencing. Such a development is indicative of the 
increasing importance of sentencing as a subject, of the 
increasing complexity of the law and of the demand for 
practitioners to advice their clients knowledgably and fully. 
Table E sets out the sentencing table devised by Mr Lord on the 
strength of the authorities then known to him. The learned 
author's main contention is that the basic principles of 
sentencing are apparent from the statutory maximum penalties and 
depend in particular on the particular drug involved and the 
precise offence of which the accused has been convicted (34). 
He continues: 
liThe range of offences specified by the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971 can be graded by severity of 
maximum punishment. At the bottom end of the 
scale is the simple possessor. He is least 
likely to present a danger to society in general 
and is least likely to have financial gain as a 
motive for his crime. Next up the scale is the 
supplier. Suppliers of controlled drugs can be 
subdivided into two basic categories - the social 
supplier and the commercial supplier. Although 
the maximum penalties are the same in either case, 
the courts tend to take into account the wide scope 
of the offence of supplying. A 'supplier' who 
collects money from his friends, contributes some 
himself and then purchases some drugs for their 
communal use is treated more leniently than a 
wholesale dealer in drugs who may not use them 
at all himself and whose sole motive is 
financial gain ... " 
While acknowledging that even specialised texts have limitations, 
this description by Mr Lord is disappointingly brief. However, 
the author continues to assert:-
liThe trends in drug sentencing have varied 
considerably over the years since the mid-1960's 
when drug abuse became a serious problem. 
Despite the court's frequent proclamations on 
the evils of drug trafficking and the need to 
eliminate it, sentences have in general become 
less severe in recent years. Many of the 
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earlier cases cannot be regarded as giving 
guidelines on sentencing policy." (35) 
The first sentence of the last quotation maybe wrong if Mr Lord 
means that the trend swung to one extreme and then back to 
leniency and back again to extreme harshness. The initial 
reaction to an apparent drugs problem as shown by the judgements 
of the Court of Appeal - and Lord Parker C.J. in particular - was 
one of stiff resistance. What might now be regarded as 
comparatively minor crimes were met with heavy sentences, clearly 
of an exemplary nature. Mr Lord may be correct if specific 
offences such as simple possession of cannabis is concerned for 
there sentences are undoubtedly a shadow of their former size. 
The second sentence in the quotation - that sentences have 
become lighter - is misleading. The great increase in drug 
offences has led to a more precise demarcation of offenders, at 
least in England and Wales. The heavy sentences passed for 
crimes of production or wholesale supplying are most certainly 
not lighter than they were before. (36) 
C. Conclusions 
Mr Philip Bean of the University of Nottingham has been a regular 
and critical commentator on matters of controlled drugs. In 
another of his valuable works, Drug-taking and the Courts: Some 
Persistent Dilemmas (37), he argues that as interest in drug-
taking only really began in the middle or late 1960's, for a 
long time anyone who appeared to know something about "drugs" 
was an expert. More, he says, is now required fo~ that 
description. Interest was initially directed to drugs, but 
subsequently the drug-takers were considered more. Mr Bean 
sought to widen the area of debate because, he said, it had 
until then (he was writing in 1974) been too narrow and it 
thereby masked some of the more profound issues which are central 
to the legal and penal system. He then considered three areas 
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which he thought ought to be the focus of special attention. Two 
of these areas were concerned with barbiturates and other similar 
drugs and these are not considered further here. The third 
however was: 
" that age-old question about sentencing, 
and as far as drug offenders are concerned, 
sentencing for what purpose?" (38) 
It seemed to Mr Bean that there were two main arguments behind 
the controlled drugs legislation, one was to stop the spread of 
drug abuse by illicit sales, gifts or prescribing and the second 
was to protect the offender from himself, that is, to convict 
him so that he may be stopped using illicit drugs again. It 
was said by the author that it had only been since the mid-1950's 
that a third such argument had been put forward, that sentences 
should be reformative, and passed on the offenders for their own 
welfare. He said that: 
"In practice sentencing policy for drug 
offenders is likely to be a pragmatic one, 
based on the circumstances of each case. 
Yet drug offenders like other offenders 
appearing in the courts have a right to 
know if they are being sentenced for their 
own good or for deterrent reasons ... " 
And later: 
"Drug offenders highlight the issue about 
welfare sentences because their behaviour 
is immediate in its impact and because of 
the rather curious ways in which we select 
certain types of drug use for moral 
condemnation and not others." (39) 
Mr Bean saw that the major difficulty in discussing drug 
offenders was, and still is, that they are not a hamogeneous 
group. He had suggested earlier in his works that durg 
offenders fell into two broad categories, those who were working 
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class and delinquent prior to drug-taking, and the second group 
who were middle-class and only delinquent after drug-taking. By 
1974 the writer thought that it was doubtful if such a 
categorization would still hold. He continued: 
" it is still convenient to talk about 
addicts and non-addicts, and although this is 
a useful working distinction addicts appear to 
take non-addictive drugs too. In other words 
drug takers in Britain use a variety of drugs, 
some addictive and some not addictive, and it 
makes little sense to see them solely in terms 
of the type of drug for which they are 
prosecuted." (40) 
Mr Bean was of the view that one should be wary of making 
generalizations because there were "no" experts in this field. 
The situation was too fluid and the knowledge base too thin to 
make qualitative predictions. He concluded that: 
"Drug use, drug abuse and drug misuse are features 
of our society and although they affect the cour,ts 
they also have deeper philosophical implications 
which, as Iran Illich says, are bound up with 
notions of health, pain, profit and vested 
interests." (41) 
In the twelve or so years that have passed since publication of 
that article by Mr Bean, the subject matter has grown out of all 
proportion to what must have been expected generally by even the 
most attentive of researchers. The 'knowledge base' referred to 
is now far greater than then but, it is submitted, we are no 
nearer to solutions and Mr Bean's observations still hold good. 
The working of the marker system combined with fickle consumer 
demands and intermittent political involvement produce together 
an area of human behaviour that is so uncertain. 
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Four aims were established at the start of this study. 
1. The first aim was to consider the framework 
of the legislation and common law for the 
disposal of any drug-related case before the 
courts. 
Perhaps the first conclusion to be set down is that it would be 
an error to consider the 1971 Act as being comprehensive. 
Although that statute contains the basic offences it has been 
shown that there are a considerable number of other Acts and 
delegated legislation which have a bearing on controlled durgs. 
With the expressed intention of Parliament being to attack the 
wealth brought by involvement in drugs it must be expected that 
this area of the law will simply grow inexorably over the next 
few years. 
2. The second aim was to analyse the subsiduary 
or supporting legislation which appears in drug-
related cases, more than in any other crime, to 
be of immense importance. 
The comments in relation to the first aim apply equally to the 
second. Of course the schedules of maximum penalties have been 
increased in criminal statutes as well as the 1971 Act. But 
few Acts have had as comprehensive a supporting statute as the 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The political will-power 
behind these changes has been and at the time of writing 
continues to be more determined than in many other criminal 
statutes. Further, the complexity is likely to increase as 
statutes covering the different jurisdictions are passed and 
come into force at v~rying times. 
3. The third aim was to consider the development 
of the legislation and judicial attitudes as a 
means of assessing drug-related activities. 
This work purports to be a study of the law relating to 
sentencing drug offenders and judicial attitudes to the same 
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offenders. In assessing drug related activities it is most 
clear that the commercial element is uppermost in the attention 
of the legislature and the judiciary. In considering this 
aspect further it might assist to have regard to Miss Mary 
McIntosh's perceptive study The Organisation of Crime. Broadly 
her work is concentrated on the managerial angle of professional 
crime rather than the sociologists and criminologists traditional 
approach of individual deviation. The study is of value here in 
that the profit motive in drug-related crimes such as 
distribution is self-evident. On the basis that professional 
crime has a higher degree of skill invovled in the performance 
of the crime, Miss McIntosh argues that: 
" professional crime is organisationally 
distinguished from other crime in one sense. 
Because professional crime is a relatively 
distinct occupational sphere, it has its own 
patterning and continuity, whereas amateur 
activities, being only part-time, are much 
more influenced by a variety of circumstances, 
often peculiar to the individual criminal. 
Professional crime is thus distinguished not 
by its scale, or degree of turpitude or 
efficiency but by its organisational 
differentiation from other activities." (42) 
And so it is that some of the heaviest sentences - in absolute 
and comparative terms - have been passed in drugs cases with the 
highest degree of preparation and planning. These cases 
ordinarily involved individuals who have personal mitigation that 
might be thought of as compelling but that has little influence 
over the court. 
The analysis of Miss McIntosh continues and she outlines four 
varieties of organisation named as picaresque, craft, project and 
business: 
"Briefly, the picaresque organisation, which is 
typical of pirates and brigands is a fairly 
D" ~t· , ' 
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permanent gang under one man's leadership, 
sometimes with a few supporting officers. 
Profits are shared among the members according 
to rank. The craft organisation, typical of 
people performing skilled but small-scale 
thefts and confidence tricks, is a small, 
fairly permanent team, usually of two or 
three men, each of whom has a specific role 
to play in the routinised thefts in which the 
team specialises. It is a team of equals and 
the profits are shared equally at the end 
of each day. The project organisation, typical 
of burglars, robbers, smugglers or fraudsmen, 
engaged in large-scale crimes involving 
complicated techniques and advance planning, 
is an ad hoc team of specialists mustered 
sometimes by an entrepreneur, for the 
specific job in hand. Profits are shared 
on a basis worked out before hand, though 
some participants may work for an agreed 
flat fee. Business organisations, typical 
of extortionists and suppliers of illegal 
goods and services who have gained some 
degree of immunity from legal control, is the 
largest in scale and the most permanent. It 
has a hierarchy of participants who engage in 
specialised activities, sometimes being paid 
by their superiors and sometimes receiving a 
share of the takings in their particular 
sector." (43) 
The extensive study of the cases earlier reveals similar 
organisations to those described above and even if there is no 
reported case for any group above then within the whole trade it 
is easy to see how such groups could exist. 
It is submitted that the drugs trade can be viewed in one of two 
possible ways for the purpose of locating an individual in that 
trade: Miss McIntosh has provided the clue with the use by her in 
the last quotation of the phrase "hierarchy of participants." 
There is a vertical approach and a horizontal one. 
~ 
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(a) Vertical Approach 
Professor John Kaplan has said that: 
II the illegal market can best be seen 
as a pyramid, with the smallest number of 
traffickers close to the source." (44) 
The judiciary have a similar ascending metaphor in mind when 
dealing with drug offenders. In R v Ford (45) the judge said 
that he placed the accused "at the very bottom rung of the 
ladder" of those who deal in drugs. in R v Tann (46) the 
appellant was described as "not being an underling." This 
vertical aspect clearly suggests various trades for in 
R v Vickery (47) it was held on appeal that those who supplied 
drugs should be treated more severely than those who merely 
possessd them. In his commentary Dr Thomas said succinctly 
that: 
" the court has distinguished between 
different kinds of suppliers, and in 
particular between the supplier of cannabis 
on a small scale and the "middleman" and 
importer respectively." (48) 
(b) Horizontal Approach 
But such a hierarchy is not the only way of viewing matters for 
in R v Bebbington (49) the trial judge referred to the defendant 
as being "in a chain" of suppliers. In R v Atkins (5) it was 
said that the appellant was: 
" shown to have been part of a chain of 
distributors, of some sort of another, of the 
supply of hard drugs for illicit purposes, and 
therefore would be playing an active part in 
the chain." (51) 
The cases cited are illustrative only for the reports contain a 
large number of similar observations. The truth of the matter, 
or so it is submitted, is that both views are correct for the 
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producer of the controlled drug can only get the substance to 
the consumer by means of a continuous series of contacts. 
Further, whether measured by value or volume the controlled drugs 
reach several critical points, high points that is, in the course 
of progress so that there is undoubtedly a hierarchy of 
participants. 
This study has been confined to reported cases but in the initial 
inquiries at the very outset the case of R v Ogunmokum (52) was 
discovered. There in the course of rejecting appeals against 
sentences the Court said: 
"The background to this case was dealing with 
heroin, and in the summer of 1973 the Police 
were keeping observation in Gerrard Street in 
Soho where, apparently, a good deal of buying 
and selling of heroin was going on. A large 
number of arrests were made. People who were 
buying only for their own use were dealt with 
in the Magistrates Courts. The next levels 
were what are called "runners" - the link 
between the buyers and the pushers. Many of 
these "runners" were addicts themselves, selling 
heroin in order to raise the money to supply 
their own requirements .. the phrase "addict-
pushers" was used to describe some, at any 
rate, of these people." (53) 
Thus, while the judiciary have supplemented the legislation with 
what has been told to them of the drugs trade to produce what 
may in fact be a full picture of the trade, the complexity of 
the whole business is such that statutory definitions of the 
trades might be very difficult. But this is not to say that such 
definition ought not to be attempted. Indeed it might be 
unobjectionable to provide in a statute that a court in passing 
sentence ought to give merciful consideration to certain aspects 
including where applicable, for example, the status of addict-
pusher. 
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4. The forth aim was to consider whether 
existing legislation can be shown to be 
ineffective to meet the drug-related 
criminal activities and therefore to 
suggest improvements in the law. 
The contemporary nature of the problems related controlled drugs 
are revealed most obviously at this point. It would have been 
until recently a matter for great emphasis that legislation was 
required to tackle profits made from these activities. This 
work purports to state the law as at 31st December 1986 but it is 
clear that legislation passed immediately after that date sought 
to provide for those types of gain from drug-related crime. As 
that legislation, at the time of writing has just been passed, it 
cannot be said to have been tested in the courts and the 
observation applies only to England and Wales, for the relevant 
Scots legislation is still to be passed. Leaving that matter to 
one side, there are two other points to be considered here: 
street values and drug classifications. 
A. Street Values 
It is apparent from even the most cursory of glances at the 
reported cases that the value assessed for a given quantity of 
controlled drugs is crucial: the higher the value the greater 
the degree of seriousness. The 1971 Act provides no indication 
as to the means to be used in calculating the value of controlled 
drugs. What is commonly referred to as the "street value" is not 
the subject of any judicial definition at least in relation to 
controlled drugs. Some assistance with the assessment may be 
found in considering other importing authorities: in Byrne v Law 
(54) the appellant was convicted before justices of fraudulently 
evading the prohibition on the importation on indecent goods 
that is to say 1000 magazines and 650 line films, contrary to 
section 304 of the Customs and Excise Act 1952. The invoice 
price of the articles in question, expressed in Danish Kroner, 
was equivalent to £2335. The accused was sentenced to a fine of 
4.25 
-285-
£3000 or 12 months imprisonment in default. He appealed to 
quarter sessions who varied the sentence by imposing a sentence 
of imprisonment, suspended, and substituting a penalty of £100 
for the penalty of £3000 imposed by the justices. Quarter 
Sessions reduced the amount of the fine on the ground that, since 
the importation of the articles was prohibited, there would be no 
"open market". For then, within the meaning of the 1952 Act, the 
"open market" was the test by which the court could fix the value 
of the goods concerned and so determine the then maximum penalty 
which the court could impose, it being the sum of £100. Section 
305(2) provided that: 
"Where a penalty for any offence under any 
enactment relating to an assigned matter is 
required to be fixed by reference to the 
value of goods, that value shall be taken 
as the price which those goods might 
reasonably be expected to have fetched, 
after payment of any duty or tax chargeable 
thereon, if they had been sold in the 
open market at or about the date of the 
commission of the offence for which the 
penalty is imposed." 
On appeal to the Queen's Bench Division, it was held that the 
appeal would be allowed and the case sent back for the offence 
to be reassessed. For the purposes of section 305(2) any 
distinction between the so-called black and white markets was 
irrelevant; all that was necessary to ascertain the penalty was 
to ask what the price was which would be paid by a willing 
buyer to a willing seller at the port of landing. An invoice 
from the overseas seller to the intended recipient would be a 
good, and sometimes the only and conclusive, guide to the open 
market value of the goods in question. 
In reaching that decision Lord Widgery C.J. referred to Rolex 
Watch Co Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (55) where 
the nature of the goods was different but the same formula of 
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the open market price was used. There Birkett L.J. held that: 
"If there is a sole concessionaire ipso facto 
the free open market vanishes, and one must do 
the best one can, taking a notional open market, 
and considering all the factors bearing on the 
question of price." (56) 
In Byren's case Lord Widgery observed that the reference to the 
sole concessionaire was because in that case the goods in 
question came into this country in the ordinary course of 
business through a sole concessionare, and thus difficulties 
were presentend in assessing the open market price. But 
Lord Widgery expressly adopted Lord Birkett's "common sense 
approach" and he added that: 
"One must do the best one can; one must 
take a notional open market and consider all 
the facts here which bear on the question of 
price." (57) 
and further that: 
"It is important that justices should realise 
that if the material seems scanty, the 
direction is that they must do their best. 
What they have to do their best to achieve 
is to find the open market, willing buyer, 
landed price of these goods." (58) 
Section 305(2) of the 1952 Act was repealed and re-enacted as 
section 171(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 in 
identical terms. 
It seems that the general approach in practice on assessing the 
value of controlled drugs is to lead evidence of policemen that 
indicates the highest price that the open market would bear. 
But it maybe argued reasonably that this matter is too vague and 
has too many elements left uncertain. There is no definition of 
"street value". No allowance appears to be made for either 
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regional variations in market price or for inflation. A police 
witness in a trial may also, it appears, give evidence as to 
value thus assuming the role of witness to fact and expert 
witness. It may be that the various police forces share 
knowledge and establish common current values for controlled 
drugs but this essentially administrative arrangement has basis 
in law which is what it perhaps ought to have. There is an 
increasing awareness of this whole problem on the bench, as 
R v Darby (59) indicates. There the appellant pleaded guilty 
to being concerned in evading the prohibition on the importation 
of cocaine. He had been detected at an airport carrying 2.95 
kilogrammes in various packets which were strapped to his back 
and to his shins. The report narrates that the cocaine was in 
fact cocaine hydrochloride of 80 per cent purity. The drug was 
valued at £472,000. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment 
and he was refused leave to appeal against sentence. The Court 
of Appeal held that the sentences fell within the limits 
suggested for large scale importation of Class A dr.ugs in 
R v Aramah. The sentence was right. Leonard J. said that: 
"According to evidence which was given at the 
Court below or was before the court in the form 
of a statement, the value was calculated as 
being £472,000. That calculation rested on 
comparison with a quantity of the same drug 
at a much lower purity and involved the 
multiplication of the quantity in the present 
case by a figure which produced an equivalent in 
relation to the degree of purity. There is no 
challenge to the conclusion which was drawn by 
the customs officer who, from hi.s experience, 
made that comparison." (60Y 
It is interesting that the judgement records that the appellant 
had been told that the drug was valued at £50,000. The 
importance of the commercial value of the drugs was stressed 
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when the Court held further that: 
" what seems to this Court to be 
important is the actual value and the 
considerable quantity of the drug which 
was imported." (61) 
It is submitted that the customs officer in calculating in the 
way that he did was in essence continuing a trend, for he 
based his figures on an earlier case valuation. There seems 
to be no assessment in this case of what an open market would 
value these drugs at, unless that valuation assumes but does 
not express that to be the basis of valuation. Further - and 
this point may reflect Scots practices - there is no statement 
of what the customs officer's experience was in terms of years 
service and length of detailed involvement in the drugs trade. 
In White v H M Advocate (62) the High Court had to decide, in 
relation to the possession of a controlled drug with intent to 
supply it to another, whether the opinion evidence on the 
dosage of drugs a user would consume, is competent only to 
medically qualified persons. It was held that: 
"Police officers who have served for some time 
with the drug squad do acquire knowledge of such 
matters as the quantity of drugs which a drugs 
user would consume in a day or in a week and so 
forth. Provided such a witness's qualifications as 
a police officer and his experience in the drug 
squad are first established such evidence, in our 
opinion, is clearly competent. Evidence of this 
nature is not competent only to medically 
qualified witnesses." (64) 
It is submitted that by analogy the same principle applies to 
expert witnesses who are called to give evidence on matters such 
as the street value of controlled drugs. 
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B. Classifications 
The 1971 Act provides for the classification of controlled drugs 
by section 2 and schedule 2. It is trite that these are 
classified into A, Band C and that Parliament has not explained 
why any drug has been so classified. It is interesting as a 
matter of comparison that the same legislation for the Republic 
of Ireland contains a very similar list of controlled drugs but 
without any division amongst the substances. (64) It has been 
shown above how counsel, in R v Kemp (65), made attempts to try 
to distinguish between controlled drugs within each 
classification. But the distinction between the classes is 
forgotten occasionally: in R v Suerdmont (66) on appeal against 
sentence Skinner J. said that: 
"It may well be that because of the high 
price of cocaine its socially harmful effects 
are less obvious than the socially harmful 
effects of other drugs, but (counsel for the 
appellant) eventually submitted to us that 
cocaine should be considered on a par with 
amphetamines in its dangerous qualities and 
we are content to deal with the matter on that 
basis." (67) 
Several important points arise from this and the first is that 
the judges should not equate cocaine with amphetamines as each is 
in a different Class. Second the judgement seems to suggest or 
now be authority in England for some test of whether a drug has 
"socially harmful effects," whatever that may mean. Thirdly, the 
judgement concerns only two out of very many controlled drugs 
thus failing to place these two in context in relation to the 
others (68). A further criticism of the classification of 
controlled drugs is that quality does not seem to be considered 
as being relevant. Thus, an accused maybe sentenced on the 
basis that the controlled drug in his possession is Class A and 
he may expect, all things being equal, a heavier sentence than 
the next person in similar circumstances who has a Class B drug. 
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But it may well be and probably frequently is the case that an 
accused has a very poor quality of Class A drug. The constant 
buying and selling of a drug means in accordance with trade 
practices that the substance is frequently adulterated. In 
the circumstances posed above the quantity of Class A might be 
a very poor financial asset compared to the high quality Class B 
drug. In short, the courts ought, it is submitted, give weight 
to the comparative qualities of the controlled drugs concerned. 
End Note 
The law of controlled drugs and the relative sentencing policy 
maybe described, modestly in the circumstances, as a developing 
subject. This work might well, indeed probably will, be 
overtaken by events sooner rather than later. Still, a few 
propositions can be formulated. The judiciary have a keen 
sense of the market and how the drugs trade represents 
individuals carrying into effect very simple and basic economic 
functions. That the profits in this trade are enormous is well 
known and the "profit-stripping" legislation represents a 
reaction to such gains. While the judges do make observations 
about the drugs trade, sustained analysis by them of the 
business does not seem to exist. This maybe contrasted, for 
example, with the view of one criminologist that: 
"The illegal drug market, as it functions 
in the urban ghetto, maybe viewed as a social 
and economic sub-system interpenetrating with 
the large capitalistic economy. The spirit of 
enterprise infuses the hierarchy of distributers 
and dealers, while consumers invest in and 
sustain the market place activity. The absence 
of regulations to ensure the manufacturing of 
quality drugs and the spy system fostered by 
repressive drug-control policies tend to 
generate chaos in the market ... " (69) 
Further, the greater volume of cases in England means that the 
judiciary have a better opportunity to explain and condem the 
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various participants and their activities. In Scotland the 
judiciary has tended to more dogmatic condemnations. If this 
work is to have any real aim it is perhaps to assist in some way 
to reduce desparity, if it exists, amongst accused. Lord 
Elwyn-Jones, a former Lord Chancellor, has said that: 
" few things give a man or a woman more 
sense of injustice than to receive a penalty 
manifestly more severe than that imposed on 
another accused person where the facts and 
circumstances are broadly similar." (70) 
It is or ought to be a mark of a legal system's degree of 
development that justice to the accused continues to be a 
relevant consideration at all times. 
Mr J A Finch of the University of Leicester said in his very 
helpful book Introduction to Legal Theory that: 
"Those familiar with literary criticism will 
appreciate the way in which differing standards 
maybe applied when one treats the writings of 
another. Two principal methods maybe found by 
which to criticise any piece of writing, whether 
the critic is addressing his assessment to form, 
or to content, or to a mixture of the two. The 
first is to consider whether the project merited 
treatment at all, or in the particular context in 
which it appeared. The second is to consider 
whether it achieved the object intended by its 
author. When contributions to any field of 
knowledge, art or literature, are criticized out 
of hand without regard to the object which the 
author set out to achieve, the second form of 
criticism is ignored at the cost of preconception 
and inaccuracy ... The former approach ... may take 
the form of an inquiry as to whether the object 
undertaken was justified and worthy of treatment, 
in terms of the standards and point of view which 
the critic held even before encountering the 
work which he is now assessing ... This difference 
in approach indicates the distinction between 
subjective and objective analysis." (71) 
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The extent of the problems relating to controlled drugs are such, 
it is submitted, that the wisdom of examining in this work the 
judicial approach cannot be doubted. All trades and professions 
have an interest in the matter on account of the size and 
complexity of what is at base a social problem. As judges strive 
to answer the question of what to sentence drug offenders for, 
the accused are not the only group to be concerned to know what 
that answer is. This work is but a very small part of an 
enormous literature on a developing subject. Twenty years ago 
there would probably not have been sufficient material to allow 
complection of this work even if there had been any interest in 
it. It is impossible now to know what events will be like in 
twenty years from now. Drug offenders, using the term in the 
broadest possible context, cannot be seen as people apart: they 
are, like practitioners in other criminal activities, simply 
part of our society. But, as was observed in a leading article 
in The Times: 
"For rescue from moral and cultural decline 
a society must turn elsewhere than to the 
criminal law." (72) 
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Act are explicit in the words of section 1(2), namely, the drugs 
concerned are those: 
"which are being or appear to (the Council) likely 
to be misused and of which the misuse is having or 
appears to them capable of having harmful effects 
sufficient to constitute a social problem." 
The classification is therefore based on the absolute harmfulness 
of drugs when they are misused. Harmfulness maybe judged 
variously including the point of view of a drug's effects on an 
individual or how far the individual suffering the effects can be 
regarded as a social problem. The Council has recognised that it 
is difficult to give precise definitions to the terms "misuse" 
and "social problem" : 1979 Report Chapter 3 para. 3.6. But is 
this all a matter for judges to consider when sentencing? 
(69) Rock p204. 
(70) 1197SU 2.M.L.J.C. reprinted from (1978) 34 The Magistrate 188. 
(71) Finch pll-12. 
(72) 29 November 1979. 
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Table A 
Schedule 4 to Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971 
SCHEDULE 4 
PRosECUTION AND PuNIsHMENT OF OPPENCIIS 
Punishment 
Section General Nature Mode of 
Creating of Offence Prosecution 
Offence Oass A drug Oass B drug aass C drug 
involved involved involved 
Section 4(2) ... Production, or being concerned (a) Summary . .. 12 months or 12 months or 6 months or 
in the production, of a con- £400, or both. £400, or both. £200, or both. 
trolled drug. (b) On indictment 14 years or a 14 years or a 5 years or a 
fine, or both. fine, or both. fine, or both. 
Section 4(3) ... Supplying or offering to supply (a) Summary . .. 12 months or 12 months or 6 months or 
a controlled drug or being £400, or Qoth. £400, or both. £200, or both. 
concerned in the doing of (b) On indictment 14 years or a 14 years or a 5 years or a 
either activity by another. fine, or both. fine, or both. fine, or both. 
Section 5(2) ... Having possession of a con- (a) Summary ... 12 months or 6 months or 6 months or 
trolled drug. £400, or both. £400, or both. £200, or both. 
(b) On indictment 7 years or a 5 years or a 2 years or a 
fine, or both. fine, or both. fine, or both. 
Section 5(3) ... Having possession of a con- (a) Summary .,. 12 months or 12 months or 6 months or 
trolled drug with intent to £400, or both. £400, or both. £200, or both. 
supply it to another. (b) On indictment 14 years or a 14 years or a 5 years or a 
fine, or both. fine, or both. fine, or both. 
Section 6(2) ... Cultivation of cannabis plant ... (a) Summary ... - - -
(b) On indictment 
- - -
Section 25. 
General 
12 months or 
£400, or both. 
14 years or a 
I 
fine, or both. 
1M 
00 
p 
~ 
f 
"' ~ 
t;:, 
~ CoO 
~ 
I") 
-..... 
'0 
'I 
..... 
Section 8 ... I Being the occupier, or concerned (a) Swnmary 12 months or 12 months or 6 months or 
in the management, of pre- £400, or both. £400, or both. £200, or both. 
mises and pennitting or suffer- (b) On indictment 14 years or a 14 years or a S years or a 
ing certain activities to take fine, or both. fine, or both. fine, or both. 
place there. 
I 
... I (a) Summary .../ Section 9 ... I Offences relating to opium /12 months or 
£400, or both. (b) On indictment 14 years or a 
fine, or both. 
Section 11(2) I Contravention of directions (a) Summary 6 months or 
relating to safe custody of £400, or both. ~ controlled drugs. (b) On indictment 2 years or a 
fine, or both. e.,' e; 
(1) Section 12(6) I Contravention of direction pro- (a) Summary 12 months or 12 months or 6 months or ~ hibiting practitioner etc. from £400, or both. £400, or both. £200, or both. 
possessing, supplying etc. con- (b) On indictment 14 years or a 14 years or a S years or a tl 
... trolled drugs. fine, or both. fine, or both. fine, or both. ~ 
e., 
Section 13(3) I Contravention of direction pro- (a) Summary 12 months or 12 months or 6 months or ~ hibiting practitioner etc. from £400, or both. £400, or both. £200, or both. f') 
-presc:ri bing, supplying etc. (b) On indictment 14 years or a 14 years or a S years or a .... 
controlled drugs. fine, (lr both. fine, or both. fine, or both. '0 ~ 
Section 17(3) I Failure to comply with notice Summary £100. 
requiring infonnation relating 
to prescribing, supply etc. of 
drup. 
Section 17(4) I Giving false information in pur- (a) Summary 6 months or 
ported compliance with notice £400, or both. p 
requiring information relating (b) On indictment 2 years or a ~ to prescribing, lupply etc. of fme, or both. 
drugs. ~ 
• W \0 
C'Il ~ Punishment ~ Section General Nature Modcof 
~ 
Creating of Offence Prosecution Offence 
Oass A drug Class B drug Class C drug General r> involved involved involved 
~ 
Section 18(1) I eonUavention of regulations I <a) S_ ... 
6 months or (other than regulations rela-
£400, or both. ting to addicts). (b) On indictment 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. Section 18(2) I Contravention of terms of licence (a) Summary 
6 months or or other authority (other than 
£400, or both. ~ 
licence issued under regula- (b) On indictment 
2 years or a 
t.," 
tions relating to addicts). 
fine, or both. ~ 
!1:> 
Section 18(3) I Giving false information in pur- (a) Summary 
6 months or ~ 
ported compliance with obli-
£400, or both. b 
gation to give information (b) On indictment 
2 years or a ~ 
imposed under or by virtue of 
fine, or both. 
regulations. 
CoO 
~ 
Section 18(4) I Giving false information, or (a) Summary 
6 months or ~ ... 
prodUCing document etc. con-
£400, or both. ....... 
'0 
taining false statement etc., (b) On indictment 
2 years or a 
'""-I 
for purposes of obtaining issue 
fine, or both. ....... or renewal of a licence or other authority. 
Section 20 I Assisting in or inducing com- (a) Summary 
12 months or mission outside United King-
£400, or both. dom of an offence punishable (b) On indictment 
14 years or a under a corresponding law. 
fine, or both. Section 23(4) I Obstructing exercise of powers (a) Summary 
6 months or of search etc. or COncealing 
£400, or both. boola. drugs etc. (b) On indictment 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. 
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Table B 
Schedule 4 as 
amended to Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971 
- - - -
SCHEDULE 4 
(Section 25) 
A, 'm"d", by 'h, C'imi", La. Ad 1917 ' 27., ,, Md Soh. 5. <h, "' .. i'''''d Co"" Au 1980, 32 (2, "d (51. <h, Crimi", J""" A" 
1982. s. 46 and the Controlled Drugs (Penalties) Act 1985 
PROSECUTION AND P UNISHMENT OF OFFENCES 
-(The preSCribed sum is at present £2.000 . S.l. 1984/447) 
Punishment 
Section 
General Nature 
Mode of 
Creatj~B 
of Offence 
Prosecution Class A drug 
Class B drug 
Class C drug 
General 
Offence 
involved 
involved 
involved 
Section 4(2) 
Production, or being concerned 
(a) Summary 
6 mOnths or 
6 months Or 3 months or 
in the prodUction. of a con-
the prescribed 
the prescribed 
£500. or both. 
trolled drug. 
sum, or both. 
sum. or both. (b) On indictment Life or a 
14 years Or a 
5 years or a fine, Or both. fine, or both. 
fine, or both. 
ection 4(3) 
SupplYing or offering to SUpply 
(a) Summary 
6 months or 
6 months or 3 months or 
a Controlled drug or being 
the prescri bed 
the prescribed 
£500, or both. 
concerned in 
the doing of 
sum, or both. 
sum, or both. 
either activity by another. 
(b) On indictment 
Life or a 
14 years or a 
5 years or a fine, or both. fine, or both. 
fine, or both. 
:tion 5(2) 
HaVing POssession 
of a con- (a) Summary 
6 months Or 3 months or 3 months or 
trol/ed drug. 
the preScribed £500, or both £200. or both. sum, or both. (b) On indictment 
7 years or a 
5 years Or a 2 years or a fine, or both. fine, or both. 
fine, or both. 
~ 
.&lo. 
~ 
<:;. 
~ 
~ 
t1 
~ 
~ 
"" ~ ,., 
... 
.... 
10 
" .... 
~ 
l..J 
Section General Nature Mode of 
Creating of Offence Prosecution Class A drug 
Offence involved 
Section 5( 3) Having possession of a con- (a) Summary 6 months or 
trolled drug with intent to the prescribed 
supply it to another. sum or both. 
(b) On indictment Life or a 
fine, or both. 
Section 6(2) Cultivation of cannabis plant. (a) Summary -
(b) On indictment -
Section 8 Being the occupier, or concerned (a) Summary 6 months or 
in the management, of pre- the prescribed 
mises and permitting or sum or both. 
suffering certain activities to (b) On indictment 14 years or a 
take place there. fine, or both. 
Section 9 Offences relating to opium (a) Summary -
(b) On indictment -
Section 11 (2 Contravention of directions (a) Summary -
relating to safe custody of 
controlled drugs. 
(b) On indictment -
Punishment 
Class B drug Class C drug 
involved involved 
6 months or 3 months or 
the prescribed £500, or both. 
sum or both. 
14 years or a 5 years or a 
fine, or both. fine, or both. 
- -
- -
6 months or 3 months or 
the prescribed £500, both. 
sum or both. 
14 years or a 5 years or a 
fine, or both. fine, or both. 
- -
- -
- -
- -
General 
6 months or 
the prescribed 
sum or both. 
14 years or a 
fine, or both. 
6 months or 
the prescribed 
sum or both. 
14 years or a 
fine, or both. 
6 months or 
the prescribed 
sum, or both. 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. 
~ 
.a:o. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ s;<. 
.... 
.... 
.... 
t 
~*-'l..4C.§,4.N"".iji§l'J'l$¥i.H>"'i!?*,* .. Cj~I· ,.i'!"'""-:'?' ...... ,. 5 
Section General Nature Mode of 
Creating of Offence Prosecution Class A drug 
Offence involved 
Section 12(6) Contravention of direction PH)· (a) Summary 6 months or 
hibiting practitioner etc. from the prescri bed 
possessing, supplying, etc. sum or both. 
controlled drugs. (b) On indictment 14 years or a 
fine, or both. 
Section 13(3) Contravention of direction pro- (a) Summary 6 months or 
hibiting practitioner, etc. from the prescribed 
prescribing, supplying, etc. sum or both. 
controlled drugs. (b) On indictment 14 years or a 
fine, or both. 
Section 17(3) Failure to comply with notice Summary -
requiring information relating 
to prescribing, supply, etc. of 
drugs. 
Section 17(4) Giving false information in pur- (a) Summary -
ported compliance with notice 
requiring information relating 
to prescribing, supply, etc. of (b) On indictment -
drugs. 
Section 18(1) Contravention of regulations (a) Summary -
(other than regulations relat-
ing to addicts). 
(b) On indictment -
33 By s. 46(1) Criminal Justice Act 1982 the penalty is at Level 3 of the standard scale-at 
present £400 (S.I. 1984/447) 
Punishment 
Class B drug Class C drug 
involved involved 
6 months or 3 months or 
the prescribed £500, or both. 
sum or both. 
14 years or a 5 years or a 
fine, or both. fine, or both. 
6 months or 3 months or 
the prescribed £500 or both. 
sum or both. 
14 years or a 5 years or a 
fine, or both. fine, or both. 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
General 
See note 33 
6 months or 
the prescribed 
sum or both. 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. 
6 months or 
the prescri bed 
sum or both. 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. 
~ 
VI 
~ ;;;. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
'=' 
.... 
<§ 
'" A 
..., 
... 
..... 
'0 
" ..... 
W 
?'" 
~ 
Section General Nature Mode of 
Creating of Offence Prosecution Class A drug 
Offence involved 
Section 18(2) Contravention of terms of licence (a) Summary 
-
or other authority (other than 
licence issued under regula-
tions relating to addicts). (b) On indictment 
-
Section 18(3 Giving false information in pur- (a) Summary 
-
ported compliance with 
obligation to give information 
imposed under or by virtue of (b) On indictment 
-
regulations. 
Section 18(4 Giving false information, or (a) Summary 
-
producing document, etc. con-
taining false statement, etc., 
for purposes of obtaining issue (b) On indictment -
or renewal of a licence or other 
authority. 
Section 20 Assisting in or inducing com- (a) Summary 
-
mission outside United King-
. dom of an offence punishable 
under a corresponding law. (b) On indictment 
-
Section 23(4) Obstructing exercise of powers (a) Summary 
-
of search, etc., or concealing 
books, drugs, etc. 
(b) On indictment 
-
Punishment 
Class 8 drug Class C drug 
involved involved 
-
-
- -
- -
-
-
-
-
- -
-
-
-
-
- -
-
-
General 
6 months or 
the prescribed 
sum or both. 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. 
6 months or 
the prescri bed 
sum or both. 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. 
6 months or 
the prescribed 
sum or both. 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. 
6 months or 
the prescribed 
sum or both. 
14 years or a 
fine, or both. 
6 months or 
the prescribed 
sum or both. 
2 years or a 
fine, or both. 
~ 
~ 
::t... 
:g 
~ 
~ !:<. 
.... 
.... 
.... 
~ 
'" 
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Table C 
Extract One 
Potas and Walker 
"Sentencing the Federal 
Drug Offender" (1983) 
00 Drug 
01 type of drug 
02 Cfuantity of drug 
03 value of drug 
04 quality of drug 
10 Nature of drug 
--
112. 
LIST I 
50 Offender 
5l prior drug criminal record 
52 bad character, incl. non-drug 
offences 
53 prior good character/first 
off.~nder 
54 unemployed 
55 drug addict 
11 as a 'lead' to hard drugs 
12 a comparatively harmless drug 
13 a highly destructive or harmful drug 
56 on parole/probation/bond at time 
of offence 
57 under influence of drugs/alcohol 
at time of offence 
58 age of offender 14 drug as a serious social evil 
15 user/addict involved in crime 
16 corruptive, filthy, detestable, 
vile, wretched 
7 as a 'lead' to crime 
o Purpose of Offence 
1 trafficking for commercial gain 
2 for personal use 
high profit expectation 
trafficking in general 
Nature of offence 
premeditated/planned 
spontaneous 
involving co-offender/s 
offence carried out alone 
syndicate/organized or 
professional crime 
large scale/major offence 
small scale offence 
use of violence, incl. use of 
weapon 
59 alien or ethnic background 
60 mental instability or disorder 
61 phYSical illness or handicap 
62 familial, domestic circumstances 
63 preSSures (unspeCified) 
70 Other 
71 effect of sentence on offender's 
employment prospects 
72 'free' to do what one Wishes 
73 lack of affirmat.ive eVidence 
74 degree of cooperation with 
authorities 
75 remorse 
76 prospects for rehab.ilitation 
77 guilty plea 
78 delay 
79 no reasons g.iven for sentence 
80 prevalence of drug use 
81 isolated offence 
82 trafficking to support own habit 
83 time already Spent in jail 
offender threatened with 
violence to comply with 
importation 
84 influence of other on offender 
90 conversion to religion 
91 ambivalence to gravity of 
trafficking 
Offender's role 
principal/instigator 
minor role 
courier 
mere paid agent 
mere physical Control, incl. 
having no knowledge of drugs 
etermined by factors beyond 
ffender's control 
lative less significant 
nco-offenders 
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Table D 
Extract Two 
Potas and Walker 
"Sentencing the 
Fedral Drug Offender" 
(1983) 
40. 
TABLE 6: FACTORS CITED IN 10 CASES OR MORE 
--------------------
actor Label Number of Citations % of Cases 
Mainly Mainly 
Aggrav. Mitigat. 
-_._------------_._---------------
F21 86 34.0 
rior good character/ 
irst offender F53 80 31.1 
antity of drug F02 75 29.6 
remeditated/planned F31 55 21.7 
egree of co-operation 
th Authorities F74 52 20.6 
of drug F01 48 19.0 
F76 33 13.0 
lty plea F77 31 12.3 
expectation F23 29 1l.S 
of offender FS8 27 10.7 
destructive drug F13 26 10.3 
FSS 25 9.9 
drug F03 24 9.5 
F43 21 8.3 
spent in 
F83 21 8.3 
ncipal/instigator F41 21 8.3 
ly/domestic 
rcumstances F62 19 7.5 
serious social evil F14 19 7.5 
volving co-offenders F33 18 7.1 
for personal use F22 17 6.7 
rse F7S 15 5.9 
fender's role in 
neral F40 13 5.1 
ior drug criminal 
cord F51 12 4.7 
lay in court hearing F78 12 4.7 
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.~ '.f' I 
Table E 
sentencing Table: 
Richard Lord 
"Controlled Drugs: 
Law and Practice" 
(1984) 
5 Sentencing Table 
Section creating NatureD! Class A Class B 
offence offence 
CEMA • ... evasion of Heroin etc. up to £100,000, Small amounts, as for 
1979. s. 170(2) prohibition on 7 years and up appro- possession . 
importation ... priatdy to £lm, 12-14 Less than 20 kgs , 
years. l'h-3 years. 
Seldom less than 4 years for Medium quantities, 3-
appreciable amount. ' years. 
Not necessarily less for Large scale , up to 
cocaine or LSD.2 10 years. 
MDA,s. 4(2) Production (Usually applies to LSD), (Usuallyamphetamim 
7-13 years if large scale . 3 analogous to 
importation ." 
MDA.s. 4(3) Supply/Offer to Seldom less than 3 years. Large quantities up to 
supply May incur sentences similar 10 years. 
to importers. ' Otherwise 1-4 years. 
MDA,s. 5(2) Possession No general rule . Prison Fine often sufficient. 
often appropriate. ' Persistent flouting ma: 
lead to imprisonment. 
MDA, s. 5(3) Possession with As for supplier. As for supplier. 5 
intent to supply 
MDA,s. 6 Cultivation of If commercial motive or 
cannabis distribution , as for 
supplier. If not , as for 
possession .6 
MDA,s. 8 .... Permitting Depends on activity 
premises ... permitted.7 
MDS,s. 20 Involvement in Depends on nature of 
foreign offences offence . 
I A ramah (1983)76Cr App Rep 190. 2 Virgin (1983) 5 Cr App Rep (5) 148. J 8011(1979) 1 Cr App R. 
(5) 218: McCulloch (1982) 4 Cr App Rep (5) 98. • Rubinst~in & Grandison (1982) 4 Cr App Rep (5) 
202 . ' If a defendant is acquitted of a charge under section 5(3) or if the prosecution accept a not guilty 
plea to such a charge. he must not be sentenced on the basis that he is a supplier: Spires (infra) . • See 
St~arn (1982) 4 Cr App Rep (5) 195: Lawr~ncdI981) 3 Cr App Rep (5) 49. 7 Even permitting premise 
to be used for smoking cannabis. the least serious section 8 offence . will usually merit a custodial 
sentence: Spires . 17 November 1983. CA (unreported). 
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